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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Jeanne, Coulibaly Yekeleya. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2011. Diversification 
or Cotton Recovery in the Malian Cotton Zone: Effects on Households and Women. 
 
 
 
This dissertation investigates income diversification alternatives from the cotton 
economy and compares those initiatives with present policy measures to restore the 
cotton sector in Mali. It also derives the welfare implications for women of these various 
policy measures.  
During the decade preceding 2011, farmers’ incomes in the cotton zone of Mali 
have been significantly affected by the downturn of the cotton economy explained by 
many factors including the low farm gate cotton price, the declining cotton yields and soil 
fertility concerns. In 2011, the Malian government substantially increased the farm gate 
cotton price as a result of the world cotton price hikes and to stimulate a revival of the 
domestic cotton industry. Also for the main crops, farmers had access to a 24 percent 
fertilizer subsidy relatively to the market price as the government wants to intensify 
agricultural production by improving soil fertility levels and raising crop yields.  
With a farm household model that allows producers to make decisions at several 
points in time, we evaluated farmers’ response to the government cotton pricing policy 
and compared the income effect resulting from this latter policy with the adoption of 
improved agricultural sorghum technologies plus marketing strategies. Then, we further 
simulated the effects of the elimination of the fertilizer subsidy and the predicted 
reduction in cotton farm gate price by 8 percent because the economic conditions of 2011 
are expected to be temporary. The welfare implications on women of these various 
policies were lastly derived.  
xiii 
Results showed that the substantial increase in cotton prices and access to 
fertilizer subsidy are very effective policies that will substantially boost the expansion of 
cotton area and farmers’ incomes. Maize will also benefit significantly from the increase 
in cotton farm gate price. With the availability of the improved sorghum technologies and 
marketing strategies, farmers’ incomes are further enhanced by 21 percent leading to 
more income diversification. The expected 8 percent decline in the cotton price will 
essentially be detrimental to cotton production as farmers will divert cotton land and 
fertilizer use to sorghum. Moreover, the removal of the fertilizer subsidy will seriously 
constrain intensive crop production and result in a sizable reduction in household wealth 
by 21 percent but diversification into sorghum will become an important part of the crop 
mix.  
Overall, the most profitable economic opportunity for the household is not the 
most beneficial for women. Women are made better off with the adoption of less labor 
intensive technologies on the communal plot. So, there is need to focus more on women’s 
specific welfare enhancing policies including access to better lands and inputs, reduction 
of their labor requirements in agriculture and household activities.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Problem Statement 
Agricultural technology introduction and marketing strategies are the main 
policies to stimulate agricultural growth in sub-Saharan countries. In these countries, 
agricultural development is constrained by low soil fertility, but water management 
techniques and improved cultivars are also critical (Sanders et al. 1996). Hence, it is not 
surprising that research programs have emphasized the diffusion of technologies based on 
inorganic fertilizers, high yielding varieties, and water retention techniques.  
In Southern Mali, diffusion of new varieties of sorghum cultivars combined with 
increasing use of fertilizer and water retention techniques have been growing during the 
past decades to respond to soil fertility constraints (Ayele and Wield 2005). This 
diffusion process for new technologies of cereals (maize and sorghum) has also  
accelerated recently with farmers’ disillusion from declining world cotton prices before 
2010 (Baquedano et al. 2010). The downward trend in the world cotton price was due to 
the cost reduction and output expansion effects due to the introduction of transgenic 
cotton, Bt cotton in the major cotton producers, combined with the reduction of the 
system of guaranteed cotton price by the Malian parastatal company (Droy 2008) as well 
as the competition from synthetics.  
The declining cotton price has encouraged Malian farmers to move away from 
cotton to cereal technologies including sorghum. Farmers are diversifying away from 
cotton through an increase in area and improved inputs allocated to the production of 
cereals. In the cotton zone, cotton production and area cultivated over the past decade has 
dramatically decreased by 80 percent (see figure 2.1) while maize and sorghum areas 
2 
have increased by 143 and 18 percent
1
 (Malian Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). Some of 
the fertilizer allocated as credit for cotton is presently being diverted to cereals especially 
maize but including sorghum. 
However, limited access to financial resources and cereal price collapses at 
harvest, have an impact on farmers’ willingness to adopt new cereal technologies. 
Farmers operate in an environment characterized by variability in rainfall and grain 
market price collapses (Vitale and Sanders 2005). There are three types of price collapses 
faced by staples in developing countries.
2
 These three price collapses reduce the expected 
prices, hence the expected incomes. Hence, marketing strategies to moderate or eliminate 
the price collapses are expected to increase the incentive to introduce new technologies.  
In 2010, the world cotton market experienced a historic price spike characterized 
by an 80 percent increase compared to the world price in 2009 (ICAC 2010). This price 
surge is explained by the adverse impact of flood on cotton production in China, one of 
the largest cotton producers and consumers. Thus, the Malian government decided to 
raise the farm gate cotton price by 36 percent
3
 in nominal terms for the 2011 crop season. 
This price increase had no precedent in the history of cotton in Mali over the past 15 
years. Through this price policy the government expects to stimulate a large supply 
response from producers and revamp the domestic cotton industry.  
Also, with the potential increased income following adoption of new technologies 
and marketing innovations in cereals, there is a need to investigate how decisions are 
made within the household and the impact of the increased income on women’s welfare. 
A large body of literature argues that women may not benefit from adoption of 
                                                          
1
 Millet area has even doubled during the last decade, which is a symptom here of soil fertility depletion.  
2
 Prices collapse annually at harvest because famers need cash then and generally have limited storage 
availability. Prices collapse in good and sometimes even normal rainfall years because there are few 
alternative markets for food staples and an inelastic demand for them. In poor rainfall years when prices 
start increasing rapidly, governments frequently intervene and drive down prices. Then the question is: 
Without a marketing strategy to overcome some of these price collapses, when can farmers make money? 
3
 In 2011, the price has been raised to 255 F CFA/kg from the 185 F CFA/kg in 2010. The exchange rate 
presently (May 2011) is 452 F CFA/kg. 
 
3 
agricultural technologies on the communal family land because of the additional labor 
requirements thereby reducing their labor available for their main source of income 
“women’s private plots” (Kumar 1987, Gladwin and McMillan 1989, Lilja and Sanders 
1998). In fact, the positive effects from technological change on the communal land on 
women’s income may be reduced or eliminated by the decrease in labor availability for 
their private plots.
4
  
Thus, there are two main problems addressed in this dissertation. First, what are 
the household income effects of further diversification of the cotton economy and how do 
these compare with the present and potential policy measures being implemented to 
revamp the cotton economy? Secondly, how would these various changes in technology, 
marketing and policy affect the welfare of women (and by implication children)?  
 
 
 
1.2 Objectives  
The specific objectives of this thesis are: 
1. Estimate the income effect of the government cotton pricing policy and fertilizer 
subsidy program. These are the innovations of Malian cotton policy in 2011. 
2. What happens to the cotton sector and to diversification when the cotton price 
comes back down to its recent levels and the fertilizer subsidy on cotton is eliminated?  
3. Evaluate the impact of new sorghum technology and better marketing practices on 
household income. Besides the yield effect following the adoption of improved 
agricultural technology, farmers have been recommended various new marketing 
strategies. What is the impact of these technology and marketing changes individually 
and collectively? 
4. Estimate the impact of fertilizer subsidies on the adoption of sorghum technology-
marketing policy and on household incomes. In 2011, the fertilizer subsidy program was 
extended to sorghum and millet as opposed to the previous years where it only targeted 
                                                          
4
 However, a complete welfare analysis would need also to consider the welfare benefits to women from 
the increased household expenditures made possible by the technological change. 
4 
maize, cotton and rice. We consider the impact of the technology-marketing changes with 
the addition of this fertilizer subsidy and what happens when it is removed. 
5. Estimate the welfare implications for women from the adoption of improved 
sorghum technology-marketing innovations and the changes in the cotton policy.  
 
 
 
1.3 Organization of the Research 
This dissertation is organized as follows:  
After the introduction, a descriptive analysis of farm production systems and 
socio-economic characteristics of farm households in the geographical setting is 
presented in the second chapter. Next, the third chapter lays out the improved sorghum 
technologies and marketing strategies diffused by the IER-INTSORMIL program in 
Mali. These technologies and marketing strategies will be the center of our analysis in 
this research work. The fourth chapter develops the modeling framework and data used to 
analyze the income effects of agricultural policies and marketing strategies. We discuss 
the stochastic environment in which farmers make their decisions by analyzing variability 
in yields and prices with secondary aggregate data. A stochastic sequential programming 
model is used as the modeling framework and the model results are discussed in three 
consecutive chapters. From these results, the welfare implications regarding the impact of 
the cotton policy and sorghum technology-marketing innovation on women are analyzed 
in the eighth chapter. Lastly, the conclusion and policy implications of the research work 
are presented in a final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY AREA 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the farm production system and socio-economic 
characteristics of the farm households in the study area. The farming and economic 
characteristics of the households in the study area will be used to construct the modeling 
framework and to validate the model’s results in subsequent chapters. The analysis is 
based on farm household data collected during a field survey for the crop year 2008/2009 
and data consistency was checked during additional field visits in 2010 and 2011. The 
primary data collection was complemented by aggregate data in the study area. The 
chapter begins by presenting the geographical location, land use and soils types of the 
study area. Then, it documents the traditional cropping systems of the average farm 
household and the cotton farm gate price fixation mechanism.  In a third section, the 
chapter discusses the traditional crop yields in the study area and issues of fertilizer 
supply. The chapter ends by analyzing the demographic and economic characteristics of 
the sample surveyed.   
 
 
 
2.2. Geographical Location, Land Use and Soil Types 
The Koutiala cercle (equivalent French name in Mali for district) is located in the 
Sikasso region of southern Mali near the neighboring countries of Ivory Coast and 
Burkina Faso. This cercle is an old cotton zone. The rapid population growth has resulted 
in an extension of area cultivated and an increase in the livestock herd size in order to 
meet the increasing demand for food. The long time practice of cotton culture and 
unsustainable land management has led to soil depletion and a reduction in the traditional 
fallow systems (Kaya and Nair 2001). Land in the Koutiala cercle is a scarce resource. 
6 
So, the resulting land scarcity combined with the poor quality of soils in the district make 
imperative the introduction and diffusion of intensive technologies.  
This is why since 2006, the IER-INTSORMIL project has disseminated in many 
villages of the cercle, an improved technological package of sorghum composed of high-
yielding sorghum cultivars, moderate use of fertilizer and intensive agricultural practices. 
The village of study selected for this research is Garasso. This village is the most 
successful site for the adoption and diffusion of the sorghum technologies in Koutiala.  
In Garasso sorghum is produced on all three topographic levels: plateau, slope 
and lowlands. The soils range from clay, loam sandy and sandy soils. Sandy soils have 
very low organic matter and infiltration capacity. Due to their poor level of fertility and 
poor water retention capacity, sandy soils are mainly cropped to millet which tolerates 
better low soil fertility and water scarcity than the other crops and is concentrated on the 
plateau and slopes. Clay and loam sandy soils are of higher quality and sorghum responds 
better in these soils. They are used to cultivate cotton, maize and sorghum often grown in 
rotation. 
 
 
 
2.3 Traditional Cropping Systems and Cotton Farm Gate Price 
 The crop season in the study area starts usually with the first rains which occur 
generally in the end of May. The agricultural campaign takes place during the rainy 
season. It starts in June with the planting activities and ends in December by the harvest.  
The traditional crops grown by farmers are sorghum, millet, maize, cotton, peanut 
and cowpea. Cotton is the first crop to be planted in June followed by maize and the other 
grains and beans. Maize harvest occurs in August and September prior to the other crops’ 
harvest which is realized from October to December. Maize is considered to be a 
“soudure” (hungry season) crop because it can be consumed during the period before 
harvest when the food supply is most scarce.  
The results in table 2.1 show that currently, the average farm size is estimated at 
15 hectares per household. Under the traditional technologies, farmers on average 
allocate 4 hectares of land to cotton, 5 ha of sorghum, 3 hectares to maize and millet. Half 
7 
a hectare is devoted to peanut. Cowpea is not often grown by farmers. Those who do 
plant it allocate very small areas of land and use the harvest to feed animals. The new 
sorghum cultivar is grown on a pilot land of one hectare on average. So, the main crops 
cultivated in the farming system are cotton, maize, sorghum and millet and they will be 
the core crops that will be analyzed in the farm model. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1: Areas and Yields of the Main Crops Cultivated in the Crop Year 2008/2009 
 
                                                                         Area cultivated in hectare                  Yields                                                                                                                                    
Crops                                                                                                                          (kg/ha) 
Cotton                                   4.2                                           1,278 
Maize 
 
                                2.8                                           1,789 
Traditional Sorghum                                 3.4                                           1,376 
Improved sorghum                                 1.3                                           1,658 
Millet 
 
                                2.8                                           1,276 
Peanut 
 
                                0.5                                             544 
Cowpea 
 
                                   0 
Total                                 15.1 
Source: Primary Survey Data 
Sample: 57 farmers interviewed 
 
 
 
Garasso, like the other villages in the cercle of Koutiala, has been traditionally a 
cotton growing area. During the flourishing years of cotton, from 1970 to the end of the 
1990s, cotton was by far the main cash crop in the farming system. Since the end of the 
1990s, the cotton economy has become less competitive with the declining world cotton 
prices and the reduction of agricultural subsidy in the Malian cotton industry. Cotton area 
and production have dropped by 80 percent in the decade from 1998 to 2008 (see figure 
2.1) whereas the area planted for sorghum and millet have respectively increased by 18 
percent and more than 100 percent (Malian Ministry of Agriculture 2009). The increase 
in areas for the cereals as represented in figure 2.2 reflects an increasing productivity for 
these crops. Moreover, presently with the collapse of the cotton economy, producers are 
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diversifying away from cotton and are becoming increasingly interested in growing 
intensively maize, sorghum
5
 and millet for consumption and marketing. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Cotton Area and Production in Koutiala (Mali), from 1998 to 2008. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Mali 
 
                                                          
5
 Traditionally sorghum has been considered a subsistence crop a type of insurance policy for poor yields of 
millet. Increasingly there are new markets for sorghum as a food and feed. 
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Figure 2.2: Area Planted to Sorghum, Millet and Maize from 1998 to 2008 in Koutiala 
(Mali) 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Mali 
 
 
 
The farm gate cotton price in Mali plays a key role in farmers’ land allocation and 
has been generally dependent on the variations in the world cotton market. The farm gate 
cotton price is fixed at the beginning of the cropping season by the CMDT, (Compagnie 
Malienne de Développement du Textile). The CMDT is a parastatal cotton company in 
charge of research, extension and marketing of cotton since 1974. This company is 
primarily focused on the cotton industry and supplies production inputs on credit to 
cotton producers and purchases the cotton production after harvest. The CMDT purchases 
4 to 5 months after harvest the cotton seed at a pan-territorial guaranteed price announced 
at the beginning of the planting season. Cotton seed is then ginned by the CMDT ginning 
companies and sold in international markets.  
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The price fixing process for cotton evolved over time. From 1974 to 1989 prices 
were fixed by the government solely. Then, from 1989 to 2004, farmers ’organizations 
became engaged in the negotiation process and a minimum guaranteed cotton seed 
purchase price was established. The minimum guaranteed cotton price was fixed at 200 F 
CFA/kg ($US/kg 0.44) and at 210 F CFA/kg ($US/kg 0.46) for the top quality cotton 
seed. In 2005, with donors’ pressure on the Malian government, the CMDT and 
farmers’organisations defined a new policy directly linking the farm gate cotton prices in 
Mali to the international cotton price. However, the full variation in the international 
cotton price was not transmitted directly to Malian farmers (Baquedano et al. 2010). 
Some agreements between the CMDT and the representatives of farmers’organizations 
specified the share of the international cotton price that will be paid to farmers and that 
kept by the CMDT for any investment and management expenditures. The farm gate 
price paid to farmers depends on their negotiation power and the government legislation 
on the cotton seed price floor and price ceiling (Nubukpo and Keita 2005). With this new 
policy, the cotton price ranged between 160 F CFA/kg ($US/kg 0.35) and 200 F CFA/kg 
up to the crop year 2010-2011 when the cotton price was raised to 231 F CFA/kg 
($US/kg 0.51) following a spike in the world cotton market. This unprecedented increase 
in the world market resulted from poor harvest and demand expansion in China. Figure 
2.3 below traces variation in the real price
6
 of the farm gate cotton seed from 1980 to 
2011. We can easily identify the downward trend in prices from the 1990s up to the 
recent year of 2011 characterized by the upswing of the cotton seed price. It is needless to 
say that cotton farmers’ incomes have been also significantly reduced over the period of 
declining cotton prices. 
A central concern of this thesis is the impact of cereal technology introduction 
from the various prices for cotton. In the long run we expect Mali to continuously lose 
market share if it does not adopt Bt cotton as is already being done in more than 40 
percent of world cotton production. 
                                                          
6
 The real cotton seed price has been obtained by deflating the nominal prices using the GDP deflator with 
2008 as the base year. Deflating the nominal cotton seed prices with the fertilizer prices would have been 
ideal. But we didn’t have fertilizer prices for a very long time series (1980 to 2009). 
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Figure 2.3: Real Cotton Prices in Mali from 1980 to 2011 (Base Year=2008) 
Source: CMDT 
 
 
 
2.4. Traditional Crop Yields and Fertilizer Supply 
Crop yields depend on soil fertility as well as on the annual amount and 
distribution of rainfall. Under the traditional technologies, maize and cotton principally 
benefit from the application of inorganic fertilizer on a regular basis. Traditionally, 150 
kg/ha of NPK, 50 kg/ha of Urea, 3l/ha of herbicide and 2 l/ha of insecticide are applied 
on cotton field. Maize receives 100 kg/ha of NPK and Urea as well as 2l/ha of herbicide. 
Since cotton and maize are the only crops that benefit from chemical fertilizer in the 
traditional farming system, it is expected that competition will take place between these 
two crops in the demand for fertilizer. 
The fertilizer inputs for maize and production inputs for cotton (seeds, fertilizer, 
herbicide and pesticides) are supplied by the CMDT. In addition to the cotton sector, the 
CMDT has for two decades extended the supply of fertilizer loans to cereals, principally 
maize which is very demanding of plant nutrients and weed control. Farmers are required 
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to reimburse the input credit for both cotton and cereals in cotton value after harvest. The 
loan reimbursement constraint will be a key component of the model formulation since it 
will have an impact on farmers land allocation.  
The CMDT purchases fertilizer from private suppliers and delivers the inputs to 
farmers at the farm gate. Transportation costs are paid by the CMDT. Farmers have the 
opportunity to purchase fertilizer directly from private suppliers. However, the input 
loans from the CMDT do not require the farmers to pay transportation or transaction 
costs. Also, the access to input loans releases the liquidity constraint that farmers often 
face for the input purchase at the beginning of the cropping season.  
The cost of fertilizer supplied by the CMDT is generally dependent on market 
prices and government fertilizer policy. Over the past decade, the nominal price of NPK 
has increased at an annual average rate of 8 percent, the Urea price has risen by 7 percent 
per year, insecticides prices were almost constant whereas the herbicides prices increased 
by 6 percent per year (Diakite et al. 2009). But in 2008, fertilizer (NPK and Urea) costs 
spiked in Mali as in the rest of the world. Fertilizer costs in 2008 were 40 percent higher 
than the cost in 2006. This surge in the price of fertilizer was due to a boom in the world 
demand for cereals and oil. The sharp increase of the world fertilizer prices halted in 
2009 and 2010 but during those years the Malian government subsidized the cost of 
fertilizer for cotton and maize while fertilizer for sorghum and millet remained at their 
market prices.  
In 2011, the fertilizer subsidy program was extended to sorghum and millet. The 
market prices for fertilizer during that latter year rose steadily to resume with their climb, 
similarly to the world market. Table 2.2 reports the cost of fertilizer for cotton and cereals 
supplied by the CMDT over the five past years. The fertilizer subsidy program will 
undoubtedly increase yields and stimulate area expansion but in the international context 
of fewer government interventions, this policy might not be very sustainable in the long 
run. It will therefore be interesting to investigate with the model the effects with and 
without the fertilizer subsidy program on farmers’ decision making and income. 
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Table 2.2: Cotton Prices in Real Terms and Fertilizer Costs supplied by CMDT from 
2007 to 2011 
 
Years Cotton Prices Fertilizer Costs for Cotton Fertilizer Costs for Cereals 
 
(F CFA/kg) 
NPKBS Urea NPK Urea 
(F CFA/kg) (F CFA/kg) (F CFA/kg) (F CFA/kg) 
2007 174 283 242 259 242 
($/kg) ( 0.38) ( 0.63) ( 0.53) ( 0.57) ( 0.53) 
2008 200 369 380 351 380 
($/kg) ( 0.44) ( 0.82) ( 0.84) ( 0.78) ( 0.84) 
2009 164 259 259 259 259 
($/kg) ( 0.36) ( 0.57) ( 0.57) ( 0.57) ( 0.57) 
2010 172 250 250 250 250 
($/kg) ( 0.38) ( 0.55) ( 0.55) ( 0.55) ( 0.55) 
2011 231 243 243 243 243 
($/kg) ( 0.51) ( 0.54) ( 0.54) ( 0.54) ( 0.54) 
Source: CMDT, 2011. 
 
 
 
Traditional yields for the year 2009 of the main crops grown by the sample of 
farmers are summarized in table 2.3 and compared with aggregate yield data assembled at 
the district level by the Malian Ministry of Agriculture.  
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Farm Level and Aggregate Yield Data in the Study Area 
 
  Maize Sorghum Millet Cotton 
  (kg/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) (kg/ha) 
Farmers' Yield 2008 1789 1376 1276 1278 
Aggregate data in 2008 2500 1500 1250 1134 
Average Aggregate data* 1832 1047 987 981 
Note: *The average aggregate data is a 10 year average data from 1998 to 2008. 
 
 
 
From the sample of producers surveyed, traditional maize yields are by far the 
highest among all crops. This is also confirmed with the aggregate data. Yield increase 
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for maize has been impressive over the past 10 years (figure 2.4) compared to cotton, 
sorghum and millet. The growth in maize productivity is the result of successful research 
efforts invested in this crop during the past decades from CIMMYT in collaboration with 
the national agricultural research program, IER. Surprisingly, despite the extension 
services provided by the CMDT, cotton yields have been stagnant and even falling in 
spite of the continuing use of high inputs. With declining cotton yields and increasing 
maize productivity farmers have been diverting cotton fertilizer from the cotton fields 
onto the cereals. Cotton still remains the main source of cash income for farmers. One of 
the reasons of farmers’ constant interest in cotton is the benefits that they can get from 
growing cotton in the form of access to credit and fertilizer. Moreover, fertilization has a 
residual effect on the cereals in the crop rotation system. Also as contrasted with the grain 
prices volatility and harvest price collapse, cotton offers stable returns with the minimum 
guarantee cotton prices. Hence, greater access to fertilizer credit for the cereals and 
adoption of grain marketing strategies to increase return on marketing are expected to 
reinforce farmers’ interest for cereals at the expense of cotton. 
Sorghum and Millet yields are not impressive because these crops are 
traditionally grown without inorganic fertilizers except for the residual effects following 
cotton in the rotation. Thereby, the use of improved inputs on those two cereals appears 
to be essential for an increase in the traditional yields.  
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Figure 2.4: Aggregate Cotton Yields and Cereals from 1998 to 2008 in Koutiala, Mali 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Mali 
 
 
 
Rainfall in the area is not a severe constraint to agricultural productivity. The 
cercle of Koutiala is known as a high rainfall area. The average amount of rainfall from 
1980 to 2009 is estimated at 800 mm (Direction Nationale de la Meteorologie 2009). In 
terms of annual quantity of rainfall, only 10 percent of the number of years since 1980 
can be identified as poor rainfall years, while 90 percent are identified as normal and 
good years of production. This region encounters flooding as in the years 1994 and 2010. 
This is an especially serious problem for maize and sorghum as they are concentrated on 
the lowlands. So, excess rainfall is a factor that needs to be taken into consideration in 
explaining yield variability.  
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2.5 Socio-economic Characteristics of the Representative Farmers 
Based on the results of the field survey of 54 farm households, the socio-
economic characteristics of the representative farmer in the study area were defined. The 
sampling was done randomly from a population of 100 farmers who participated in the 
IER-INTSORMIL project for the diffusion of the improved sorghum technology.  
 
 
 
2.5.1 Household Social Characteristics 
In the sample of household heads surveyed, the average age of household heads is 
57 years old (table 2.4). Households are extended families with on average 27 people 
living together among which 14 people are above 15 years old. Field labor is basically 
family based. On average, 10 household members work full time on the fields. In 
Garasso, it is very common for adult males to migrate seasonally out of the farm. In each 
family, an average of 2 people worked off farm seasonally in larger cities of Mali or in 
neighboring coastal countries (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea). These migrants come 
back to the farm to perform the farming activities required in the agricultural season.  
Household heads interviewed have little formal education. Most of them do not have any 
level of school education either in French or Arabic (table 2.4). 
The main cereals consumed are by order of importance sorghum, millet and 
maize. But these grains are perfectly substitutable in consumption. During the interviews, 
farmers revealed their preference for millet and maize but the amount of maize consumed 
is limited by the cost of the purchased inputs for maize production. This preference for 
maize is consumption is expected to influence the crop allocation in response to a 
fertilizer subsidy. Household daily grain consumption is estimated on average at 25 kg 
per household or 0.93 kg per person per day.  
One of the most important farming goals stated by producers is the need to meet 
the subsistence consumption level every year. Thereby in the model construction, this 
objective will be specified as a priority for farmers before maximizing their profits. 
Households own a large number of cattle with an average of 20 animals per 
family. In fact, cattle represent a main asset for farmers. Farmers invest their cash 
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earnings in cattle which are considered as savings. Cattle play also a key role in the 
farming systems. They provide the manure used as organic fertilizer on the crops and the 
power in animal traction farm operations. They are important sources of cash for 
financing the agricultural inputs for sorghum and millet and for some emergency family 
expenses especially at the beginning of the cropping season where farmers often are 
facing a liquidity constraint.  
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Household Characteristics 
 
  Household Characteristics   Mean 
Age of the household head 
 
  57 
Number of people in the household below 15 years 
 
  13 
Number of people in the household between 15 years and 35 years old 9 
Number of people between 35 years and 65 years old 5 
Number of people above 65 years   1 
Total number of people in the household   27 
Number of people working full time on the field 10 
Number of migrants 
  
  2 
Education level of household members   0 
Household grain consumption (kg) 
Number of Cattle 
 
25 
20 
Source: Primary Survey Data 
Sample: 54 farmers interviewed 
      
 
 
2.5.2 Agricultural Inputs Financing 
Farmers use several sources of liquidity to finance agricultural inputs such as 
fertilizer, seeds, agricultural equipment and hired labor used during the rainy season. 
These financial resources originate from livestock sales, crop sales, non-farm work, 
remittances, and input loans for both cotton and the improved sorghum variety (table 
2.3). Eighty four percent of the input expenses come from the cotton and maize credit 
borrowed from the CMDT. Seven percent originate from the improved sorghum credit 
contracted with the producer’s cooperative working under the IER-INTSORMIL 
program. The remaining input expenses come by order of importance from the sales of 
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crops (cotton, fruit trees, and grain), livestock and non-farm work. During the rainy 
season, few non-farm activities are performed because farmers are busy working on the 
fields. Producers are only able to devote time to non-farm work during the low labor 
demand periods of the agricultural season and during the dry season. Examples of these 
non-farm work are mechanic (bicycle and motorcycle repair), small food or clothing 
retailing activities, and blacksmith. The revenue from non-farm activities are small but 
represent a source of income diversification to help households to smooth consumption 
over time and to meet some of their expenses. 
 
 
 
Table 2.5: Sources of Liquidity for the 2008/2009 Agricultural Campaign 
 
Items        Amount in F CFA                        Percentage 
Cotton credit      499,505    ($ 1,104) 84% 
Sorghum credit 41,500      ($ 92) 7% 
Crops 34,654     ($ 77) 6% 
Livestock 12,130     ($ 27) 2% 
Remittances 4,717      ($ 10) 1% 
Non-farm income 3,111    ($ 7) 1% 
Other 377      ($ 1) 0% 
Total   595,993    ($ 1,317) 100% 
Source: Primary Survey Data 
Sample: 54 farmers interviewed 
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com 
 
 
 
2.5.3 Household Income and Expenditures 
There are three main periods during which income is generated and the primary 
expenditures occur. These are harvest (October – December), dry season (January to 
May) and the hungry period (June-August).  
At harvest, the main source of cash comes from crop sales. Cotton sales used to 
be the most important cash earnings at harvest. Cotton farmers were selling back their 
harvest at the fixed price to the parastatal company for the repayment of the input cotton 
credit. After reimbursement the net revenue of farmers from cotton was returned right 
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after harvest. However, since 2005 the cash payments to farmers have taken place much 
later in the year. For example in 2009, the payments were received in the month of June 
that is six months after harvest. This long waiting time inconveniences farmers because 
they usually count on these earnings to make some of their biggest expenditure 
requirements such as taxes, school fees, loan repayments, hired agricultural labor wages, 
social ceremonies expenses such as naming ceremonies, marriage, funerals, gifts to 
household members (table 2.6). All these customarily expenses take place around harvest 
time when farmers are expected to have more income. So, farmers are sometimes forced 
to sell grains at harvest to meet their necessary harvest expenses. The most traded grains 
are millet and maize because of the higher selling prices. The harvest income goal is 
another important objective for farmers that will be taken into consideration in the model 
construction.  
 
 
 
Table 2.6: Household Expenditure Items in 2008/2009 
 
Expenditures Items Amount in F CFA Percentage 
Food consumption 85,869 ($ 190) 16% 
Animal health and feed 85,357 ($ 189) 16% 
Social ceremonies 82,704 ($ 183) 15% 
Health 56,189 ($ 124) 10% 
Gifts to all household members 49,367 ($ 109) 9% 
School fees 48,812 ($ 108) 9% 
Taxes 
 
45,549 ($ 101) 8% 
Motorcycle and bicycle repair 40,546 ($ 90) 7% 
Hired Labor 22,146 ($ 49) 4% 
Loans 
 
19,056 ($ 42) 3% 
Others 
 
9,385 ($ 21) 2% 
Total   544,978 ($ 1,204) 100% 
Source: Primary Survey Data 
Sample: 54 farmers interviewed 
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com 
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During the dry season, the reduction in the demand for labor for the agricultural 
activities allows farmers to be involved in non-agricultural activities to have some cash 
earnings. In this period of time, household expenditures include any emergency health 
issue, social ceremonies, livestock expenditures (feed complements and vaccinations) and 
the recurrent expenditures of school fees and food items. Also, at the end of the dry 
season, farmers start preparing the next agricultural campaign by purchasing agricultural 
inputs.  
The hungry season or lean season is usually identified as two months right before 
the harvest but in this research we assume that it is lined up with the crop season for 
modeling purposes. During the lean season, farmers are running out of food in their 
storage units. This is why farmers like early maize. All family workers have to allocate 
their labor principally on the communal plot which is used to generate the cash income 
and the home food consumption. After the communal work, family members can 
participate in their private activities such as private plots, petty trade and agricultural 
gender work teams. The crop season is the time for migrant family workers to return to 
the farm or to send remittances to assist their families in agricultural and household 
expenses.  
Household expenditures are spread throughout the year although the availability 
of cash crops at harvest gives more incentive to households to honor their debts, reward 
family members for their agricultural work and pay for any pressing household 
expenditures. The main expenses are related to food consumption, animal care and feed, 
and social ceremonies. The expenses for food consumption include principally 
expenditures for complementary items for food consumption such as meat, fish, and 
sauce ingredients. Purchase of grains is limited. When it occurs, it is generally during a 
bad crop year when quantities of grain produced are not sufficient to cover the home 
consumption needs for a year. On average, during a bad year the stock of grain will last 
only 7 months. In this case, grain purchases will be necessary during the crop season. In 
normal years, the stock of grain lasts almost a year, in good years it can go up to 15 
months. With the adoption of high-yielding cultivars of sorghum, the level of self-
sufficiency in grain consumption is expected to increase. 
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Household expenses vary across years. During a very good crop year, households 
increase their expenditures on social ceremonies specifically wedding and dowries for 
their children of age to get married, housing improvement, agricultural equipment, assets 
such as cattle and gifts to household members. The extent of gifts (grains, cash or 
clothing) offered to household members particularly to women depends on the state of 
nature of the crops as well as on the purchasing price of cotton set by the parastatal 
company (CMDT).  
In the past, when the cotton economy was very successful, all adult household 
members including women were often granted clothing items and cash payments. But, 
nowadays with the reduced income from cotton, compensations in cash or clothing have 
decreased or have been completely cancelled. With the declining cotton economy, 
women are predominantly compensated in nature by some amounts of grains at harvest. 
Quantities of grains received vary according to the state of nature of the crop year. 
Therefore, the adoption of sorghum technologies and the government interventions in the 
cotton sector are expected to influence differently women’s compensation after harvest. 
The three critical periods of income earnings and cash expenditures discussed 
above will be fundamental in the development of the model as they will represent the 
main points where household decisions are made. 
 
 
 
2.6. Summary 
The study area is located in southern Mali in the district of Koutiala which is a 
higher rainfall area with average rainfall estimated at 800 mm. This area is an old cotton 
zone with depleted soils due to the long time practice of cotton and population growth. 
Sorghum, maize and millet are the main cereal crops cultivated in the area. In the 
traditional farming system, cotton and maize are cultivated intensively with the use of 
inorganic fertilizer whereas millet and sorghum are grown without inorganic fertilizer but 
benefit from the residual fertilizer effect of cotton and maize. Cotton, maize and sorghum 
are typically part of a crop rotation system on low-lands and better lands. Millet is 
generally cultivated on the poorer soils especially on the plateau and on sandy lands. The 
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average household in the study area is composed of 27 persons, consumed 25 kg of grains 
per day and cultivated 15 ha of lands including 4.2 ha of cotton, 2.8 ha of millet and 
maize and 5 ha of sorghum.  
Cotton area and productivity have been declining over time mainly driven by the 
falling trend of the cotton price paid to farmers and the delays in the payment by CMDT  
to the farmers. But with the surge in 2011 of the cotton price, farmers are expected to 
increase the area of cotton. Hence, the models’ results will predict farmers’ acreage 
allocation in response to the cotton price policy.  
Inputs for the intensively grown crops cotton and maize are financed with the 
input loans from the CMDT while inputs for sorghum and millet are financed by cashing 
farmers ’assets of small livestock or trading crop commodities. Over the past two years, 
cotton and maize have benefited from the government subsidy program in which 
sorghum and millet were included in 2011. Fertilizer is a catalyst for yield but with 
increasing public expenditures, this program might not be pursued in the long run. So, the 
effect of the government fertilizer subsidy allocated to the different crops will be an area 
of investigation with the model. The income effects of the adoption of the traditional 
technologies will be assessed without and with the fertilizer subsidy. 
The main farm household expenditures are undertaken during points in time with 
significant cash needs that are the end of harvest season, the dry season and the next crop 
season. Thus, three main periods of decision making will be defined in the model 
construction. 
Overall, the socio-economic characteristics of the representative farmer in the 
study area will be used to build the modeling framework of farmers’ decision making and 
the traditional technologies will be used to calibrate and validate the results of the model 
estimation. Farmers’ decision making will be estimated with government intervention 
regarding cotton pricing policy and fertilizer subsidy program.  
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CHAPTER 3: NEW SORGHUM TECHNOLOGIES AND MARKETING 
STRATEGIES 
 
 
 
This chapter documents the new sorghum technologies and marketing strategies 
diffused in the study area to improve farmers’ income. This combination of technologies 
has been introduced as an alternative source of income for farmers in the cotton zone 
given the declining cotton economy and the resulting reduction in farmers’ revenues. 
Moreover, with the declining soil fertility and low yields of local sorghum varieties, the 
adoption of high-yielding cultivars and the use of moderate levels of inorganic fertilizer 
on sorghum are crucial to increase sorghum productivity. The chapter gives details on the 
higher yielding sorghum cultivar that is very responsive to the use of fertilizer and the 
adoption of better agronomic practices in any rainfall year.  
The second innovation is represented by the improved marketing practices that 
allow farmers to take advantage of the price seasonality and therefore receive a higher 
return on marketing. The ultimate effect is expected to be an increase in the profitability 
of the new sorghum technology, particularly in the poor rainfall years where the seasonal 
price variation can double the harvest price.  
 
 
 
3.1. Improved Production Technologies for Sorghum 
The heavy soil types and sufficient rainfall in the Koutiala region are excellent for 
sorghum. This explains the large area allocated to sorghum in the traditional farming 
systems. So, emphasis has been put by the IER-INTSORMIL program since 2005 on the 
diffusion of new technologies of sorghum in this region. The technological package for 
sorghum is a combination of higher yielding varieties, soil management technologies, 
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improved agronomic practices such as thinning and the use of moderate amounts of 
inorganic fertilizers. The technologies are expected to alleviate the constraints of soil 
fertility and relatively poor traditional crop yields. So, farmers will adopt the new 
technologies if the innovations generate substantially higher yield gains over the 
traditional varieties. To do this the first prerequisite is to increase soil fertility. 
 
 
 
3.1.1 Ridging and Tied Ridging 
A large percentage of lands in the study area are degraded lands with low water 
retention capacity. Thus, ridging is perceived as a soil management technology important 
to increase soil moisture which leads to higher returns from the fertilization. It is used as 
a land preparation technique performed before planting after the first rainfall or during 
the weeding activities. Conventional ridge cropping has become a main component of the 
traditional farming systems on the most degraded lands. The decreasing land quality 
pushes farmers to perform this practice despite the fact that the returns are low when 
performed on degraded lands. The economic return is much higher when the technology 
is applied before soil degradation (Sanders et al. 1996).  
Tied ridging is a technology improvement over the traditional ridges. It consists 
of ridging the soil and cross tying the ridges to reduce the run-off of water from the soil. 
Hence, tied ridging has the advantage to decrease the loss of water and mineral elements 
from the soil and to conserve water in the soil longer. It therefore controls for erosion and 
increases the soil moisture necessary for good crop germination. This practice leads to 
substantial crop yield gains over the traditional simple ridges and does not require 
significantly higher labor contribution. Sanders et al. (1996) reported that the adoption of 
tied ridging increases yields by approximately 50 percent and farm income by 12 percent. 
 
 
 
3.1.2. Inorganic Fertilizer 
 Soil deficiencies in Nitrogen (N) and Phosphorus (P) are identified as major 
constraints for the production of sorghum. Inorganic fertilizer is thus an essential input 
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for crop production because it enhances crop productivity through intensification rather 
than area extension. Application of fertilizer has been conducted over thirty years in the 
study area but application was on cotton and maize.  
 Extensive availability of inorganic fertilizer for all crops is constrained by 
marketing infrastructures, credit and governmental support. Many farmers lack cash to be 
able to purchase significant amounts of inorganic fertilizer. Thus, to facilitate adoption of 
fertilizer and improve sorghum yields, the IER-INTSORMIL project has procured 
moderate amounts of inorganic fertilizers for farmers providing input credit. Farmers 
involved in the program reimburse fertilizer in grains to the farmers’ association thereby 
creating a revolving fund to continue fertilizer purchase over time. 
 The recommended fertilizer levels are 100 kg/ha of NPK and 50 kg/ha of Urea. 
The nutrient content of the NPK is 15-15-15. More recently, farmers have switched to a 
lower cost package of inorganic fertilizer represented by the di-Ammonium Phosphate 
(DAP). The inorganic formula is 18-26-0 and the principal focus of fertilization is on 
Nitrogen and Phosphorus because Potassium (K) is generally sufficient.  
 
 
 
3.1.3. High Yielding Cultivars 
 The gains in production due to adoption of soil management practices and 
inorganic fertilizer need to be supplemented with high-yielding seed varieties responsive 
to fertilizer. Several sorghum cultivars have been introduced over time to improve the 
response to the local agronomic conditions and produce higher yields.  Currently, the new 
variety diffused is a Caudatum which is an intermediate cycle variety as opposed to the 
local varieties that are long cycle varieties. The local name of the improved variety is 
Grinkan. 
 The improved Grinkan variety is high yielding, very responsive to the use of 
inorganic fertilizer and more tolerant to Striga infestation and some plant diseases 
compared to the traditional cultivars. In addition, according to some farmers, the 
improved sorghum cultivar is more resistant to flooding damage compared to the local 
varieties. Average crop yield in normal years is about 1.4 tons to 1.9 tons with the best 
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farmers reaching 2.5 tons to 3 tons per hectare with the combination of soil management 
technologies, use of inorganic fertilizer and rigorous implementation of agronomic 
practices at specific periods of the plant cycle (Coulibaly 2010). The yield gains over the 
traditional varieties are considerable and are 40 percent higher for the average farmer 
during a normal rainfall year.  
 Nevertheless the net returns on production of the improved sorghum for the 
average farmer are almost similar to the one of the traditional varieties for the crop year 
2008/2009 when the grains are sold at the harvest price of 80 F C FA/kg (table 3.1). 
  A first implication of this latter result is that for very high input costs such as 
those of the year 2008/2009, the average farmer might be indifferent between adopting 
and not adopting the improved sorghum while the most efficient farmer will have a 
stronger incentive to adopt. To enhance return on adoption, it is necessary to increase 
yield through a rigorous implementation of the agronomic practices or to lower the 
production costs. Hence, we observe that in 2011, there is a very high return on 
technology adoption with the subsidized cost of fertilizer (table 3.1). This outcome 
suggests that at affordable fertilizer costs, the average farmer will have a higher 
willingness to adopt the improved sorghum and to substitute more for the local varieties. 
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Table 3.1: Returns for the Traditional Sorghum and the Improved Sorghum Cultivar.  
Crop Year 2008 and Estimations for 2011 
 
  Traditional Cultivar Improved Cultivar Improved Cultivar 
 
Crop Year 2008 Crop Year 2008 Crop Year 2011 
Inputs Items       
Seed (F CFA/ha) 4,000 1,200 1,200 
NPK (F CFA/ha) 0 36,000 25,000 
Urea (F CFA/ha) 0 19,000 12,500 
Total Inputs Cost
7
  
(F CFA/ha) 4,000 56,200 38,700 
Yield (kg/ha) 1,154 1,642 1,642 
Harv.Price* (F CFA/kg) 80 80 80 
Total Revenue1 (F CFA) 92,320 131,360 131,360 
Net Return1 (F CFA) 88,320 75,160 92,660 
Rec. Price **(FCFA/kg)  115 115 
Total Revenue2 (F CFA)  188,830 188,830 
Net Return2 (F CFA)  132,630 150,130 
Note: Harv.Price*= This is the expected harvest price collected in the regional market of Koutiala 
(Mali) in 2008 
Total revenue1 and Netreturn1 are those obtained with the harvest price of 80 F CFA/kg ($/kg 
0.18) 
Rec.Price**= This is the expected price during the price recovery period collected in the regional 
market of Koutiala (Mali) in 2008 
Total Revenue2 and Net Return2 are those obtained with the recovery price of 115 F CFA/kg 
($/kg 0.25) 
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com 
 
 
 
 A second implication of the results reported in table 3.1, is that selling the grains 
at harvest, does not lead to significant return on adoption of the improved sorghum 
technology because of the harvest price collapse. But, when farmers are able to sell the 
improved sorghum in the price recovery period, return on technology are substantially 
higher (see table 3.1). So, in addition to increasing yields or reducing costs of fertilizer, 
farmers must be able to sell sorghum at higher market prices to increase profitability of 
                                                          
7
 We didn’t include labor costs in the total input costs as most the labor used is family labor. There would 
be some additional costs including increased labor from higher plant and weed density resulting from more 
fertilization. Also more labor woluld be required by the new operations especially thinning which farmers 
do not normally do and the split application of fertilizers. 
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the new technology and the return on adoption. With increased sorghum production 
following the adoption of the higher yielding cultivar, farmers in the farmers’ association 
have the opportunity to store the excess grains above consumption and sell when prices 
are higher in the market.  
 
 
 
3.2 Grain Marketing Strategy 
The development of marketing strategies contributes to increase the profitability 
of the improved technologies. Higher yields reduce costs of output. Farmers are more 
willing to adopt agricultural technologies when those innovations are able to increase 
profitability. Unfortunately, technology introduction of staples is constrained by three 
types of price collapses.  
Prices collapse during years of good or even normal rainfall because of the price 
inelasticity of demand. Once households with sufficient income to buy cereals have 
enough, there are few alternative markets to keep prices from collapsing. In the regional 
market of Koutiala, prices of sorghum as well as other grains collapsed during the good 
rainfall years of 1999, 2003 and 2006 as opposed to the years 2001 and 2002 which were 
poor rainfall years (table 3.2). The between year price collapse in sorghum as well as in 
other grains introduce more riskiness in grain prices as revealed by the larger value of the 
coefficient of the standard deviation compared to cotton (table 3.2) for which a minimum 
guaranteed price is fixed yearly at the beginning of the cropping season by the 
government. The lower price variability of cotton is an attraction but the previous other 
advantage of obtaining cash near the harvest time has been reduced in recent years by the 
tardiness of CMDT in paying farmers. Moreover, real cotton prices have been falling for 
most of the 21
st
 Century until 2011.  
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Table 3.2: Real Producer and Consumer Prices, and Coefficients of Variation from 1998 
to 2008 
 
 Years 
Millet 
Prices 
Sorghum 
Prices 
Maize  
Prices 
Cotton 
Prices 
(F CFA/kg) (F CFA/kg) (F CFA/kg) (FCFA/kg) 
       PP*      PC*       PP       PC       PP PC        PP 
1998/1999 135 181 129 168 106 147 262 
1999/2000 75 112 72 111 61 100 214 
2000/2001 121 166 107 144 101 162 224 
2001/2002 174 221 170 212 144 187 252 
2002/2003 168 217 149 190 119 166 235 
2003/2004 77 113 63 98 57 85 255 
2004/2005 153 189 144 173 127 159 255 
2005/2006 124 151 103 124 89 110 188 
2006/2007 87 102 79 95 72 86 184 
2007/2008 107 123 97 114 104 120 174 
2008/2009 126 145 110 127 110 128 200 
Mean 122 156 111 141 99 132 222 
($/kg) (0.27) (0.34) (0.25) (0.31) (0.22) (0.29) (0.49) 
Standard dev 34 42 34 39 27 35 32 
Coef of var 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.14 
Note: PP*=Producer Prices, PC*= Consumer Prices. Prices have been deflated by using the year 
2008 as the base year. Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at 
www.oanda.com. 
Standard dev. stands for standard deviation; Coef. of var .stands for coefficient of variation 
Source: Author own Calculation from Aggregate Data and Index of Inflation from 1998 to 2008. 
 
 
 
In addition to the between year price variation and collapse, there is a within year 
price variability with prices falling at harvest because most farmers sell their crops to 
finance the necessary harvest time expenditures. These expenditures are a series of 
traditional requirements including school fees, local taxes, paying workers for 
agricultural activities during the last crop season, financing younger males to migrate to 
cities for seasonal employment, and traditional ceremonies such as marriages and naming 
ceremonies. The price collapse results from most farmers feeling the necessity to have 
funds at harvest. 
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Then prices start increasing after this collapse. From January (harvest season) to 
May (recovery price season) prices increase on average by 27 percent (table 3.3). From 
May to September (lean season) there is an average smaller price increase in the market. 
This results because the public sector often intervenes in this second season to keep 
prices from increasing further. Moreover, merchants with larger stocks start unloading 
with larger quantities in this second period. Thus the greatest increase in the returns to 
storage has historically been selling in the recovery period. However, if the government 
does not intervene, there is substantial potential to sell later in the lean period especially 
in poor rainfall years.  
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Sorghum Production (Kg/ha) and Producer Prices (F CFA/kg) across 
Marketing Periods 
 
Year 
Production 
(kg/ha) 
Period 1 
Prices 
Period 2 
Prices 
Period 3 
Prices 
Percentage 
Change 
Percentage 
Change 
  
Harvest Recovery Hungry Period        
1 to 2 
Period        
2 to 3 Season Period Season 
1998 971 119 135 124 14% -9% 
1999 1090 80 73 65 -9% -11% 
2000 978 65 117 153 79% 31% 
2001 1056 114 185 202 62% 9% 
2002 798 157 157 115 0% -27% 
2003 1059 56 65 72 15% 11% 
2004 994 90 158 196 76% 24% 
2005 989 96 108 103 13% -5% 
2006 991 69 73 93 7% 27% 
2007 1095 82 90 120 9% 34% 
2008 1500 80 109 138 37% 26% 
Average 1047 
92 
($/kg0.20) 
115 
($/kg0.25) 
126 
($/kg 0.28) 
27% 10% 
Note: Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com. 
Prices have been deflated by using the year 2008 as the base year. 
Source: Author own Calculation from Aggregate Data and Index of Inflation from 1998 to 2008.  
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The third type of price collapse occurs during adverse years for crop production 
when the government often intervenes to drive down prices paid by consumers usually 
after they have increased substantially. For example during the poor crop year of 2002 
the Malian government imported grains from Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso and released 
grains from its warehouses. Though there is a public stock policy, government release of 
stocks is not very common due to their financial limitation to generate and hold 
substantial stocks of grains. Import of grains from neighboring countries is a more 
common policy. In figure 3.1, we notice that during the crop year 2002, grain prices 
started falling by June (the lean season). In the last decade donors have been increasingly 
reluctant to help governments drive down the prices and thereby reduce incentives in 
agriculture. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Normalized Producer Prices for Sorghum from 1998 to 2002 
Source: National Marketing Watch (OMA/Mali) 
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Figure 3.2: Normalized Producer Prices for Sorghum from 2003 to 2008 
Source: National Marketing Watch (OMA/Mali) 
 
 
 
 Given the seasonality in prices developed above and depicted in figures 3.1 and 
3.2, new marketing strategies need to be implemented to assist farmers in dealing with at 
least the first two types of price collapses. Specifically, the model is concerned with the 
storage and the higher prices from selling later in the year. But other strategies including 
increasing farmers’ negotiation power through learning by doing process are also 
important since they have potential to increase return on marketing.
8
  
 
 
 
3.2.1 Grain Storage and Late Sales 
 Grain storage at harvest and late sales within the year enable farmers to avoid the 
harvest price collapse and thereby take advantage of the price increase later in the year. 
                                                          
8
 To respond to the price inelasticity problem new market development for the cereals is the on-going 
strategy of the Production-Marketing project of INTSORMIL. As the intensive poultry sector continues to 
rapidly expand, sorghum should be able to compete with maize but this was not included in the modeling.  
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farmers’ cooperatives buy grains from their members at harvest and store these cereals in 
storage facilities until prices recover from their harvest collapse. But very poor farmers 
with a lack of alternative financial resources for the harvest expenditures are often unable 
to forgo their harvest income by participating in this collective grain storage store their 
grains. Nevertheless, by obtaining access to the banks for the input purchases or 
inventory holdings, famers have the opportunity to get credit for consumption while 
storing their grains up to the period of price recovery.  
 
 
 
3.2.2 Increasing Producer Bargaining Power 
 The increase in farmers’ bargaining power is an important strategy to capture 
higher marketing margins. Farmers are encouraged to market their sorghum grains 
through the producers’ associations in order to increase their bargaining power and take 
advantage of the economies of scale. By being involved in associations, producers have 
the opportunity to buy inputs and sell sorghum in larger quantities to wholesalers instead 
of dealing with individual intermediaries who can take advantage of their lack of 
knowledge of market prices and thus capture large benefit in the supply chain. Hence, 
farmers’ collective action enables them to benefit from storage and from a higher price by 
selling in bulk quantity. The producers association can also invest more in market 
information than the individual farmer.  
 
 
 
3.3. Summary 
 The new sorghum technologies diffused in the study area consist of an improved 
sorghum cultivar, use of moderate levels of fertilizer and the implementation of better 
agronomic practices. These new technologies lead to higher yields and expected profits 
than with the traditional sorghum. Thus, farmers should develop more interest in growing 
the new sorghum cultivar if they have access to the new technology package. Higher 
profitability of the new sorghum technology is also expected to be achieved by the 
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adoption of marketing strategies based on storage and late sales, especially in the price 
recovery period.  
 The higher yielding cultivar associated to the use of moderate levels of fertilizer 
for the improved cultivar and the adoption of efficient marketing strategies will be 
introduced in the model to assess the impact on farmers’ decision making and income. 
The results will be compared to the base case scenarios where no improved agricultural 
technologies for sorghum are used. Under the adoption of improved sorghum technology, 
the income effect of the cotton pricing policy and fertilizer subsidy will be estimated and 
compared with the base case scenario characterized by the traditional technologies. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we will develop a model to represent farmers’ decision making 
process in the study area. The representative farm household in the study region is 
assumed to maximize the expected ending wealth subject to some resource constraints 
such as labor, land and other agricultural inputs. Based on field research and interviews 
conducted in the study region and on empirical research performed in several other sub-
Saharan countries, farmers take their decisions in order to cope with risk. The previous 
chapters showed that farmers face many sources of risk in agriculture and grain 
marketing including variability in rainfall, crop yields and commodity prices. These risk 
factors influence farmers’ production, consumption and marketing decisions. Farmers’ 
decisions are made sequentially across marketing periods based on the outcomes of yields 
and prices randomness. The planning period in which farmers make their decisions starts 
at the beginning of the planting season in June up to the end of the lean season in 
September.  
After providing a justification for the choice of the sequential stochastic farm 
modeling approach, this chapter discusses in a following section the stochastic 
environment in which farmers make their decisions. Next the decisions variables included 
in the model are described. Then, the empirical model is presented and in a last section 
the data used for the model estimation are provided. 
 
 
 
4.1. Justification of the Model 
Several methods have been described in the literature to measure the income 
effects of agricultural technologies and to evaluate farmers’ decision making in an 
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uncertain environment. Uncertainties are related to some stochastic events including 
rainfall distribution, input and output prices which affect famers’ production decisions 
and marketing strategies.  
The most common theory used to analyze farmers’ decisions under risk is the 
expected utility theory. This theory assumes that the decision maker chooses between 
risky or uncertain plans by comparing their expected utility and selecting the one that 
yields to the highest utility (Hazell and Norton 1986). Depending on the decision maker’s 
preference or utility function, diverse types of models can be used to assess farmers’ 
decision making with the expected utility theory. Mean-Variance models (EV) are used 
when the utility function reflects normally distributed returns. These models involve 
mathematical programming and can be applied to identify the set of efficient portfolios 
with the smallest variance from the mean. An alternative to the Mean-Variance model is 
the MOTAD model (Hazell and Norton 1986). This model solves for an efficient 
portfolio set by minimizing the absolute deviation of a portfolio from the mean portfolio. 
Implementation of the MOTAD is based on linear programming. Adesina, Abbott and 
Sanders (1988) used a MOTAD model to estimate the impact of agricultural technologies 
in Niger. Their results show that adoption of fertilizer depends on farmers’ level of risk 
aversion. Highly risk averse farmers adopt fertilizer on limited crop area as opposed to 
less risk averse producers.  
Other programming techniques incorporating risk include safety-first models and 
lexicographic utility functions. Safety first models are appropriate in highly risky 
environment. It ensures that the farmer maximizes his income after securing his 
subsistence needs. This model has been used to explain producers’ behavior related to the 
levels of fertilizer adoption (Bell 1972), land allocation to food and cash crops (Carter 
and Wiebe 1990) or area of land allocated to improved and traditional technologies 
(Smale, Just, and Leathers 1994). Lexicographic utility functions assume that farmers 
cope with risk by making their decisions to satisfy ordered goals. While in safety first 
models farmers have one main subsistence goal to achieve before maximizing their 
income, lexicographic utility functions allow for more than one goal to be secured. 
Hence, empirical application studies on agricultural technology adoption in developing 
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countries, by Abdoulaye and Sanders (2006), Baquedano et al. (2010) identified a 
subsistence objective and a harvest income requirement as principal goals farmers need to 
satisfy prior to maximizing their profit.  
The models described above were extensively used to capture stochastic events in 
agricultural production and to estimate the impact of agricultural technologies on 
producers’ income. However, these models are static and assume that all decisions are 
made at one point in time. This assumption places some restrictions on the use of these 
modeling techniques because they do not permit farmers to make adaptive production and 
marketing decisions based on new information received over time. Yet, farmer interviews 
in Mali revealed that producers make decisions at several points in time in order to cope 
with production and marketing uncertainties. It is therefore necessary to use a modeling 
framework that takes into account farmers’ ability to adjust their decisions over time. 
Also, there is a growing recognition of the importance of sequential decision making as 
farmers ’strategies in coping with uncertainty (Fafchamps 1993, Dorward 1996).  
Discrete Stochastic Programming (DSP) model appears to be very appropriate to 
analyze sequential farmers’ decision making under uncertainty. This model has the 
advantage to handle conditional strategies which allows future decisions to be influenced 
by past decisions (Preckel 2008). Moreover, in addition to handle randomness in the 
objective function, this model accommodates also randomness in the constraint 
parameters or the right hand side of the constraints.  
Application of DSP has been limited in empirical research. Empirical agricultural 
studies with discrete stochastic programming models have started with the work of Cocks 
(1968). He developed a multistage farming problem in which labor requirement and gross 
margin are stochastic decision variables with discrete probability distribution. Rae (1971) 
further discussed the capability of DSP in solving problems with sequential decisions 
under uncertainty by applying this model to a farm management problem. Although 
much attention has been devoted to the application of this model in developed countries, 
some authors have used this model to analyze agricultural issues in developing nations. 
Adesina and Sanders (1991) and Shapiro et al. (1993) used this model to show that 
peasant farmers in Niger have the ability to adapt cropping and resource management 
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strategies to the rainfall pattern. Lopeiz-Pereira et al. (1994) determined the income effect 
of soil conservation strategies and seed-fertilizer technologies in Ecuador by using a 
discrete stochastic model. More recently, Maatman et al. (2002) applied a sequential 
programming approach to describe farmers’ decision making in Burkina Faso regarding 
grain consumption, sales, storage, and purchases throughout the growing and post-harvest 
seasons.  
A common feature across the studies mentioned above is that rainfall and/or 
yields were the only random variables influencing farmers ’decisions. Their 
methodologies did not allow for randomness in prices. Yet, variability of harvest and 
post-harvest prices are equally important sources of uncertainty that may influence 
farmers ’decision making. To fill the gap, this study takes into account price uncertainties 
as well as yield variability in analyzing farmers’ production, inventory and marketing 
decisions over time. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, this research is the first empirical 
study in sub-Saharan Africa that evaluates the impact of new agricultural technologies 
and marketing strategies within a context of stochastic crop yields and prices. 
The implementation of a discrete stochastic programming model requires several 
steps as follows: the specification of the random variables and construction of the 
probability distribution, the identification of the decision variables and constraints within 
each stage and the definition of the objective function for the planning horizon.  
 
 
 
4.2. Stochastic Environment 
The stochastic environment discusses variation of yield and prices as well as 
defines the probability distribution of the random variables. 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Random Variables 
The specification of the DSP stochastic events requires first the definition of the 
random variables included in the model. The random variables of interest are crop yields 
and prices. Yields for the traditional crops concern cotton, sorghum, maize and millet. 
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The improved crop yield includes only the new sorghum cultivar. Crop yields are chosen 
as random variables instead of rainfall because rainfall does not explain all variability in 
yields. Yields are determined by rainfall since agriculture in Mali is mainly rain fed. But 
other factors such as temperature, soil fertility and agronomic practices influence the 
yield outcome for a given crop year. So, by choosing yields as random variables, we take 
into consideration all possible factors that have an impact on yields. Since the study area 
is known as a high rainfall area, flooding is sometimes encountered and can be as 
detrimental to the crop yield as drought is. Figures A.1 to A.3 in appendix A show the 
quadratic relationship between yields and rainfall. Yields increase with rainfall but are 
negatively affected by excess rainfall. Yield of cotton in addition to rainfall is also 
predetermined by the announced cotton price at the beginning of the planting season (see 
table A.1 in appendix A). So, cotton prices are exogenous non- random variables fixed by 
the CMDT parastatal company 
Grain prices are considered as the second set of random variables and influence 
the marketing decisions. Marketing decisions are taken at points in time with substantial 
cash needs. These are the beginning of the cropping season, the harvest season and the 
lean season. At the beginning of the planting season, farmers need money to purchase 
agricultural inputs. At harvest, they need cash to compensate hired labor employed during 
the cropping season or for some pressing household expenditures. During the lean season, 
they need some financial resources to purchase grains when their stocks are depleted. 
Harvest prices are influenced by yield outcomes. We used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regressions and aggregate data from the crop year 1998/1999 to 2007/2008 to show the 
dependence between yearly harvest prices and yields for the grains sorghum, maize and 
millet (equation 4.1). The results are reported in table 4.1.  
 
11101 ititit yP      (4.1) 
1itP Harvest prices for grain crop i in year t 
1ity Harvest yield for grain crop i in year t     
10 ; Constant term and coefficient for the yield variable 
1it Error term for the equation of grain crop i in year t 
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 Results of these regressions reported in table 4.1 indicate a significant relationship 
between grain yields and harvest prices, especially for sorghum and maize. The small 
data set might explain the low values of the R
2
. Other explanations may first be lying in 
the argument of the higher rainfall area characterizing the south of the country, which is 
our study area. Large amount of rainfall in this part of the country might certainly reduce 
much of the yield variability over the years which could lead to a low significance level 
of the regression model. This might not be the case in the northern low rainfall areas of 
Mali where we should expect to see more variability in yields. Secondly, the relatively 
weak correlation between prices and aggregate production is an indication that other 
factors such as grain trade flows in the Malian economy and to a lesser extent 
government carry-over stock exert a significant influence in explaining the variations in 
aggregate producer prices.  
 
 
 
Table 4.1: Relationship between Harvest Crop Prices and Own Crop Yields and from 
1998 to 2007 
 
Harvest Prices Intercept Yield Coefficient Adjusted 
R
2
 
F Standard 
deviation of 
residuals 
Sorghum  336.94*** -0.24** 0.40 7.24** 21.93 
 (58.88) (0.09)    
Millet  305.62** -0.20 0.12 2.18 27.84 
 (132.57) (0.14)    
Maize  178.20*** -0.05* 0.22 3.47* 19.33 
 (52.04) (0.03)    
Note: N=10 and standard error of the coefficients are reported in parentheses 
***= significance at 1 % level of confidence, **= significance at 5 % level of confidence 
and *=significance at 10% level of confidence 
 
 
 
 To have a good understanding of the relationship between prices in the different 
marketing periods several OLS regressions were performed. The goal of these regressions 
is to analyze price seasonality. There is interdependence between prices at different 
marketing periods and we want to know how well prices in a given marketing period are 
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impacted by prices in earlier marketing stages. These analyses are essential for farmers’ 
decision making because farmers’ marketing strategy is determined by their information 
about current prices but also by past random events. 
 For this aim, three sets of OLS regressions have been performed (equation 4.2). In 
the first set of regressions, prices for sorghum, millet and maize in the recovery season 
have been regressed against own harvest prices. A weighted average is used for harvest 
prices to reflect adequately the timing of the marketing decisions. Based on empirical 
observations, the largest part of the grains sold at harvest occurs in the month of 
December. So, upon field reports and technicians advice, we attributed a weight of 20 
percent to the grain prices for the month of October and November and a weight of 60 
percent for the month of December. Prices in the recovery period are represented by the 
average price of April and May. Farmers’ objective is to sell their stock of grains during 
those months as prices experience sizable increase. In the second set of regressions, 
prices in the lean season are estimated as a function of harvest prices and prices in the 
recovery period for each of the commodities mentioned previously. Here, prices in the 
lean season are characterized by the average price of August and September which are 
the months with the highest prices for the hungry season.  
Overall, we performed OLS regressions on grain prices to reflect their conditional 
nature with time series price observations across 10 years.  
 
itpitpitp PP   110           (4.2) 
itpP Prices for grain crop i in year t and marketing period p 
1itpP lag price for grain crop i in year t     
10 ; Constant term and coefficient for the lag price variable 
itp Error term for the equation of grain crop i in year t and marketing period p assumed 
to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance.  
 
The results of the set of regression equations between harvest prices and prices in 
the recovery period show high values of R
2
 meaning that harvest prices predict very well 
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variation in the post-harvest prices of April and May (table 4.2). Knowing harvest market 
prices help farmers to predict prices in the post-harvest season. 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Estimation of the Relationship between Crop Harvest Prices and Own Prices in 
the Price Recovery Period 
 
April-May 
Prices 
Intercept Harvest Prices R
2
 F Standard 
deviation 
of residuals 
Sorghum 24.38 0.99** 0.46 8.54** 28.96 
 (32.85) (0.34)    
Millet 28.53 0.88** 0.36 6.14** 31.42 
 (40.40) (0.35)    
Maize 21.34 1.03** 0.43 7.69** 24.23 
 (31.42) (0.37)    
Note: N=10 and standard error of the coefficients are reported in parentheses 
***= significance at 1 % level of confidence, **= significance at 5 % level of confidence 
and *=significance at 10 % level of confidence 
 
 
 
 Results of the set of regressions between prices in the lean season and prices in 
the two preceding periods (table 4.3) show a very strong and significant dependence 
among prices. Prices in the lean season are well predicted by prices in the recovery and 
harvest periods 
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Table 4.3: Estimation of the Relationship between Crop Prices in the Hungry Season and 
Own Prices in the Recovery and Harvest Periods. 
 
Aug-Sept 
Prices 
Intercept April-May  
Prices 
October-
December 
Prices 
R
2
 F Standard 
deviation 
of 
residuals 
Sorghum 48.50*** 1.52*** -1.08*** 0.94 66.93*** 10.45 
 (13.11) (0.14) (0.19)    
Millet 42.24** 1.43*** -0.77*** 0.96 77.36*** 10.06 
 (14.26) (0.12) (0.16)    
Maize 50.78* 1.29*** -0.99** 0.81 15.10*** 15.47 
 (22.04) (0.24) (0.35)    
Note: N=10 and standard error of the coefficients are reported in parentheses.  
***= significance at 1 % level of confidence, **= significance at 5 % level of confidence and 
*=significance at 10 % level of confidence 
 
 
 
4.2.2. Probability Distribution of the Random Variables 
Using the Gaussian Quadrature approach (see appendix B), 17 states of nature for 
yields were defined with the sum of the probability of occurrence of the 17 events equal 
to 1. Among those 17 states of nature, one event happens at harvest. Then, from the 
realized yield outcome, harvest prices are determined. At the end of the recovery season 
the states of nature of second period prices are realized conditional on harvest prices and 
yields. Next, prices fluctuate during the lean season and at the end of this period we have 
realization of the lean season price state of nature conditional on the outcomes of prices 
and yields in the preceding periods.  
The values of the error terms in the grain price regression equation for each 
marketing period (see equation 4.2) were used to construct the probability distribution of 
prices in each marketing period. Observations for prices are only available for 10 years so 
an empirical distribution was used to define the states of nature and their associated 
probabilities. Thus, 10 states of nature were defined for prices in each marketing period 
with a probability of occurrence of one event equals to 1/10.  
At the end of the year, the total number of states of nature is the product of the 
events that were obtained in each decision period. This product is equal to 17,000 that is 
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17x10x10x10. The probability of the end period states of nature is also obtained by 
multiplying the probabilities of the outcomes that unfold in each time period. As we can 
notice, the size of the DSP increases exponentially with the number of stages and states 
of nature but the modeling of number of states of nature achieved is feasible with current 
computer capacity. 
 
 
 
4.3 Decision Variables 
The decision variables are best described using the decision tree that summarized 
the sequential and stochastic process (figure 4.1). Circles in the decision tree represent 
realization of the random events while squares depict points in time where the decisions 
are made conditional on the occurrence of the states of nature. It is assumed that 
decisions are made at the beginning of each stage. Three stages are identified in the 
decision tree. 
The first stage in the decision tree describes the agricultural season. This initial 
stage extends from the beginning of the agricultural season of year 1 (June) up to the 
harvest of year 1 (December). At the start of the pre-harvest period, decisions regarding 
land allocation across crops (millet, sorghum, maize and cotton), inputs used such as 
fertilizer application, amount of grains to trade in the market and the transfer of stock of 
grains to the next stage are taken. All these decisions are made with subjective 
probabilistic knowledge of the states of nature of yields. These decisions are constrained 
by resources availability including land, non-labor inputs, labor, cash or credit 
availability. Under the traditional technologies, farmers finance their inputs for grain 
crops with cash originating from grain sales, cotton revenue from the previous harvest as 
well as livestock sales. Cotton inputs and fertilizer for maize are purchased with the 
credit received from the parastatal cotton company. At the beginning of the growing 
season, the yearly price of cotton at which the parastatal company will buy cotton from 
framers is announced. This price is expected to influence farmers’ land allocation 
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decisions and the use of purchased inputs. At the end of the agricultural season, the 
outcomes of the randomness of crop yields and grain prices are known and represented 
respectively by Yh1 and Ph1 on the decision tree. The probabilities of occurrence of these 
two events are respectively a1 and b1. 
Stage 2 is the price recovery period. It starts at the end of the first harvest 
(January) and goes up to the beginning of the next growing season (June). At the 
beginning of stage 2, farmers have full knowledge of the realization of the random yields 
and the prevailing crop prices associated with crop yields but they have only subjective 
probability estimates of the post-harvest prices which will occur later in the year. The 
outcome of yields and prices in stage 1 influenced the decisions made in stage 2. Thus, 
conditional upon the yield and price outcomes and their conditional knowledge regarding 
the future distributions, farmers decide on the amount of crop to sell immediately at 
harvest, buy, store for consumption or sell later in the year. Hence, at harvest, farmers 
face several marketing decisions. They sell grains at harvest to satisfy some necessary 
harvest expenditures. Those expenditures at harvest include payment of hired labor, 
school fees, any eventual health expenses or social ceremonies. Also, during a good state 
of nature, farmers are able to store grains above domestic consumption and sell later in 
the year. Sorghum grain, especially the improved variety is usually stored collectively in 
the cooperative storage house and sold at the end of the price recovery period. At the end 
of stage 2, one outcome of the price states of nature in the recovery period occurs that is 
Pr1 conditional on the preceding harvest price Ph1. This realization occurs with a 
probability c1. 
Stage 3 portrays the lean season. This stage starts at the beginning of the second 
growing season (June) and ends at the second harvest (December). At the beginning of 
stage 3, farmers have full knowledge of the post-harvest grain prices that prevailed in the 
recovery period. Recovery prices have been determined conditionally on harvest prices. 
Thus, the set of activities selected at the start of the hungry season takes into account 
realization of prices during the recovery period and harvest season. The decisions made 
by farmers include grain sales, grain purchases and home consumption. At the end of 
stage 3, the outcome of price uncertainty in the hungry season is known and identified in 
the decision tree as Phu1 with probability d1.
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Figure 4.1: Decision Tree for the Discrete Stochastic Model 
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4.4 Empirical Model 
The empirical formulation of the model requires specification of material and 
cash balances in each time period. Then, the expected wealth at the end of the planning 
horizon is maximized. 
 
 
 
4.4.1. Material Balances 
Material Balance at First Planting up to First Harvest 
kkkkk BQISC 11111          (4.3)  
In equation (4.3), the starting inventory of output k ( kQ1 ) is used for consumption 
( kC1 ), sales ( kS1 ) and the remainder ( kI1 ) is kept in the form of inventory stock. This 
constraint allows cereals to be purchased ( kB1 ) in the event that the starting stock is not 
enough to meet the household grain consumption needs. Minimum subsistence 
requirements for the grains are defined in this period as well as in the subsequent periods 
as households need to guarantee a food security level before satisfying any other 
objective. 
 
 
 
Material Balance from First Harvest to the Hungry Season 
ksj
j
kjskksksks BybIISC 21222          (4.4)  
Equation (4.4) specifies that consumption ( ksC2 ), sales ( ksS2 ) and inventory of 
output k for a given state of nature s in the second period ( ksI2 ) cannot be greater than 
the inventory of output k  ( kI1 ) carried over from the first period plus output k produced 
in state of nature s using different combinations of crop technologies ( jkjs yb ) plus the 
amount of grain k purchased ( ksB2 ) in the corresponding state of nature s during the 
second period. 
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Production of output k harvested in the second period is subject to the resource 
constraints as follows: 
Ky
j
j              (4.5)  
Equation (4.5) defines the land constraint. The sum of areas allocated to the 
different crop technologies ( jy ) must be less or equal to the total land availability (K). 
i
j
jij xya               (4.6)  
Equation (4.6) is the constraint on total purchased input availability. Input i used 
( ija ) for the different crop production systems j is ( jy ) set to not exceed the amount of 
input i available ( ix ).  
HLlx hol              (4.7)  
In equation (4.7) labor allocated to crop production system j and ( lx ) to off-farm 
employment ( ol ) must be less or equal to the total family labor available (
hL ) and the 
amount of hired labor (H). 
 
 
 
Material Balance from the Hungry Season to the Next Harvest 
kstkskstkstkst BIISC 32333           (4.8)  
In this equation (4.8) another state of nature t is added to reflect the price dynamic 
that occurred during the second period. Indeed, from the first harvest to the price 
recovery period (hungry season) prices of the main grain commodities that are millet, 
sorghum, maize increase across time and covary positively. The state of nature t is 
conditional on the state of nature s that occurred in the first period. We assume that at the 
beginning of the third time period, producers have full knowledge of the state of nature of 
yields and prices realized in the past periods. Hence, in the third period, the sum of 
consumption ( kstC3 ), sales ( kstS3 ) and inventory of output k in state of natures s and 
t ( kstI3 ) are  restricted to not be more than the amount of cereal k purchased in period 3 in 
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state of nature s and t ( kstB3 ) and the transfer of inventory of output k received from the 
second period in state of nature s ( ksI2 ). The cash balances corresponding to each set of 
material balance are defined below. 
 
 
 
4.4.2. Cash Balances 
The cash balances guarantee an equilibrium state between the financial resources 
and the uses in each marketing period. We defined three cash balance equations: 
 
 
 
Cash Balance in the First Period 
k
k
s
k
k
k
b
k
Ki
ii SpFRBpxcE 111111  

      (4.9)  
Equation (4.9) represents the cash constraint for the first period. The cash and any 
liquid asset (F) plus the value of output sold in the first period ( k
s
k Sp 11 ) is used to satisfy 
household expenditures ( 1E ), input purchases ( ix ) except labor and land, expenses on 
grain for home consumption ( k
b
k Bp 11 ). Remaining cash ( 1R ) is carried over the next 
period. Cash and liquidity assets include any sales of livestock that occur to finance some 
emergency expenditure such as health expenses and/or food purchases mainly during a 
bad state of nature.  
 
 
 
Cash Balance in the Second Period 
1222222 RSpHRBpE ks
k
s
kssks
k
b
ks         (4.10)  
Equation (4.10) states that the cash generated from the second period output sales 
( ks
s
ksSp 22 ) in a given state of nature s and the retained cash from the first period is 
allocated to the necessary household expenditures ( 2E ) (school fees, debt and taxes 
repayment, wages for migrant labor, heath expenses, social ceremonies), to hire labor 
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(H), and for the grain purchases ( ks
b
k Bp 22 ). Again, retained cash ( sR2 ) from the second 
period in state of nature s  is transferred to the subsequent time period.   
 
 
 
Cash Balance in the Third Period  
s
k
kst
s
kststkst
k
b
kst RSpRBpE 2333333          (4.11)  
In equation (4.11), the cash revenue from the sales of output in state of nature s in 
the third period ( kst
s
kstSp 33 ) and the retained cash from the second period in the identical 
state of nature s must at least covered household expenditures ( 3E ), grain purchases 
needed in the third period ( kst
b
kst Bp 33 ). Any excess of liquidity will be in the form of 
retained cash ( stR3 ).  
The risk aversion behavior of households has been reflected in the constraints to 
secure enough grain for their subsistence in each period (equation 4.12) and to fulfill a 
harvest income goal (equation 4.13) which corresponds to income requirements at harvest 
to pay for school fees, taxes, debt, naming ceremonies, etc. We defined a minimum level 
of total grain consumption for each period based on household surveys ’results. The 
harvest income requirement is defined obviously at harvest. Those constraints are 
satisfied before the expected profit is maximized. 
 
Tk
k
Tk CC            (4.12)  
HISp k
k
s
k  22
         (4.13) 
 
 
 
 
4.4.3. Objective Function 
After specifying the constraints on cash and grain inventory in each period, the 
objective function can be written as follows: 
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The objective function to be maximized is the expected end period wealth 
(equation 4.14). It is a function of the profit across the different periods in the planning 
horizon and the joint probabilities of states of nature s, t and r. r is the probability of the 
price state of nature for the end of the hungry season. Yield and prices are both random 
variables with yield and prices at harvest having a probability distribution of )(s , post-
harvest recovery price carrying a probability distribution of )(t and post-harvest price in 
the hungry season having a probability of )(r . The sum of the probabilities of states of 
nature s, t and r is equal to 1. Equation (4.15) details the profit maximized in equation 
(4.14) as the difference between the sum of the net revenue earned in each period from 
the net grain sales less costs from the cropping activities, plus wages from non-farm 
work. Estimation of this farm household model using only the present traditional 
technologies gives the optimal crop mix, quantities of grain purchased, inventories of 
stock over the planning horizon and household’s profit prior to the introduction of new 
cereal agricultural practices. This first model is the base case scenario. 
We will use it to measure the impact of the use of intensive level of inputs 
(fertilizer, urea, and improved sorghum seeds) and government policies on the decision 
variables and the farm income. 
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Variable Definitions 
Item Notation 
j  combination of crop and technology 
i  inputs used (fertilizer, urea, pesticides, herbicides, insecticides, seed) 
jy  area devoted to production system j  
ija  use of input i by production system j  
kjsb  yield per unit of area for output k  
T   =1, 2, 3 planting period, harvest and up to the next harvest 
s  state of nature of yield and prices at harvest 
t  state of nature of price between harvest and second planting 
TkC  Consumption during period T for output k  
TkS  Sales during period T for output k  
TkI  Output k  inventory for period T 
kQ1  Starting inventory for output k  
TkB  Quantity of output k purchased in period T 
TE  Expenditures in period T 
s
Tkp  Selling price of output k in period T 
b
Tkp  Buying price of output k in period T 
TR  retained cash in period T 
K  Total area of land available 
ix  Total quantity of input i available 
lx  Labor allocated for crop activities 
ic  Cost of input i per unit of hectare 
jl  labor allocated to the production system j  
ol  labor allocated to off-farm activities 
hL  Total amount of family labor available 
H  Total amount of hired labor 
s  Probability of state of nature s 
t  Probability of state of nature t 
r  Probability of state of nature r 
TkC  
Minimum consumption level for grain k in period T 
HI Harvest income goal 
str  Profit maximized in state of nature s, t, and r 
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4.5. Data 
Data used in the model came from a combination of primary and secondary 
observations. Primary data have been collected from a field survey conducted in 2008 
and supplemented by additional field research in the months of June and July 2010 in the 
village of Garasso which is part of the district of Koutiala. The surveys were designed to 
analyze the income effects of improved sorghum technologies and traditional farming 
practices on the population of 100 farmers participating in the IER-INTSORMIL 
program in Garasso. So, a stratified random sample has been defined along the 
homogenous group of farmers participating in the program and 54 percent of the total 
number of farmer members of the IER-INTORMIL program has been interviewed.  
The primary data collected included household expenditures, consumption, 
inventories, output sales, grain purchases, farm labor, agricultural input quantities and 
costs, land allocation. Secondary data were aggregate information in Koutiala from 1998 
to 2008, gathered from the Ministry of Agriculture in Mali and the “Compagnie Malienne 
pour le Développement du Textile” (CMDT). Prices data for the main crops of the model 
are monthly observations covering the time frame 1998 to 2008 and were obtained from 
the National Market Watch in Mali. Those prices have been deflated using a GDP index 
for the same time period obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Rainfall 
observations in Koutiala for the time span 1980 to 2009 have been collected with the 
State Department of Meteorology. The labor coefficients used in the model were 
developed from the household survey and confirmed by field observations from 
Coulibaly et al. (1998).  
 
 
 
4.6. Summary 
The Discrete Stochastic Model has been chosen as modeling framework because 
it captures the sequential production cycle and marketing decisions in a stochastic 
environment. The stochastic process is related to randomness of yields and grain prices. 
Grain yields are influenced by rainfall while cotton yields are dependent besides rainfall 
on the annual prices announced by the CMDT. Seasonal price variation and conditional 
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price distributions were captured through OLS regressions using retail market price data 
from the years 1998 to 2007/2008. Farmers’ decisions regarding land allocation, input 
uses, grain consumption, marketing and cash flow are assumed to be made at the 
beginning of every marketing period based on realization of the current random variables 
and farmers’ expectations about the future. The development of the empirical model 
maximizes expected wealth at the end of the planning horizon subject to resource 
constraints. The model also considers satisfaction of subsistence constraints and harvest 
income goals as farmers’ means of revealing their risk aversion. The data needed to 
estimate the model were collected from primary household survey data and supplemented 
by secondary observations.  
In the next chapters, the model will be used to evaluate the household income 
effect of the adoption of improved sorghum technologies and marketing strategies as well 
as various policy measures to restore the cotton sector. 
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CHAPTER 5: TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND MODEL PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the model results for the traditional technologies of cotton, 
maize, sorghum and millet. The results of the model are validated with empirical 
observations and observed farmers’ decision making. First, the model findings will be 
compared with farm survey data and results of other recent studies. Then, the ability of 
the model to predict farmers’ behavior in response to changes in cotton prices and 
fertilizer costs will be evaluated.  
For the first step of the model validation, we run the model with the cotton price 
and fertilizer prices for the crop season 2008/2009 as the farm household data were 
collected during that crop season. We will compare the model results with field 
observations and other research studies in the same agro-ecological zone. Then, in the 
second step, we use the 2011 cotton price and fertilizer costs to predict farmers’ acreage 
response and the income effect of those policies with the traditional technologies.  
 
 
 
5.1. Calibration and Validation of the Model 
 Running the model for the cotton price of 2008, the model allocates 3.7 ha to 
cotton, 2 ha to maize, 6.3 ha to sorghum and 3 ha to millet (see table 5.1). The large share 
of sorghum in the crop mix results from sorghum’s role as the major staple grain in the 
household. Outside of the primary cotton zone with higher rainfall, sorghum has a 
comparative advantage over maize because sorghum is more flood, drought, and low soil 
fertility tolerant than maize.  
The model results match fairly well our empirical field observations where the 
average farmer allocates 4.2 ha to cotton, 2.8 ha to maize, 5.2 ha to sorghum and 2.8 ha to 
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millet. This is not surprising as the data in the model construction have been used to 
calibrate the empirical field observations.  
The model results for the traditional technologies are compared with other 
empirical studies in the Sudano-Guinean region of Mali. Baquedano et al. (2010) 
analyzed the impact of the removal of US cotton subsidies on farm household income in 
Mali. Under traditional technologies, Baquedano et al. (2010) found that Malian farmers 
allocate 3.6 ha to cotton, 5.8 ha and 1.0 ha to sorghum and maize, respectively. Coulibaly 
et al. (1998) studied the impact of devaluation on new technology adoption in this cotton 
zone. They estimated that on average farmers grow 3.0 ha of cotton, 6 ha on sorghum and 
0.5 ha on maize and 2 ha on millet. These latter results are for moderate risk averse 
farmers. We also handle risk aversion by including constraints to satisfy subsistence 
consumption and the harvest income goal. Both constraints are expressed as priorities by 
farmers in their decision making. 
As in our study, sorghum is the principal cereal activity and the land allocations to 
the different crops are very similar to our findings.  
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Validation of the Model with Average Farm Data and Model Results 
 
Traditional Crop  Average Model’s results 
Technologies  Farm Surveyed Cotton Price=200 F CFA/kg 
Cotton (ha) 4.2 3.8 
Maize (ha) 2.8 1.9 
Sorghum (ha) 5.2 6.3 
Millet (ha) 2.8 3.0 
Total Area (ha) 15   
Total minimum household grain consumption (kg) 
Period 1
a
 5103 
 Period 2b 3645 
 Period 3c 2916  
Note:
 a
Period 1 corresponds to the agricultural season  
b
Period 2 corresponds to the price recovering period 
c
Period 3 is the lean season. 
Source: Model Results 
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The crop mix identified in this previous section is mainly driven by the 
announced cotton price at the beginning of the agricultural campaign, the fertilizer costs 
and the need to satisfy a minimum grain consumption requirement. Now, we will analyze 
how the cotton seed price and fertilizer costs have changed recently and how the 
traditional system has responded to these changes. Indeed, in 2011, two major changes 
took place in the Malian agricultural economy, the extension of the fertilizer subsidy to 
sorghum and millet and the substantial increase in the cotton farm gate price of 31 
percent relatively to the real price of cotton in 2008.  
 
 
 
5.2. New Economic Environment of Fertilizer Subsidy and Substantial Increase in Cotton 
Price in Mali 
With the debt crisis of the 1980s in developing countries the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) began putting substantial pressures on developing 
countries to eliminate subsidies and privatize the fertilizer market that was under the 
control of state-owned companies most commonly cotton parastatal. Fertilizer was 
widely distributed to farmers with government agricultural credit which resulted in high 
fiscal costs and inefficiency in the distribution process marked by many delays in the 
supply of fertilizer to farmers. As in most African countries, under the structural 
adjustment programs Mali had to reform their fertilizer market by allowing more 
competition from the private sector. Moreover, fertilizer and other subsidies in 
agriculture including on credit were eliminated in Mali during the 1990s. 
In 2005, the Malawi government designed a targeted fertilizer voucher program 
entitled Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Program (AISP) to enhance maize production and 
farmers’ income. In the AISP, targeted farm households9 received 2 subsidized coupons 
of 50 kg of fertilizer (NPK and Urea). With the subsidized coupons, farmers were only 
paying 28 percent of the market price of fertilizer, the remaining 72 percent were paid by 
the government (Dorward et al. 2008). Along with the fertilizer subsidy, maize hybrid 
                                                          
9
 According to the program objectives, households receiving the coupons were poor farmers with severe 
liquidity constraints, but in practice this was not always respected (Dorward et al.2008). 
58 
cultivars were also available at discount prices. With the combination of factors including 
good weather conditions and the use of improved maize cultivars, the AISP led to a 
significant increase in maize productivity, food availability and economic growth. Maize 
production more than doubled and the value of the agricultural sector in the GDP was 
raised from US$ 3.2 million before 2005 to US$ 11.1 million in 2006 and 2007 (Dorward 
et al. 2008).  
After Malawi’s success in raising maize yields with fertilizer subsidies, the World 
Bank position on the fertilizer subsidy changed. The World Bank position now is that 
developing countries have the right to follow their own policy initiatives and implement 
fertilizer subsidy programs. If there is another crisis similar to the one that led to the 
structural adjustment movement, we can expect the World Bank and the IMF to again 
apply pressure against subsidies. For the moment there is an understanding that 
developing countries need to increase their own food production and that fertilizer use is 
a critical element to do that. The argument for a fertilizer subsidy is a learning by doing 
or infant industry argument. As farmers learn to better use fertilizers and combine them 
with new cultivars and better agronomy, there will be a higher return over time and 
subsidies will not be necessary.  
Hence, the Malawi success story has encouraged many developing countries to 
follow this program of subsidizing fertilizer. Moreover, in the Abuja meeting in 2006 
African policy makers decided to improve fertilizer access through targeted subsidies 
with special attention to poor farmers.
 10
 The fertilizer subsidy program was also 
encouraged by the sharp increase in commodity prices in 2007 and 2008 as the result of 
the international food crisis during those years and the consequent pressure on developing 
countries to raise crop yields in the agricultural sector. 
In response to the regional call for stimulating agricultural production in Africa, 
the Malian government began providing subsidies for rice production in 2008. Then these 
subsidies were expanded in 2009 to include cotton, maize and wheat. Finally in 2011, 
after complaints from producers’ organizations and NGOs, sorghum and millet were also 
                                                          
10
 In 2006, African Union leaders signed a declaration during the Africa Fertilizer Summit in Abuja to 
stimulate an African Green Revolution through incentives to use fertilizer in Africa. 
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eligible for the fertilizer subsidy program. The subsidy was provided through vouchers to 
farmers who redeem the voucher with a private supplier. The fertilizer dealer submits the 
voucher to the government for repayment of the price differential between the market 
price and the subsidized price. 
Figure 5.1 below depicts the market prices for cotton fertilizer prices (NPKBS
11
 
and Urea) in Mali from 2003 to 2011 and the costs at which the CMDT supplied fertilizer 
to farmers during the same period of time. Fertilizer for cotton and maize are provided by 
the CMDT and private dealers supply fertilizer for the other crops. As we can observe in 
this figure, the market and CMDT fertilizer prices were at record levels in 2008 but prices 
retreated in 2009 and 2010 to their normal trend before the 2008 hikes. Then in 2011, 
fertilizer prices are resuming their 2008 hikes.  
Before 2008, the CMDT fertilizer prices were aligned with market prices. After 
2008, the CMDT fertilizer prices became much lower than the market prices because the 
government subsidized fertilizer for maize and cotton and then in 2011 millet and 
sorghum. The government subsidy in 2011 is 28 percent for NPK and 20 percent for Urea 
as compared to the average market price of 2011. Note that the subsidized price of 
fertilizer offered by the CMDT and generally received by sorghum and millet in 2011 
returned to the pre-2008 market price levels. Also note that Urea costs have dipped as 
natural gas has become cheaper. The high other fertilizer prices are influenced by the 
commodity price spike of recent years. As that comes down so will fertilizer prices. 
 
                                                          
11
 The cotton fertilizer compound NPKBS is different from the cereal compound in the fact that it contains 
boron and sulfur in addition to nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. Boron and sulfur are two essential 
nutrients for the growth of cotton. Prices for the NPKBS for cotton are slightly higher than the NPK for the 
cereals but variation of prices over time for these two types of commodities are similar.  
60 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Market and CMDT Prices for Cotton Fertilizer (NPKBS and Urea) from 2002 
to 2011 
Source: CMDT, 2011 
 
 
 
Regarding the cotton seed prices, since 2005, the farm gate cotton price is fixed 
by the government based on world cotton price of the previous year. 
12
 Normally, the 
cotton price is set in negotiation between the CMDT and farmers’ union representatives 
before the start of the crop season. The CMDT plays a very influential role in defining 
the domestic cotton price as farmers are poorly informed about the world cotton price and 
trends (OECD 2006). As we can observe from figure 5.2 below, fluctuations in the world 
                                                          
12
 The world cotton prices are the season average Cotlook Index A. An index is published every year by the 
International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC). The prices were originally in $US/lb but they have been 
converted to $US/kg in this study for comparison purpose. The Malian cotton prices are the farm gate 
cotton prices reported by the CMDT. The prices were converted to lint equivalent $US/kg using a seed/lint 
ratio coefficient of 0.42 (Alston et al. 2008) and an average annual exchange rate published by the USDA 
Economic Research Service (www.ers.usda.gov/Data/ExchangeRates). 
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price have been transmitted to the domestic farm gate price but with a lag strongly 
favoring the CMDT. After a decade of slowly increasing world prices (nominal), in 2010 
the world price more than doubled (ICAC, 2010). However even with the lagged catch up 
in 2011, the farm gate price increased by only 48 percent above the 2009 Malian price 
level. The Malian cotton price increased from $ US/kg 0.35 to $US/kg 0.51 from 2010 to 
2011.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: World and Malian Nominal Cotton Prices in Lint Equivalent from 2004 to 
2011 
Source: ICAC 2011 and CMDT 2011 
 
 
 
5.3. Model Prediction of Farmers’ Response to the Increase in Cotton Price and Fertilizer 
Subsidy without and with Grain Marketing Strategy 
Farmers generally sell at harvest to satisfy pressing household expenditures and 
make very little sales of grains during the post-harvest season. Those small sales are 
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usually called consumption because the purpose of those sales is to buy some items to 
complement domestic grain consumption. In the first runs all cereals are sold at harvest. 
Without the opportunity for farmers to sell cereals during the post-harvest period 
the combined effect of substantial increase in the cotton price and the access to fertilizer 
subsidy translate into a large expansion of the cotton and maize planting areas. Cotton 
and maize planting areas increase by 43 percent and 154 percent, respectively (table 5.2). 
The acreage expansion for cotton leads to a decrease in total area planted for cereals. 
Traditional sorghum area is the principal cereal crop affected by these price changes of 
2011 for cotton and fertilizer. The area of sorghum is drastically reduced
13
 by 72 percent. 
As a result, farmers are reallocating land and family labor resources to the most profitable 
crops which are in this case cotton and maize.  
Maize area is very responsive to the increase in the availability of fertilizer 
subsidy. With the increased price for cotton the maize producers also have an incentive 
because this makes more credit available for maize (an allowed option with the cotton 
input financing), and it is easier to repay with the higher cotton price. The maize input 
credit has to be repaid in cotton.  
Maize substitutes for sorghum in home consumption (see figure 5.3). The growth 
in cotton production and sales at a high price leads to a high household wealth estimated 
at 1,206,482 F CFA ($ 2,666), a 49 percent increase in household wealth.  
The availability of more maize and cotton for sales ease the liquidity constraints 
at the end of the planning horizon (table 5.2). With less sorghum production, the marginal 
value of the sorghum balance constraint increases by an additional 56 F CFA/kg ($0.13 
$/kg) relatively to the 2008 economy. 
Farmers’ response to the new economic environment is then analyzed allowing 
the marketing strategy for sorghum and then for all grains. The marketing strategy 
selected consists of storing the grains and selling after the price recovery and before the 
next planting season. By selling during the price recovery period farmers can take 
                                                          
13
 Since millet is concentrated on the poorer soils and there is less technology available than for either 
sorghum or maize we consider its supply to be inelastic. 
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advantage of the normal seasonal price increase especially during a bad year of 
production (figures 3.1 and 3.2 in chapter 3).  
With the higher price for sorghum from selling sorghum later, the area for 
traditional sorghum is extended at the expense of the maize area. Income increases 
further but only by 2 percent over the gains obtained from the cotton and maize 
improvements without marketing practices of sorghum. But sorghum has shown its 
potential to compete in the crop system even with the favorable conditions for cotton and 
before the new sorghum technologies are introduced. When maize and millet are also 
sold later in the season, farmers have a greater incentive to expand the maize area to 
substitute for sorghum. The overall wealth effect is an additional increase of 3 percent 
compared to the previous case identified by the marketing strategy for sorghum.  
In the 2011 economy or when the marketing strategies are adopted for all grains, 
there is less variability in the distribution of income as revealed by the lower standard 
deviation (table 5.2). So, higher cotton price and the late sales of grains enable farmers to 
secure consistently enough income throughout the year.  
With more grain marketing opportunities there is a further easing of the cash 
constraint during a bad crop year. Farmers’ ability to sell their grains later in the season 
increases the return on storage as depicted by the higher marginal value of the grain 
balance constraint at the end of the harvest period (table 5.2).  
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Table 5.2: Farmers’ Response to the 2011 Economy with their Traditional Technologies 
and the Opportunity to Implement Marketing Strategy 
 
Traditional Crop  Base Case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Technologies  TT TT TT TT 
 
No MS No MS MS for Sorghum 
MS for all 
Grains 
  
2008 
Economy 
2011 
Economy 2011 Economy 2011 Economy 
Cotton Price  200 231 231 231 
Cotton Area (ha) 3.8 5.42 5.02 5.29 
Percentage change 
 
43% 32% 39% 
Maize Area (ha) 1.9 4.82 3.83 5.99 
Percentage change 
 
154% 102% 216% 
Sorghum Area (ha) 6.3 1.77 3.15 0.71 
Percentage change 
 
-72% -50% -89% 
Millet Area (ha) 3 3 3 3 
Total Area (ha) 
 
15 15 
 End Wealth (F CFA) 
 
808,386  
 
1,206,627  
 
1,222,705  
 
1,247,780  
 
Percentage change 
  
49% 
 
51%  
 
54%  
 
Expected Marginal Value 
Grain Balance at Harvest 
(CFA/kg) 
    
Maize 23,624 20,006 20,925 21,120 
Millet 27,174 26,673 26,671 27,001 
Sorghum 24,995 25,051 26,134 26,197 
Minimum Wealth (CFA) 1,329  199,076  163,569  148,806  
Maximum Wealth (CFA) 2,525,354  2,505,395  2,874,063  2,909,505  
Standard Deviation of 
Wealth (CFA) 
535,692  479,592  521,546  514,279  
Max Marginal Value of 
Cash in Period 2 
1.79  1.41  1.31 1.34  
Max Marginal Value of 
Cash in Period 3 
7.94  4.71  2.07  1.36  
Source: Model Results 
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com 
Note: TT= Traditional Technology, MS= Marketing Strategy 
65 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Substitution in Consumption of Cereals across Policy Scenarios 
Source: Model Results 
 
 
 
5.4. Summary 
The 2011 Malian government pricing policy on cotton and the fertilizer subsidy 
led to large improvements in the household wealth. But, farmers still have a long way to 
catch up for their share of the large increase in the world cotton price. The substantial 
increase in cotton price is expected to trigger growth in cotton areas. The maize sector 
will also benefit substantially from the fertilizer subsidy and the increased access to 
fertilizer. Sorghum areas retreat significantly as cotton and maize are expanding. 
Similarly, if all grains can be stored and sold later, farmers pick maize for these sales and 
traditional sorghum decreases substantially. 
Allowing only sorghum to be stored and sold later has a very small effect on 
incomes (as does storage of all grains) compared to the other changes in economic policy 
going on, specifically the increased cotton price and the fertilizer subsisdy. In the next 
chapter we will add to the 2011 economy the new sorghum technologies.  
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CHAPTER 6: IMPROVED SORGHUM TECHNOLOGIES AND MARKETING 
STRATEGIES 
 
 
 
We saw in the previous chapter that the 2011 cotton pricing policy and fertilizer 
subsidy led to substantial household wealth and cotton acreage response. Farmers were 
diverting from local sorghum into maize and cotton. However, the opportunity to sell 
their sorghum later in the year and to receive higher prices particularly during adverse 
years of production increased the incentive to crop traditional sorghum and slightly 
increased incomes. 
In this chapter, we describe first the improved sorghum technology now available 
in the region. Next, the sorghum technology is introduced in the model without and then 
with marketing strategies and we estimate the resulting income effect and acreage 
response from technology alone and technology with marketing.
14
 The new sorghum 
technology-marketing scenarios will be analyzed with the 2011 economic conditions. We 
also compare the model results with some field observations of farmers collected in 2011 
during a following–up visit. Finally, we make some concluding observations.  
 
 
 
6.1 Improved Sorghum Technologies 
The improved sorghum technology consists of a higher yielding cultivar of 
sorghum, use of moderate levels of fertilizer in the following quantities, 50 kg of Di-
Ammonium Phosphate (DAP), 50 kg of Urea and 10 kg of seed of the improved sorghum 
cultivar. In addition to inorganic fertilizer, the Production-Marketing project of 
                                                          
14
 Note that we already considered marketing alone in the previous chapter. 
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INTSORMIL included a package of agronomic recommendations including organic 
manure, ridging, side-dressing, the split application of fertilizer and thinning. The 
principal components of the technology were the improved caudatum
15
 sorghum, 
Grinkan, and the moderate fertilizer levels. The improved sorghum variety responds well 
to inorganic fertilizer and expected yields for average farmers are 50 to 100 percent 
higher than the traditional variety. For the best farmers, yield gains go up to three times 
those of the traditional cultivars. These yield gains were derived from field investigations 
and from researchers’ estimations (Coulibaly 2010). Compared to cotton, average yield 
of the improved sorghum is one and half times above traditional cotton yields. But the 
average traditional maize yield is 7 percent higher than the mean yield for the improved 
sorghum (see table 1.2).  
Due to liquidity constraints farmers need access to bank loans for the purchase of 
fertilizer for the improved sorghum cultivar as they do for cotton and maize. Producers 
have to operate in farmers’ associations to obtain the lower price of credit of 12 percent16 
from the BNDA (National Bank for Agricultural Development) and there is a credit 
ceiling of 150,000 F CFA/ha ($/ha 332 at the exchange rate of 452 F CFA/ $US). 
Farmers can pay back their bank loans by selling their grains after prices recover from the 
harvest collapse since the bank loans are for ten months. Based on historical experience, 
expected prices increase 26 percent from the harvest price to the second price period, 
approximately four months later. So, by selling their grains after harvest, farmers can 
obtain a substantial return on storage and later sale.  
 
 
 
6.2 New Sorghum Technology in the Model with no Marketing Strategy 
With the introduction of the improved sorghum technology in the model without 
the marketing strategy, the traditional sorghum is entirely replaced by the new sorghum 
technology. By adopting the new sorghum technology even without better marketing, the 
household wealth is enhanced by 16 percent over the base case at the 2011 prices (table 
6.1).
                                                          
15
 Actually a cross between Guinea and Caudatum with 25 percent Guinea and 75 percent Caudatum.  
16
 The normal bank interest rate is 24 percent. The lower interest rate is given to the producers’ associations 
because of the reduced risk premium when lending through a famers’ association. There may also be some 
subsidy from this public institution to support farmers’ associations. 
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Table 6.1: Results of the Adoption of Improved Sorghum Technologies without and with 
Marketing Strategy under the 2011 Agricultural Economy 
 
Traditional Crop  Base Case Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Technologies  TT IST IST IST 
 
No MS No MS 
MS for 
Sorghum 
MS for all 
Grains 
 
2011 
Economy 
2011 
Economy 
2011 
Economy 
2011 
Economy 
Cotton Price (CFA/kg) 231 231 231 231 
Cotton Area (ha) 5.42 4.6 4.4 3.5 
Percentage change 
 
-16% -20% -36% 
Maize Area (ha) 4.82 3.4 3.6 4.5 
Percentage change 
 
-28% -24% -6% 
Sorghum Area (ha) 1.77 0 0 0 
Percentage change 
    Millet Area (ha) 3 3 3 3 
New Sorghum 
 
4.0 4.0 4 
Total Area (ha) 15 15 15 15 
Expected Wealth (x1000 CFA) 
Percentage change 
1,206  
 
1,394 
16% 
1,444 
20% 
1,457 
21% 
Marginal Value of the IST      -    0.75 1.32 1.28 
Credit Constraint 
    Expected Marginal Value Grain 
Balance at Harvest (CFA/kg)         
Maize  20,006 22,499 21,492 21,727 
Millet  26,672 26,754 26,690 27,096 
Sorghum 25,051 24,947 26,147 26,117 
Minimum Wealth (x1000 CFA) 199 227 105 72 
Maximum Wealth (x1000 CFA) 2,505 3,458 3,964 4,272 
Standard deviation of 
wealth(x1000 CFA) 
480 702 749 816 
Max Marginal Value of Cash 
Period 2 
1.41 1.69 1.41 1.69 
Max Marginal Value of Cash 
Period 3 
4.71 6.39 3.32 1.36 
Source: Model Results 
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com 
Note: TT= Traditional Technology, MS= Marketing Strategy 
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The new sorghum gives higher yield response under intensive input levels 
compared to the traditional varieties. The traditional tall sorghum cultivars lodge with 
higher fertilizer use.  
Thus farmers new crop portfolio is composed of all intensive crops that require 
fertilizer use with the exception of millet.
17
 On the best lands, the improved sorghum is 
competing with cotton and maize in land allocation. The fact that farmers do not have to 
reimburse their input loans for sorghum at harvest when prices are at their lowest levels 
leads to higher returns of the improved sorghum. Here they do not have the option to 
market later but can keep the sorghum for consumption over the crop year. With the new 
technology farmers are diverting land and family labor from maize and cotton to grow 4 
ha of the improved sorghum.  
The area cultivated for the improved sorghum could have even been higher if 
farmers were not limited in the amount of credit they could borrow. Indeed, the marginal 
value of the credit constraint shows an opportunity cost of 0.75. This means that if 
farmers had an additional 1 F CFA available they would have purchased more fertilizer to 
grow sorghum and increase their wealth by 0.75 F CFA. So, the shadow value of the 
credit constraint indicates a return of 75 percent on the marginal increase of credit. This 
return is higher than the interest rate on the bank loans for the purchase of fertilizer for 
sorghum and reveals consequently the high profitability of the improved sorghum as well 
as the limiting nature to farmers of the credit constraint when the new sorghum 
technology is available.  
Sales of sorghum at harvest become very important especially with the low cotton 
yields. As discussed previously farmers have important cash requirements at harvest. 
With the introduction of the new sorghum, there is more flexibility in the pattern of grain 
consumption, sales and purchases. More sorghum is sold during years of higher harvest 
price of sorghum relatively to maize. Consumption of sorghum substitutes for maize 
particularly when the harvest price of sorghum is less attractive than the maize price. 
                                                          
17 Millet area stays constant in the crop mix because millet is traditionally grown on poor lands and is the 
only produce in the crop mix that can respond reasonably well on these poorer soils. However, many 
Malians prefer millet as a food so the harvest prices of millet are higher than those of sorghum and maize.  
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With the new technology farmers need to purchase less maize and sorghum for their 
home consumption (figure 6.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Expected Quantity of Grain Sold at Harvest across Policy Scenarios 
Source: Model Results 
 
 
 
With the introduction of the new sorghum technology, the marginal value of cash 
increases substantially (table 6.1) during poor states of nature of the new sorghum variety 
as farmers need money to satisfy their financial needs. So, farmers will have a higher 
incentive to store enough millet and maize for their consumption and household 
expenses. This is reflected in the larger marginal value of millet and maize grain balance 
constraints. 
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6.3 New Sorghum Technology in the Model plus the Marketing Strategy 
The opportunity for farmers to sell sorghum in the price recovery period yields an 
additional 4 percent increase in the ending wealth relative to the previous case when 
farmers were only able to sell at harvest (table 6.1). The higher post-harvest prices for 
sorghum gave an increased incentive to farmers to postpone their sales of sorghum until 
the price recovery period (up to the next planting season) and increase their revenues. 
Hence, in figure 6.1, we see that no sales of sorghum occur at harvest when farmers can 
implement the marketing strategy. The stock of sorghum above consumption is carried 
into the price recovery period. The returns for the improved sorghum cultivar are 
increasing as revealed by the larger marginal value of the sorghum credit constraint.  
The credit constraint for the improved sorghum is still binding and the marginal 
value of 1.31 indicates a 131 percent return on investment in expanding the sorghum 
area. If there were no input credit constraint, farmers would have increased the area 
allocated to the new sorghum above the 4 ha. We might ask whether given the credit 
constraint on increasing the land planted for the new sorghum cultivar, why farmers are 
still not cultivating the traditional sorghum to supplement the improved sorghum 
production and respond to the higher return on marketing sorghum. With the availability 
of the fertilizer subsidy and the high cotton price, farmers prefer to grow additional area 
of maize and sell at harvest prices thereby satisfying consumption objectives and 
enabling sorghum to be sold later. Thus, we notice that although the maize area is still 
lower than that of the base case scenario, there is a small positive area response of maize 
which increases by 4 percent compared to the case where post-harvest sales for sorghum 
did not occur.  
The small increase in maize area comes at the expense of cotton area which is 
reduced for the maize area. Maize is competing with cotton for additional fertilizer 
resources and maize displays larger net returns during the very bad years of cotton 
production characterized by cotton yields below 800 kg/ha and a high harvest price for 
maize. Nevertheless, cotton still represents the largest area in the improved farming 
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system. Note the constraint on the further increase of the sorghum area.
18
 Also, with 
farmers’ opportunity to adopt the improved marketing practices for all their grains, there 
is a slight increase in the household wealth and more competition between sorghum and 
maize in land allocation at the expense of cotton (table 6.1). Note that with the 
opportunity to store and sell all cereals more maize is produced and sold but there is no 
reduction of the sorghum area. Cotton area reduction now makes the increased cereals 
marketing more profitable. So the crux of the diversification decision is the increasing 
importance of both cereals.  
The adoption of the improved sorghum and grain marketing strategies lead to 
higher income but there is more variability in the distribution of wealth around the 
expected value as revealed by the standard deviation of wealth (table 6.1). The decreasing 
marginal value of cash at the end of the marketing periods is an indication that farmers 
become less cash constrained when they are able to sell sorghum and the other grains 
later in the season at higher prices. Also, with the sorghum and the other grain marketing 
opportunities producers value more their stock of grains available at the end of harvest 
(table 6.1).   
The model results with the adoption of improved sorghum and marketing strategy 
were compared with farmers’ predictions regarding their land allocation during a field 
survey at the beginning of the 2011 agricultural campaign with a sample of 34 farmers in 
the study area. For the 2011 crop year, the interviewed farmers intend to allocate 4.8 ha 
of land to cotton, 3 ha both to maize and traditional sorghum, 2.9 ha to millet and 1.3 ha 
of land to the new sorghum. The model result overestimated the land allocated to the new 
sorghum and underestimated area in the traditional sorghum but they indicated a shift to 
the new sorghum technology. They also indicate how models adjust faster than farmers to 
new economic opportunities requiring some agronomic and marketing adjustments by 
farmers. 
                                                          
18
 With a large scale introduction of the sorghum technologies we expect the sorghum price to fall. One 
result will be the increasing substitution of sorghum for maize in the rations for poultry and other animals. 
This scaling up of the sorghum technology and expanded use in poultry feed is expected to occur over the 
next five years. 
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6.4 Summary 
Under the 2011 policy interventions, the opportunity for farmers to adopt the 
improved sorghum agricultural technologies leads to a substantial rise in household 
wealth. This increase is largely driven by the switch from the traditional sorghum 
technologies to the improved one and the resulting higher yield effect. The introduction 
of the improved sorghum in the farming system increases the opportunity costs of 
financial capital and suggests a need for a greater access to credit.  
The prospect for farmers to take advantage of the price seasonality especially 
during adverse years by selling sorghum or maize later in the years has a positive but 
smaller impact on the household wealth as compared to the introduction of the improved 
sorghum cultivar and associated technologies. Combining both agricultural technologies 
for sorghum and marketing strategies produces the highest income effect due to the 
cumulative impact of the good fertilizer response of the new sorghum variety and the 
higher market prices. 
Note that with both new technology and the marketing strategy farmers’ returns 
are higher with sorghum than with cotton. In the region where this technology was 
introduced farmers in surrounding regions call Grinkan (the new sorghum cultivar) the 
“cotton of Garasso.” 
In the next chapter we consider what happens when the golden age of 2011 ends. 
Then cotton prices are expected to come back down and fertilizer subsidies eliminated.  
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CHAPTER 7: BACK TO NORMAL: REMOVING THE FERTILIZER SUBSIDY AND 
RESPONDING TO THE EXPECTED DECLINE OF THE COTTON PRICE 
 
 
 
The previous chapter analyzed farmers’ response to the introduction of the 
improved sorghum with the economic conditions of 2011, including a substantial increase 
in the cotton price and the access to fertilizer subsidies for sorghum. In this chapter, we 
consider the return to the trend of world cotton prices and the elimination of the fertilizer 
subsidies. First, we review the economic forces driving the expected changes in the 
Malian cotton pricing policy and fertilizer subsidy program. Second, we simulate first the 
effect of the reduction of the high cotton prices and then we add in the increase in 
fertilizer costs. The cotton price comes down by 8 percent. Fertilizer prices increase by 
24 percent with the elimination of the subsidies. Both scenarios are compared with the 
2011 economic environment including the new sorghum technology and marketing 
changes.  
 
 
 
7.1 Predicted Policy Change in the Cotton Price and Fertilizer Subsidy 
The historic 2010 increase in the world cotton price has substantially increased 
cotton production in the big producer countries. World production is expected to rise by 8 
percent in 2011 in most of the world producing countries except in the US (ICAC 2011). 
Even though cotton areas have grown significantly in the US, bad weather conditions in 
Texas, especially the drought have resulted in a substantial yield decline. So, US 
production is projected to decrease by 12 percent relative to 2010 (ICAC 2011). Cotton 
production in India, China and Australia, is expected to reach record levels. Thus, with 
the surge in world cotton supply of cotton, stocks will be replenished, import demand in 
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large importing countries will be reduced and the overall effect will be a lower world 
cotton price than in 2010. 
Furthermore, the decline in the world cotton price will also be driven by the 
output expansion with the increasing use of transgenic BT cotton and the continuing 
competition from synthetic fibers. The ICAC secretariat could not publish a price forecast 
for the year 2011 based on the price model because this model performs well only when 
the cotton price is in its historical range (ICAC 2011). However, based on the ending 
stock consumption ratio in China and the rest of the world, a price decline of 15 percent 
with respect to the 2010 price is expected (Commodities 2011).  
We used a price elasticity method (Alston et al. 2007) to compute the elasticity of 
price transmission between the world cotton price and the farm gate lint equivalent cotton 
price from 2004 to 2011. We found a transmission elasticity of 0.54. During the time 
period 2004 to 2011, farmers receive 54 percent of the changes in the world cotton price. 
This elasticity coefficient is also very close to the 58 percent estimate of Baquedano et al. 
(2009). Then, we determined a base price at the Malian gin gate by translating the 2011 
farm gate seed price into lint equivalent price. Based on the assumption of a 15 percent 
world price decrease in 2011, and the price transmission elasticity of 0.54, we found that 
the farm gate cotton lint price will decrease by 45 F CFA/kg ($/kg 0.1) or by 8 percent. 
When we translate the farm gate cotton lint price into cotton seed price we found that 
farmers will be paid 212 F CFA/kg ($/kg 0.47) in real price for the next agricultural 
season. So, this price will be used in the model to predict farmers’ response to a change 
in the farm gate price. 
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Table 7.1: Impact of a Decrease in the World Cotton Price on the Cotton Fiber Price in 
Mali 
 
World Price Malian Fiber Price 
 
Base Price
1
= 550 F CFA/kg ($/kg 1.22) 
 
Elasticity of transmission= 0.54 
Percent change Absolute change (F CFA/kg) Percent change 
-15% -45 ($/kg 0.1) -8% 
Source: Author calculations 
Note:
 1
The base price is the cotton fiber price in Mali in 2011. This price is obtained by dividing 
the real farm gate cotton seed price by the seed/lint coefficient ratio of 0.42. The elasticity of 
transmission is found by taking the average of the ratio between the percentage change in export 
price to the percentage change in the farm gate fiber price from 2004 to 2011 (% fE PP  % ) 
(see Alston et al. 2007). 
 
 
 
The second change in the government policy that will occur is the removal of the 
fertilizer subsidy. The subsidy on fertilizer has been provided since 2008. The goal was to 
increase agricultural productivity through moderate use of fertilizer, to improve soil 
fertility and to help farmers overcome the liquidity constraint. Although important in 
improving agricultural production, the fertilizer subsidy program will not be sustainable 
in a medium or long term because of several factors.  
First of all, criticisms of the fertilizer program view this program as high cost for 
governments in developing countries (Harrigan 2008) and donors are unlikely to be 
willing to help pay for this program as costs accelerate with more farmer participation.  
Second, evidence from Malawi shows that a voucher fertilizer subsidy program is 
often inefficient because of difficulties in the implementation of the program. In Malawi, 
there was a lack of transparency in targeting the desired beneficiaries of the fertilizer 
subsidy. Generally, producers with a significant number of assets or strong political 
connections receive the subsidy as opposed to poor farmers with little endowment and 
connections who are often claimed to be the main beneficiaries (Ricker-Gilbert et al. 
2011).  
Thirdly, the market prices for fertilizer in Mali are expected to stay on an upward 
trend. In 2011, fertilizer prices were moving toward the record level of the 2008 year 
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after a setback in 2010 (see figure 5.1). From 2011 to 2014, world demand for fertilizer is 
expected to remain strong due to population growth, rising income in emerging countries 
and biofuel development in USA, Brazil and European Union.  
The growing population and incomes in emerging countries are expected to 
increase the demand for vegetables, grains and other agricultural products as well as lead 
to intensification in land use with increasing application of fertilizer. Rising income will 
boost demand for meat which uses grains as animal feeds. The production of biofuels 
using cereals such as corn, sugar cane and oilseed is forecasted to increase and compete 
with the crude oil prices which are projected to remain strong (IFA 2011). All those 
factors accelerate grain consumption and support a rise in fertilizer demand.  
On the supply side, world fertilizer is forecasted to increase at modest rates due to 
increased production capacity in many exporting countries (FAO 2010). This growth will 
be mainly triggered by surpluses of nitrogen and phosphate while potash is likely to 
remain more or less stable. Overall, even though the balance between supply and demand 
shows some positive surpluses in the medium term, it is expected to be tight in the 
coming years.  
So, with the expansion of the fertilizer subsidy to more crops and more farmers 
and with the probable increased fertilizer prices, the fertilizer subsidy program will 
become more expensive for the Malian government and ultimately will not be fiscally 
sustainable for the government. Moreover, in the medium to long run if there are crises 
again international agencies will push the government to reduce or eliminate the fertilizer 
subsidies. Thus we will consider the case of eliminating the 24 percent difference 
between world and Malian fertilizer prices.  
 
 
 
7.2 Effect of a Reduction in the Farm Gate Cotton Price 
The 8 percent decrease in the farm gate price leads to a small decrease in the area 
in cotton and a marginal increase in maize area (table 7.2). Production of the new 
sorghum stays at its maximum 4 ha with the credit constraint. 
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The income effect resulting from the 8 percent reduction in the cotton price is a 
decrease of the household wealth by 5 percent (table 7.2). This is primarily due to the 
reduction in the expected return from cotton following a decline in cotton area. A larger 
reduction in household wealth has been offset by the higher returns to sorghum driven by 
the increased sorghum sales. This is an important result as marketing strategies to 
improve sorghum prices or in general grain prices can soften the negative impact on the 
household wealth following a decline in the farm gate cotton price. The reduction in 
cotton price introduces more risk in the distribution of the expected ending wealth 
through the larger standard deviation of wealth and increases substantially the marginal 
value of cash across periods (table 7.2).  
The higher marginal value of the sorghum credit constraint of 1.48 (table 7.2) 
indicates farmers’ willingness to invest more in the improved sorghum. Sorghum 
provides the largest expected return among the crops due to a combination of factors 
including the reduced cotton price, the fertilizer subsidy and the prospect to sell sorghum 
at higher prices after storage.  
Purchases of grains particularly sorghum and maize are very limited during the 
post-harvest season (table 7.3). Rather farmers increase their sales of sorghum by selling 
a larger part of their sorghum production in the price recovery period while no harvest 
sales occur (table 7.3). Consumption of sorghum is kept at a minimal level due to the 
higher return on marketing. Maize and to a lesser extent millet, substitute for sorghum in 
consumption (table 7.2). Millet contributes to the financing of household expenditures at 
harvest. There is a higher percentage of millet sold at harvest time relatively to the other 
grains to compensate for the decreased cotton sold then (see table 7.3).  
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Table 7.2: Farmers’ Response to a Reduction in Cotton Price and Removal of 
Fertilizer Subsidy 
 
Traditional Crop  Base Case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Technologies  
Improved 
Sorghum  
Improved 
Sorghum Improved Sorghum 
 
Marketing 
Strategy 
MS for all 
Grains MS for all Grains 
 
for all 
Grains 
Reduction in 
Cotton Price 
Reduction in Cotton 
Price 
  
2011 
Economy only 
and Removal of 
Fertilizer Subsidy 
Cotton Price 231 212 212 
Cotton Area (ha) 3.49 3.31 1.35 
Percentage change 
 
-5% -61% 
Maize Area (ha) 4.51 4.7 1.17 
Percentage change 
 
4% -74% 
Traditional Sorghum Area (ha) 0 0 6.47 
Percentage change 
   Millet Area (ha) 3 3 3 
New Sorghum 4 4 3.01 
Percentage change 
 
0% -25% 
Total Area (ha) 15 15 15 
Expected End Wealth (F CFA) 
 
1,457,230 
 
1,388,355  
 
1,154,091  
 
Percentage change   -5% -21% 
Marginal Value of the IST 1.28 1.48 0.80 
Credit Constraint 
   Minimum Wealth (CFA) 72,088 19,952 0.000 
Maximum Wealth (CFA) 4,271,996 4,261,232 4,489,907 
Standard Deviation of Wealth 816,187 826,410 888,311 
Marginal Value of Grain Balance 
Constraint (CFA/kg) 
   Maize  21,728 21,775 24,823 
Millet  27,096 27,142 27,994 
Sorghum 26,117 26,120 26,222 
Max Marginal Value of Cash Period 
2 
1.69 1.70 2.36 
Max Marginal Value of Cash Period 
3 
1.36 1.39 12.82 
Source: Model Results 
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com 
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Table 7.3: Expected Grain Consumption, Sales and Purchases across Policy Scenarios 
 
  
Expected Consumption 
(kg) Expected Sales (kg) Expected Purchases (kg) 
 
Harvest Price Recovery Harvest Price Recovery Harvest Price Recovery 
  Season Season Season Season Season Season 
Improved Sorghum and Marketing Strategies 
Sorghum 205 280 0 2962 167 13 
Maize 3435 2261 0 1419 396 1 
Millet 5 375 287 907 0 22 
Total 3645 2916 287 5289 562 36 
Reduction in Cotton Price only 
Sorghum 105 285 0 3081 71 6 
Maize 3536 2269 1 1557 169 1 
Millet 4 362 378 925 0 12 
Total 3645 2916 378 5562 241 19 
Reduction in Cotton Prices and Removal of Fertilizer Subsidy 
Sorghum 2203 1601 0 4634 0 0 
Maize 1442 781 0 147 330 180 
Millet 0 533 738 836 0 7 
Total 3645 2916 738 5617 330 187 
Model Results 
 
 
 
7.3. Effect of a Reduction in Cotton Price and Removal of Fertilizer Subsidy 
With the reduction in cotton seed price combined with the increased fertilizer 
costs, there is a double constraint on the cotton and maize production. First, the lower 
cotton price reduces the cotton expected returns and the area planted to cotton (table 7.2). 
Secondly, the higher fertilizer costs further reduce cotton profitability and the acreage 
response. Maize area decreases also substantially (table 7.2) because the input tied credit 
available for maize as well is linked to the cotton price and the cost of fertilizer. Maize 
input credits from the CMDT must be repaid in cotton. 
The improved sorghum area declines by 25 percent but the declines in cotton and 
maize area are at least twice that. The traditional sorghum area (without fertilizer) 
increases by a sizable amount and is now cropped on 6 ha of land. The grain marketing 
opportunity at higher prices improves the expected return of sorghum and reduces the 
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effect of higher fertilizer costs on the improved sorghum profitability. Moreover, the 
production costs of the improved sorghum cultivar are lower than those of cotton and 
maize. Those two latter crops require higher level of fertilizer (200 kg/ha instead of 100 
kg/ha for the improved sorghum) and other input expenses including a high level of 
insecticides for cotton.
19
  
Profitability of sorghum increases with farmers’ ability to take advantage of the 
price seasonality. The share of sorghum planted on the best lands increases from 33 
percent to 75 percent and the use of sorghum as a cash crop is enhanced with higher sales 
at harvest and during the second price period (table 7.3). With the decrease in maize 
production and larger supply of sorghum, this latter crop substitutes for maize in 
consumption.  
A change in the 2011 agricultural economy simulated through a decline in cotton 
price and the elimination of the fertilizer subsidy leads to a sharp reduction in household 
wealth, which falls by 21 percent (table 7.2). There is a higher exposure to risk in the 
distribution of wealth and in the poor states of nature where farmers do not make any 
profit, the marginal value of cash achieves a peak level (table 7.2). Clearly, the cost of 
fertilizer is a central policy measure which impacts markedly household wealth.  
 
 
 
7.4 Summary 
The predicted policy change of 8 percent reduction in the cotton seed price has 
only a small impact on the household wealth and cotton area. The yield effect of 
improved sorghum and the ability of farmers to store and sell sorghum after harvest play 
key roles in generating additional revenue if farmers continue to have access to bank 
loans at favorable interest rates as they do presently. This combination of factors could 
lead to major shifts in some regions such as the Koutiala region and the sorghum 
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 The production function for cotton and maize includes farmers’ customary use of fertilizer as 
recommended by CMDT and zero fertilization. The case is similar for sorghum but with lower fertilizer 
recommendations. In the future more alternative fertilization data would be useful for defining other 
alternatives as some of the reduction of maize and cotton may be due lack of alternative options, this linear 
production function. We are grateful to Jerry Shively for this point.  
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technology also should be a big benefit to Mali in feeding itself and in making shifts to 
more processed food from sorghum and to the use of sorghum substituting for maize in 
feed rations. 
When the subsidy is removed on fertilizer, farmers’ incomes are severely 
affected. But, there are still higher returns on cultivating the improved sorghum compared 
to cotton and maize. Sorghum profitability was boosted here by the returns on marketing. 
There were substantial impacts on marketing from the shifts to sorghum. This differs 
from our earlier finding that marketing had little impact on incomes in comparison with 
the sorghum technology introduction.  
As the fertilizer subsidy will be fiscally unsustainable in the medium to long run, 
it is important to find other non-subsidized methods to reduce the cost of fertilizer. These 
could include higher nutrient fertilizers, better transportation, improved agronomy to 
make better use of available fertilizer, and improved distribution networks for 
fertilizer.After evaluating the importance of new technology, marketing and fertilizer in 
driving household incomes, the next question is the benefits to women (and children) 
from these different changes.  
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CHAPTER 8: WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY ON WOMEN 
 
 
 
This chapter raises the question of the benefits accruing to women and the welfare 
impact on women resulting from new economic opportunities already studied for their 
household income effects in the previous chapters. The specific economic opportunities 
are the new sorghum technologies and associated marketing practices, the increased 
cotton prices, and finally the fertilizer subsidy. In the previous chapter, we have observed 
that these latter economic opportunities led to substantial income effects for the 
household. In this chapter, we are emphasizing the sharing of the increased profit within 
the household, particularly women’s gains from the improved technology and marketing. 
Women are an important labor resource used on the household communal field 
along with the male adult family members. When a new economic opportunity requiring 
higher labor investments occurs, women have been observed reducing their participation 
on their individual plots to respond to the higher demand for labor on the communal or 
family land (Savadogo, Sanders and Mc Millan 1989). The resulting effect is an increase 
in the household income generated on the family plot with men controlling this increased 
income. The share of the additional income accruing to women or income compensation 
for women’s increased labor is the outcome of negotiation between spouses and depends 
on their relative bargaining power. Since the household head has greater control of the 
household decision making and productive resources, women (and the other adult males 
in the household) may not be fully compensated for their increased labor participation on 
the communal field.  
With many other demands on women’s time for child care, food preparation, 
water and firewood delivery and the priority of work in the communal lands, greater 
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labor demand on the communal lands means reduced time available and hence income 
from the private plots of women. So, this chapter aims at investigating the benefits and 
net welfare effects that women get from the adoption of new sorghum technologies and 
the higher cotton prices and the other changes discussed in the previous chapters.  
First, it describes the household decision making and women’s role in the farming 
system. Second, the methodology and results of the estimation of the impact of adoption 
of the new policies on women are discussed. Lastly, policy implications are derived from 
the findings. 
 
 
 
8.1. Household Decision Making 
 This section considers the intra-family labor allocation and the role of women in 
the farm family system. It also defines the theories of resource allocation and income 
distribution within the household. 
 
 
 
8.1.1. Farm Family and Women’s Traditional Roles 
In rural sub-Saharan African households, agricultural production generally takes 
place on a communal land area and in private, individual plots. The historic role of the 
communal land is to provide the subsistence consumption during the year. With the 
addition of cash crops, the household head obligation remains to provide for the family 
food requirements. However, there are often increased income streams beyond these 
basic food requirements. These are still controlled by the household
20
 head with other 
household members including women increasingly contesting for them.   
The male household head has a dominant power in his relationship with other 
household members. He controls the labor allocated to the communal field and the 
income generated from this land (Gladwin and McMillan 1989, Hopkins, Levin and 
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 The household in West Africa traditionally refers to large extended families composed of several nuclear 
families, generally siblings living together with their wives and children. The size may exceed 30 but the 
average is around 15. The household is under the authority of a single head, usually a man. Anthropologists 
often define the household as those eating from the same pot. 
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Haddad, 1994). All active household members can allocate their labor to their private plot 
activities only after meeting the obligation of working on the communal land.  
Social and religious customs prevailing in a given household, as well as women’s 
age dictate the extent of women involvement on the communal land. This varies from no 
work on the communal land to full employment. Indeed, even though some families 
exempt women from participating in communal activities, many other households require 
women to perform certain agricultural tasks during the farming season. Younger women 
are generally involved in most cropping activities whereas older women have a privileged 
status in the household. The participation of older women in the communal plot activities 
is voluntary. They are also exempted from most domestic household chores particularly 
when their daughters in law are included in the extended family and do these chores for 
them. But we are studying in this research the average woman in the household with 
obligation to work on the communal plot and who receives a private plot. 
In return for labor participation on the communal plot, family subsistence grain 
consumption and other necessary household expenditures are paid for by the household 
head. Also, depending on the state of nature of the cropping year, women are 
compensated for their work during the agricultural season by receiving some gifts 
including clothes, cash payment or an additional share of the grain production above their 
subsistence needs, which they can sell. Private plots are allocated by male household 
heads to individual household members principally for the purpose of growing crops for 
sale to supply their personal needs or to complement consumption in the family. The 
rights to specific private plots are generally made on an annual basis based on the 
household head discretion and land availability. 
Women produce vegetables, legumes and spices on their private plots. Women 
are the principal decision makers regarding production on their private plot or other 
personal income generating activities. Women use their private plots to complement 
home consumption and for their own financial needs and those of their children. They 
make decisions based on the residual time left after meeting the requirement for 
household chores and communal work. Then, depending on their time availability after 
these main activities including their private plot, they can be involved in off farm work or 
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self-employment activities such as craft work, beer brewing or food marketing. Given all 
these multiple tasks performed by women, they have a very long work day and have to 
give up their leisure time (Lado 1992). Some studies reported that women spend on 
average 12-16 hours a day in agricultural and household work (Warner and Campbell 
2000). While women contribute actively to farm production and family income 
generation, women and non-household head men are confronted with unequal access to 
productive resources including land, labor, technology, and credit (Warner and Campbell 
2000).  
The introduction of a new intensive agricultural technology on the communal plot 
involves a readjustment of women’s labor allocation with increasing time spent on the 
communal plot. This leads to less labor supplied to the private plot and thereby to 
reduced earnings from the private plot. But women can still be made better off depending 
upon how the household head spends the increased incomes resulting from the new 
technologies and the decision making prevailing in the household.  
 
 
 
8.1.2. Theories of Household Decision Making 
Household decision making plays an important role in determining the 
distribution of income within the family and the payment received by women for their 
communal work. Three types of family decision making have been specified as 
influencing the value of women’s labor. These are the exploitation theory, the neo-
classical theory and bargaining theory. 
In the exploitation theory the household head is portrayed as a dictator who 
allocates resources in the family not necessarily for the best interest of household 
members. Women are relegated to subordinate roles within the household. The division 
of labor and distribution of resources within the family is shaped to be more profitable to 
the male household head (Heath and Ciscel 1988). The household head reaps most of the 
benefits of the labor efforts of family members and women’s share of household income 
is determined by whatever the household head wants to pay them. In this condition, the 
value of women’s labor in farm production is not determined by economic market forces 
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but rather enforced by social factors, customs or expectations about women’s role in the 
family and economy (Folbre 1986). Under the exploitation theory, we would not expect 
women’s share of household income to increase with new income streams in the 
household or to increase very much. 
The other extreme representation of the decision making in the household is the 
one attributed to the neo-classical economists who represent the household as a unitary 
model with a joint utility function. The household head is described as being altruistic 
and allocates resources within the family for the best interest of family members. So 
incomes would be divided by the needs of the household and the household head only 
embodies this decision making maximizing the welfare of the household. In the altruistic 
decision making, increased income streams are perfectly divided satisfying everybody. 
Empirically, the joint utility hypothesis has been challenged by empirical studies. Much 
informal evidence in developing countries indicate that household members have diverse 
preferences, particularly in the context of extended family and household demand for 
goods and leisure depends on the identity of the individual controlling the income (see for 
example Schlutz 1990, Thomas 1997, and Hopkins et al. 1994).   
Generally, the exploitation and neo-classical views of women’s labor allocation 
and family decision making have not been empirically confirmed. Rather, numerous 
studies in developing countries point out some interactions in the process of household 
resource allocation and income distribution within the household. The dynamic of intra- 
household resource allocation is captured through game theory tools. For this aim, Nash 
Bargaining models of cooperation and non-cooperation in resource allocation and 
distribution within the family have been developed by  Bourguignon and Chiappori 
(1992), Manser and Brown (1980) as well as Mc Elroy and Horney (1981).  
The decision making process with the bargaining theory is analogous to the one of 
a firm where conflicts are resolved through negotiation. All household members know 
they need to collaborate to survive but there is conflict over the income streams 
especially as new technologies increase income. For example both company officials and 
the workers (or union) conflict over income shares but both know they are dependent 
upon each other. Sen (1990) terms this as “cooperation-conflict”. Hence, bargaining 
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theories have been developed based on the cooperation-conflict relationship in the 
household. The outcome of negotiation is determined by the relative bargaining power 
which is derived from the parties’ best alternative options or “threat point”. But, there is 
also possibility for the party with less power to exit the contract if dissatisfied. The 
relevance of the exit option between bargaining parties depends on how credible the 
threat point is. So, in bargaining models, a key determinant of women’s share of 
household income is their bargaining power. Women’s bargaining power is generally 
influenced by better education, women’s opportunity costs, access to productive 
resources and social norms (Jones 1983a, Agarwal 1997).  
 
 
 
8.2. Method for the Estimation Procedure for the Welfare Impact 
of Policies Changes on Women 
The welfare effect on women of new policy initiatives will be measured through 
the change in women’s total income in various scenarios with technology and policy 
changes that were analyzed in previous chapters. The conceptual approach, empirical 
estimation approach and the data required are laid out below. 
 
 
 
8.2.1. Conceptual Approach 
The conceptual approach of the welfare impact of new sorghum technologies and 
agricultural policies focuses on the two most important farm productive activities for 
women: the communal field and the private plot. Women’s additional work on the 
communal plot resulting from the increased demand for their labor of new technologies 
and policies enables them to receive additional compensation at harvest and to guarantee 
their food consumption and that of their children. The private plot work is women’s best 
alternative opportunity. The welfare impact of the introduction of a labor intensive new 
technologies and/or policies on the communal plot can be summarized in the diagram 
below: 
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Figure 8.1: Diagram of the Welfare Impact on Women of a Labor Intensive Economic 
Opportunity 
Source: Author Own Design 
 
 
 
Conceptually, the introduction of new economic opportunity on the communal 
plot leads to a reallocation of labor to respond to the higher demand for labor on the 
communal plot and will result in an increased profit controlled by the household head. 
Then the change in women’s welfare following the new economic opportunity will 
depend on women’s share from the increased incomes and the impact that her labor use 
on the communal land will have on her private plot.
21
  
The increased profit from the communal plot translates into increased payments 
from the communal plot in the form of gifts principally clothes, cash or cereals. In the 
1990s, the cotton economy was characterized by higher cotton seed price and higher 
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 This increase labor could also come from other activities or leisure. We are treating here the case where 
the labor increase in the communal plot reduces private plot activity. There is a literature arguing that 
women have no leisure time as they have many pressing responsibilities. 
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profits for farm households. So, during this period of cotton boom the harvest gifts to 
women were substantial (Lilja and Sanders 1998). Cash and clothes were the principal 
gifts received. With the decline of the cotton economy in the 21st century, the system 
returned to a more traditional pattern. Women’s harvest gifts were reduced and included 
mainly grains which women could sell. With the 2011 spike in the cotton price and 
adoption of new technologies, sizable income surplus for households are expected and 
women harvest gifts are therefore likely to increase. 
The supply of labor time on the communal plot enables household members to 
receive their subsistence allowance. The household head has the obligation to provide the 
subsistence allowance to all his household members. The subsistence allowance is a 
minimum amount of grains consumed by every household member and it is the outcome 
of the production of cereals on the communal field. So, home consumption is part of the 
household members’ compensation for their collective work on the family farm. In the 
traditional system, the pressure of just providing subsistence consumption leads to 
collaboration. When there is new technology, there will be increased demands for family 
labor and new income streams will be generated. In this new system of the cotton zone, 
farmers are already eating well. So little change in the subsistence grain production is 
expected
22
.  
With the increased returns on the communal plot, farmers have often been 
observed making household investments for the collective good of their families. The 
household investment expenditures benefiting women include housing improvement, new 
farm equipment, children’s education, and health improvement. Even though such 
investments undoubtedly improve women’s welfare, it is difficult to measure 
quantitatively the effect of many household investments on women’s welfare. This is 
illustrated by asking how much a motorcycle purchase, housing improvement or another 
wife for the household head benefits women? An additional wife may reduce the labor 
requirements of other family members. Clearly, improvement in housing would benefit 
all household members but how much is the benefit to women? Given the limits to 
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 Other food components were undoubtedly added to the grain consumption but we did not measure them. 
So, we understate women’s welfare improvement by the value of diet improvement. 
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measure the effect of such parameters on women’s total income, they will not be included 
in the estimation of women’s welfare.  
Under the traditional technology, women receive most of their disposable income 
from the private plot although these are generally marginal lands in which few improved 
inputs are used. Income from self-employment activities is minimal in many regions
23
 
and the off-farm rural labor market has become more restricted with the downturn of the 
cotton economy before the year 2010.
24
 With the increased labor time on the communal 
land, women’s additional time will be principally coming from the private plot since 
household duties require a fixed amount of labor time and little time is allocated to non-
farm activities during the agricultural season. Women are constrained to spend at least 4 
hours/day in domestic work from field interviews. Self-employment opportunities are not 
very common during the agricultural season so the amount of time that women devote to 
these activities is minimal.  
Thus the evaluation of the welfare impact on women of new policies will consider 
the benefits received from the communal field and the changes in the returns from the 
private plot.
25
  
 
 
 
8.2.2. Empirical Estimation 
The welfare impact on women of new economic incentives is evaluated by using 
a partial budgeting approach which considers changes in the communal payment, the 
subsistence allowance and the private plot earnings. The empirical estimation of the 
welfare impact of new sorghum technologies and agricultural policies focuses on the two 
most important productive activities for women: the communal field and the private plot. 
Women’s additional work on the communal plot enables them to receive additional 
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 Villages on the main highways with seasonal products to sell often benefit women but this was not 
important in our evaluated village. 
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 We are restating that the year 2011 was characterized by a spike in the farm gate cotton price 
 
25
 This approach underestimates surely women’s welfare but it is the best that can be done given the limits 
in measuring quantitatively the benefits to women from increased family expenditures. 
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compensation at harvest and to guarantee their food consumption and that of their 
children. The private plot work is women’s best alternative opportunity.  
The general form of women’s income earnings is defined as: 
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f yyyfY           (8.1) 
where fY is the total private income earned by women, fcy is the communal plot 
payment fsy is the value of the subsistence allowance and
f
py is the private plot earnings. 
The communal payment is represented by the value of gifts that women receive at harvest 
from the household head for their labor effort supplied on the communal plot during the 
agricultural season. These gifts are received in diverse forms that are in-kind (grains, 
clothes) or in cash payment.  
The welfare impact of technological change or new economic policy on women is 
a function of first the income gains received by women for their increased labor supply 
on the communal plot, second the expected increase in the subsistence allowance and 
third the expected income losses from the private plot due to the reduction in time spent 
on the private plot. It can be described as follows: 
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where TY f  is the change in total income earned by women under the new policy 
scenario, ( Ty fc  ) is the change in women’s compensations for their work on the 
communal, and ( Ty fs  ) are the changes in subsistence consumption and private plot 
earnings ( Ty fp  ), both relative to the household income changes.  
The income gain from increased labor participation on the communal plot is 
identified as the share of household wealth that women receive under the new economic 
opportunity. During the field interviews, we estimated the proportion (  ) of household 
income that women were receiving at harvest under historic technological change 
(traditional technology and new agricultural technology or good crop year). This 
proportion is the ratio of the value of the gifts received by women at harvest over the total 
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household income
26
. The increase in the proportion of household income granted to 
women when a new economic opportunity emerges reflects women’s bargaining power 
within the household. We expect the proportion of increased household income that 
women receive to be non-zero and positive if the household decision making is 
characterized by bargaining or altruism, as opposed to an exploitative decision making. 
The change in women’s share of the household wealth following the adoption of a 
new policy ( Ty fc  ) is obtained by multiplying the change in women’s share of 
household income relatively to their bargaining power ( ) fcy by the change in 
women’s proportion of household income from the traditional technologies to the new 
policies ( )T . The mathematical expression is: 
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To estimate the income losses from the private plot, we assumed that the amount 
of labor withdrawn from the private plot corresponds exactly to the same amount of 
additional labor supplied to the communal land. Because of the lack of leisure time, 
women have to reallocate their labor instead of reducing their leisure time. So, there is a 
one to one relationship between the labor allocated to the communal and private plots.  
cp LL            (8.4) 
The evaluation of women’s labor contribution for each technology or policy 
scenario is derived directly from the farm programming results. Then, this estimate of 
women’s time spent on the communal plot is equivalent to their reduced time on the 
private plot. 
The resulting income losses from the private plot is found by multiplying the 
reduced labor time supplied to the private plot under each economic opportunity by the 
average return to the private plot.  
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 Given the difficulty that farmers have to reveal their income, we used the household expenditures as a 
proxy for household income. Total household expenditures have been reported in table 2.6 of chapter 2. 
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where Tl fp   is the variation in women’s labor allocated to the private plot from the 
traditional technology to the new policy. fp
f
p ly  is the total output on the private plot per 
unit of women’s labor and corresponds to the average product of labor on the private plot 
with the traditional technology. In this study, the relevant range of women’s production 
function is assumed to be linear. This is because field evidence (Coulibaly et al. 2011) 
revealed that women have access to very small areas of land (1/10 ha to 1 ha) and when 
they get additional improved inputs their productivity increases substantially even at a 
higher rate than those of men.
27
 
The change in the subsistence allowance ( Ty fs  ) is the difference in women’s 
grain consumption before and after the policy interventions.  
Our methodological procedure was inspired by Lilja and Sanders (1998) but it 
departs from this latter study in the way we estimated women’s communal payment 
( Ty fc   ). The latter authors used an econometric model to find the coefficient estimate 
of the change in women’s communal wage due to technological change. In our 
procedure, we used directly the results of the farm programming model and household 
survey to evaluate the changes in communal income led by technological innovation and 
new economic policy. Women’s communal payment was the result of the product of the 
proportion of household income women declared receiving during the field survey and 
the value of the household wealth derived from the model results under each economic 
opportunity. 
 
 
 
8.2.3 Data 
Data used for this analysis were obtained from a random sample of 30 women 
from rural households that adopted sorghum new technologies respectively in the village 
of Garasso of the study area Koutiala. These women were the wives of the household 
                                                          
27
 We expect a sharply rising production function for women so these linear estimates would underestimate 
the potential gains to increased labor supply of women if other inputs were also available. 
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heads interviewed for the farm household model development in earlier chapters. One 
woman was surveyed randomly per household.  
Evaluation of the welfare impacts of the new policies on women is based on the 
examination of women’s conditions without and with the economic opportunity from 
sorghum technologies and the increased price for cotton. Respondents were interviewed 
about their labor contribution on communal plots, private plots, off farm, gifts they 
receive from the household head at harvest, private plot productions and sales, earnings 
from self-employment activities, bargaining ability over increased profits from the 
communal plot, livestock assets, and other social characteristics. Moreover, each 
interviewee was given the opportunity to discuss the effects that the new policy had on 
the time spent on the communal plot, private plot, self-employment activities, and leisure.  
The data will be used to discuss women’s labor allocation across productive and 
non-market activities, their income estimates and to analyze the net welfare impact of 
policy change on women. 
 
 
 
8.3. Results of the Empirical Estimation of Women’s Welfare 
Women’s Welfare with Marketing Innovations and in the 2011 Economic Environment  
Before delivering the results of the empirical estimation of the welfare impact on 
women of the technology change and the new cotton policy, we will discuss women’s 
labor allocation and personal earnings in the study area.  
 
 
 
8.3.1. Women Labor Allocation 
The descriptive data analysis revealed that women allocate their labor across 
multiple simultaneous activities including farm work, non-farm activities and household 
duties. 
Farming labor allocation includes the work on the communal plot and on own 
managed private plots. The activities on the communal plot take priority over the work on 
the personal plots. Married women work during few labor periods and shorter hours than 
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men on the communal plot. Their labor input is only compulsory during planting, harvest 
labor periods including threshing and sometimes fertilizer application. Nonetheless, the 
household head is free to request additional labor input at any time if there is need for 
more labor supply such as during weeding activities. Data collected during the field 
survey and confirmed in Coulibaly et al. (1998) reveal that women spend on average six 
(6) hours per day working on the communal field whereas men usually work 8 hours.  
Women have access to personal plots through their marital status and the head of 
the household. These plots are specified on an annual basis by the household head and 
their size and land quality depend on several factors with the most important being land 
availability and the social status of women in the household. In the sample of women 
interviewed, not all women had access to a private plot since land is a scarce resource. In 
the sample 73 % of the women had access to a private plot. In families with limited land 
resources to meet household food consumption, no private plots were granted to women. 
Older women in the household, who are retired cooking wives,
28
 have priority in access 
to private plots over younger active cooking wives. Hence, the data reveal that the 
average age of women having access to a private plot is 47 whereas those who do not 
have access to a private plot are on average 37 years old. The average area of land 
cultivated by women with a private plot in the sample is 0.56 ha.  
In Garasso, women with private plots usually grow crops that do not compete 
with the communal land’s production. Women grow a variety of crops such as rice, okra, 
peanuts, soybeans and spices that are complementary to the household communal crop 
production. The yields of these crops are poor, less than 500 kg/ha for each crop because 
women face many constraints in farming. These constraints include poor soil fertility, and 
the lack of access to agricultural inputs such as organic and inorganic fertilizer, labor and 
plowing equipment. Women’s fields are often depleted lands found on the edge of the 
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 Retired cooking wives in the household are women who no longer participate in the household chores 
and are not obligated to work on the communal plot during the agricultural season. A woman achieves this 
social status when at least one of her sons get married and brings his wife to live with the extended family 
in the compound. Her daughter in law represents an additional worker in the household. This latter then 
substitutes for her mother’s in-law labor with respect to household duties and the labor obligation on the 
communal plot.  
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communal fields. Any attempt to increase women’s private plot especially in the south 
might take into account land availability since in some southern villages land is 
constrained by population growth.  
Access to input for the private plot is very restricted. The private plot production 
technology depends basically on women’s own labor input. Women can work on their 
private plot after the communal work has been performed. Family labor specifically 
children’s labor are made available to them once the activities on the communal fields are 
completed. They recruit their children and use their labor and other female’s labor 
primarily during the peak labor season of weeding and harvesting. Women lack access to 
agricultural equipment and purchased inputs (fertilizer, herbicide). The limited access to 
productive resources and the time constraint facing female farmers clearly translates into 
many delays in their work and results in low productivity on their private fields. Also, 
during the labor demanding seasons for women on the communal plot (planting, fertilizer 
application and harvesting), activities on the private plots are often delayed or omitted.  
On average, women spend 2.8 hours per day working on the private plot, and the number 
of days that a woman will spend to work on one hectare of private land is 4 days for land 
preparation, 11 days for seeding, 24 days for weeding and 22 days for harvesting (see 
table 8.1).  
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Table 8.1: Women’s Labor Allocation across Communal Plot and Private Plot 
 
 Communal Plot (days/ha) Private Plot (days/ha) 
Land Preparation 4 4 
Seeding 12 11 
Fertilizer Application 2 0 
Thinning and weedings 46 24 
Ridging 19 0 
Harvest (& Threshing) 133 22 
Total 108 61 
Source: Household Survey   
Note: Women have less than one hectare of land. 
 
 
 
Women non-farm activities are small commerce performed locally during weekly 
village market days or every day at home by children or older women, who are not 
involved in domestic duties and farming activities. Women, who do not have access to a 
private plot, have more time to engage in small retailing activities. Small commerce 
consists of sales of processed food, spices and the sales of tree crop products such as shea 
nuts, shea butter, bananas, mangoes and some other wild fruits. Women have less 
opportunity to expand their non-farm work during the rainy season as opposed to the dry 
season when there is less demand for agricultural activities. They do not generally engage 
in the non-farm activities during the peak agricultural labor seasons. The prospect for 
women to find off-farm employment is limited by the village remoteness of Garasso (55 
km from the main town with poor roads most of the way), the lack of women’s education 
and the inability to speak the language
29
 used for commercial transactions. Moreover, 
domestic duties constrain women’s ability to participate in off-farm activities.  
Women’s main family responsibility is to be in charge of the unpaid household 
chores. The household duties include cooking meals, hauling water, processing grains for 
domestic consumption, taking care of children, doing dishes, and fetching wood. These 
                                                          
29
 In the village of Garasso, women speak only the local language Minianka from their ethnic tribe as 
opposed to men who are able to speak at least two languages Minianka and Bambara, which is the national 
language in Mali and is used prominently in commercial transactions.  
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tasks involve a large amount of women’s labor because they are labor intensive. In the 
data sample, active cooking wives spend at least 4 hours per day to perform their 
household duties. Grain processing, cooking and hauling water are the most time 
consuming household duties quoted by women during the informal interviews. For 
example, field observations showed that women can spend 2 hours per day processing 
grains which involves several steps including threshing the grains, blowing, cleaning and 
pounding the grains with a mortar and a pestle. In extended families meal cooking 
responsibilities rotate among married women. The wife in charge of cooking prepares 
breakfast for household members and then cooks lunch to be carried into the field for the 
workers. Once she is on the communal field, she might spend some time helping the 
other workers, and afterwards heads for her private field to finally go back home at the 
sun set (6:30 pm) to resume her work on the household chores. In the village surveyed, 
no labor saving household technologies such as grain mills, fuel efficient stoves or 
improved water pumps are available to enhance women’s productivity and efficiency in 
accomplishing the household duties.  
 
 
 
8.3.2 Women’s Earnings 
Women have diversified sources of income distributed across private plot and 
non-private plot owners (see table 8.2). These are sales of the private plot produce, non-
farm activities, communal field incentives and women’s work group activities. These 
activities generate some small amount of money used by women to finance their own 
needs, those of their children and consumption goods for the household.  
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Table 8.2: Income Earning Activities and Labor Allocation across the Main 
Activities 
 
Activities 
Private Plot Owners Non Private Plot Owners 
Return  Number  Total Income Return  Number  Total Income 
F CFA/day days/year F CFA F CFA/day days/year F CFA 
Private Plot 1,042  35 36,461  0  0  0  
 ($2)  ($81)    
Off Farm 431 20 8,617  952 43 40,813  
 ($1)  ($19) ($2)  ($90) 
Work Group 275 4.0 1,087  419 3.3 1,363  
 (<$1)  ($2) ($1)  ($3) 
Livestock 137 168 22,977    
Fattening (<$1)  ($51)    
Communal Plot 25 108 2,667  8 108 900  
 (<$1)  ($6) (<1$)  ($2) 
Total 2,594  195  71,809  1,380  154  43,075  
 ($6)  ($159) ($3)  ($95) 
Source: Household Survey Data 
Sample: 30 women with 73 percent having a private plot. 
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com 
 
 
 
From the survey results, income from the private plot producers is the most 
important cash generating activity for women despite the low productivity of these plots. 
Data reveal that the value of their production on the 0.56 ha of land cultivated area is on 
average 36,461 F CFA ($US 80.56) which corresponds to 64,429 F CFA/ha ($US/ha 
142.35). With the private plot savings, women generally invest in small ruminants (goats 
and sheeps) fattening activity. Hence, the small ruminants represent live assets for 
women and are important stock of wealth as revealed by the value reported in table 8.2. 
The third source of income generating activity for the private plot owners is the non-farm 
revenue with an average of 8,617 F CFA ($US 19) earned during the cropping season. 
Despite the limited amount of time invested in this non-farm activity, for women without 
access to a private plot, the returns are even higher than those earned from the communal 
field. For the non-private plot producers, non-farm work (petty commerce) is their main 
source of cash generating activities.  
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Compensation from the communal plot is the fourth largest income source for 
private plot producers and the second for the non-private plot owners. Under the 
traditional technology, payments to women for the communal work are low. The average 
payment for the communal work is estimated at 2,667 F CFA ($US 5.89) that is 178 
FCFA/ha ($US/ha 0.39) for the private plot owners. The non-private plot owners receive 
as communal payments 900 F CFA ($US 2) or 60 F CFA/ha ($US/ha 0.13). So, private 
plot producers receive on average higher incomes than the non-private plot owners. This 
probably results from the larger opportunity costs
30
 that private plot owners possess. 
Indeed, the earnings from the private plot represent these women’s best alternative 
opportunity and apparently give them higher bargaining power over the sharing of the 
household wealth even though the household head entirely controls the allocation of the 
private plot to women annually.  
In terms of average return, compensation from the communal plot leads to the 
lowest return on labor. It would not have been rational for a woman to allocate a 
substantial amount of time to the communal plot if it were not for the need to provide for 
the household subsistence allowance and living expenses. Economic rationality implies 
that women allocate labor across activities until their returns are equalized. Women’s 
compensation for the communal work is lower than the daily wage for hiring labor 
estimated at 500 F CFA/day ($US/day 1.10). So, the household head will exploit this 
comparative advantage by mobilizing family labor for the communal work. 
The payments for communal labor or bonuses are variable across years and 
depend upon the states of nature. For bad weather years there is little payment for the 
communal labor. During good years of crop production, these payments can be up to 77 
percent higher than the value for normal years (unpublished field interview data).  
The last source of women’s income is the earnings from the gender workgroup. 
Men and women participate in gender farm work teams. In Garasso, 63 percent of women 
interviewed are members of a farm work team. The initial purpose of these work teams 
                                                          
30 Otherwise, we would expect women not having access to private plots to receive more compensation 
from the communal plots because access to the private plots could be considered as a compensation for 
working on the communal plots.  
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was to assist the husbands of group members in performing agricultural tasks during peak 
labor seasons. These work groups used to function under a form of labor exchange with 
no or minimum income compensation for service rendered. The cash earned was spent in 
organizing some social activities and village parties (purchase of uniformed clothes for 
wedding, funerals, naming ceremonies, musical entertainment). But as already reported 
by Lilja and Sanders (1996), there is now evidence of institutional change in the 
functioning of women work teams. These groups are moving from mutual assistance and 
community service to be more profit oriented. They are hired by farmers for some 
agricultural tasks and with their collective bargaining power, the gender work groups 
demand to be paid generally on a fixed cash rate upon completion of their work or at 
harvest. Furthermore, these groups are evolving into associations and help members 
getting small loans for private investments instead of using the returns on their labor for 
community actions. 
The total average income gains show a greater advantage to those with access to 
the private plots.  
 
 
 
8.3.3. The Welfare Impact of the New Technologies and Policy Changes for Women 
Private Plot Producers  
This section discusses the welfare impact on women private plot producers. The 
outline that is used to estimate the welfare impact of the new sorghum-marketing 
technology and the policy changes is detailed as follows. 
First, we estimated women’s communal gains under the traditional system and 
compare it with the new alternatives including the new sorghum-marketing package and 
policy changes. This was obtained by multiplying the proportion of household income 
received by women under each opportunity by the corresponding household wealth 
derived from the model results. From the household surveys, a woman’s proportion of 
household income is estimated on average at 0.4 percent of the household income under 
the traditional technologies. This proportion is the value of the gifts (grains, clothes and 
cash) women declared receiving at harvest divided by the total household expenditures in 
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the traditional system (544,978 F CFA or $1,204) as reported in table 2.6 in chapter 2. 
Under a new economic opportunity, this proportion increases to the average of 1.4 
percent. This percentage is found by dividing the value of gifts women reported receiving 
during a good crop year or under the adoption of the new sorghum technology by the 
household expenditures defined in table 2.6. 
Second, we estimated the resulting private plot earnings women receive under the 
new sorghum-marketing technology and the policy changes. The private plot earnings is 
the result of the average return to labor multiplied by the change in labor time from the 
traditional system to the new technology or policy environment. For the change in labor 
allocated to the private plot, we assumed that a unit of labor increased on the communal 
land is equivalent to the same unit of labor reduced from the private plot. This is because   
as already said earlier, the labor time allocated to the household chores is inelastic and 
women have virtually no leisure time (Warner and Campbell 2000).  
Finally, women’s total income across the traditional system and each of the new 
economic opportunities is defined as the sum of the communal income and the private 
plot earnings when obviously they could have benefit from other household expenditures. 
The welfare impact on women of the new technologies and policy change is defined as 
the percentage change in women’s total income from the traditional system to the 
superior economic opportunity.  
The evaluation of women’s welfare is performed under the various policy 
initiatives analyzed in the preceding chapters. The base case consists in evaluating 
women’s welfare with the traditional technologies and economic conditions prevailing 
when the primary data were collected. The economic conditions were represented by the 
announced cotton price of 200 F CFA/kg and no fertilizer subsidy. Then, the second 
scenario estimates women’s welfare with the traditional technologies, adoption of 
marketing strategy and the 2011 agricultural policy. This latter policy reflects the 
substantial rise in cotton price of 31 percent and the 24 percent fertilizer subsidy. The 
marketing strategy is the sales of grains at higher prices in the second price period. The 
third scenario reflects the introduction of new sorghum technology accompanied by the 
marketing strategy and the 2011 agricultural economy. In the last scenario, women’s 
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welfare is estimated under the improved sorghum technology and marketing strategy but 
with the reduction in the cotton price and the elimination of the fertilizer subsidy (table 
8.3). 
 
 
 
Women’s Welfare with Traditional Technologies 
The use of traditional technologies yields a very low women’s share of household 
wealth, estimated at 3,300 F CFA ($US 6.63). This is as expected since the use of 
traditional technologies doesn’t generate much income surplus. Also, with the downturn 
of the cotton economy, household decision making has shifted back to the one prevailing 
in the subsistence system. During the time of cotton prosperity and the availability of 
significant market surplus, women as well as other household members received higher 
payments in gifts for their work on the communal plot. When they were not satisfied with 
their payments, women engaged in bargaining with the household head (Lilja and 
Sanders 1998). The share of the new income streams received was a function of their 
bargaining power. However, with the declining cotton seed price up to the year 2011, the 
returns to cotton have substantially declined and so did the communal payments to 
women.  
So, in this traditional system, the main benefit to women for working on the 
communal land is the subsistence consumption and any household investment made for 
the benefit of the entire family including women. The model results estimate the yearly 
grain consumption per household member at 432 kg which is valued at 36,132 F CFA 
(US$ 79.83) (table 8.3). Compared to the gifts received at harvest, the value of the 
subsistence allowance is substantially larger and helps explain why in spite of the low 
communal payments, women keep supplying their labor to the communal field. Their 
goal is to guarantee enough food consumption for themselves and the other household 
members including children. 
As expected, the private plot earnings represent women’s main source of income 
in the traditional system. The total return to labor and land (0.56 ha) is estimated at 
36,461 F CFA (US$ 80.56) (table 8.3). Thus, women’s total income from farm work in 
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the traditional system depends principally on the total return on land and labor of the 
private plot. An increase in the private plot total return will be made possible either by an 
increase in the time spent on it, a higher productivity or an increase in the amount of 
private land cultivated. 
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Table 8.3: Welfare Impact on Women of the Cotton Price Policy and Adoption of 
Improved Sorghum Technology 
 
  
Traditional 
Technologies 
Traditional 
Technology+ MS 
and 2011 
Economy 
IST                     
MS        
2011 
Economy 
IST+MS            
Reduction in 
Cotton Price, 
Removal of 
Fertilizer 
Subsidy 
 
 
   
Household Wealth (FCFA)                                 808,386 1,247,780  1,457,000  1,154,091  
 ($1,786) ($2,757) ($3,220) ($2,550) 
A Woman' Portion of                                        
Household Income  
 
0.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 
Women's Gains of                                     
Household Income (FCFA)      
  
3,257  17,976  20,994  16,627  
 ($7.20) ($39.72) ($46.38) ($36.74) 
Change in Communal Labor  
 
38% 26% -10% 
Grain Consumption (kg) 432 432 432 432 
Value Consumption (FCFA) 36,132 36,132 36,132 36,132 
 ($ 79.83) ($79.83) ($ 79.83) ($79.83) 
Average Return to                                          
Private Plot (0.56 ha)               
(F CFA) 
 
1,042  1,042  1,042  1,042  
 ($2.30) ($2.30) ($2.30) ($2.30) 
Number of days                                      
in private plot 
 
35  22  26  39  
Women Income from                                                
Private Plot (F CFA) 
 
36,461  22,606  26,981  40,107  
 ($80.56) ($49.95) ($59.61) ($88.61) 
Private Plot Income Gain                          
or Loss (F CFA) 
 
 
-13,855 -9,480 3,646  
  (-$30.61) (-$20.94) (-$8.06) 
Total Income per year (F CFA) 39,717  40,582  47,975  56,733  
 ($88) ($89.66) ($106) ($125.34) 
Change in Total Income  
 
2% 21% 43% 
Source: Author’s Calculations. Note: IST refers to improved sorghum technologies (high yielding sorghum 
cultivar, fertilizer use, and improved agronomic practices). MS refers to marketing strategies for all grains. 
We are not adding the value of grain consumption as it is constant across alternatives 
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Women’s Welfare with Marketing Innovations and in the 2011 Economic Environment  
With the implementation of the 2011 agricultural policies and farmers’ ability to 
sell grains later in the year, the household wealth increases by 54 percent over the 
traditional case. This is because of the higher use of inputs including family labor. The 
model’s outcome reports that family labor demand increased by 38 percent. At higher 
cotton prices and with access to fertilizer subsidy, cotton and maize productions increase 
considerably.  
The household income gives the women a share of 17,976 F CFA that is 1,198 F 
C FA/ha ($US/ha 2.65). This is almost six times higher than the compensation paid to 
women with the traditional technologies (table 8.3). Although women receive a higher 
share of the communal income from the increased wealth, this share is still low compared 
to the increased profit generated by the spike in the cotton price, the use of fertilizer 
subsidy and the implementation of the marketing innovations. The remaining surplus not 
paid to family members is kept by the household head who might use it for its own 
preferences and/or to purchase some investment goods to enhance the well-being of the 
household. In this latter case, women will have additional gains for their communal work 
if the increased profit translates in an increased demand of the household goods for their 
benefits. The literature reports higher men’s expenditures on cigarettes and alcohol 
(Warner and Campbell 2000) but these still represent a very small income quantity. Even 
if redirected, this income increase is minimal and would not affect the welfare of women 
and children significantly. 
The increased demand for women’s labor in the communal plot comes at the 
expenses of women’s time on the private plot. Hence, women’s labor on the private plot 
decreases by 38 percent and they spend 22 days instead of 35 days in their private plots 
for the traditional system without sorghum marketing strategy. This reduction of labor 
results in a loss of 13,855 F CFA ($US 30.61) in the returns from the private plot (table 
8.3).  
Since women’s gains from the increased household income are higher than the 
decrease in their private plot earnings, women are still better off with a 2 percent increase 
in their total income (table 8.3).  
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Women’s Welfare with the Improved Sorghum Technology and New Marketing Strategy 
in the 2011 Economic Conditions 
Combining the adoption of improved sorghum along with the marketing strategy, 
plus the substantial increase in cotton price and the fertilizer subsidy, the household 
wealth increases by 80 percent relatively to the traditional system. There is an increase of 
26 percent in women’s labor requirements for the communal land, but this rise in 
women’s labor time is less than that obtained in the system without the new technology. 
This is because of the decrease in labor requirements for the reduced area of cotton and 
maize.  
The labor supplied to the communal work boosts the household income and 
translates into higher payments for women estimated at 20,994 F CFA (US$ 46.38) (table 
8.3). With the proportion of woman’s share of income being maintained at 1.4 percent, 
most of the increased income is controlled by the household head. The labor for the 
communal plot comes from the effort on the private plot through a reduction of 9 days 
spent on the private plot and a loss of 9,480 F CFA (US$ 20.94) in the total return of the 
private plot.  
Despite the reduced returns from the private plot, the overall gains to women 
occur with an increase of 21 percent in their income (table 8.3). This positive income 
gain for women is due to the increased share of the household gains that compensates for 
the reduction in the private plot income.  
 
 
 
Women’s Welfare with the Improved Sorghum Technology and Marketing Strategy but 
removing the Fertilizer Subsidy and the Cotton Price Spike 
The removal of the fertilizer subsidy and the reduction in cotton price increase the 
production costs of all intensive crops. The household wealth increases by only 43 
percent which is the lowest income effect compared to the preceding economic 
opportunities (table 8.3).  
Labor is pulled mainly out of cotton and maize production and allocated into 
traditional sorghum which is less labor demanding. The resulting effect is a release of 10 
percent of family labor compared to the 2008 case. Women reinvest this released labor 
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time in their best alternative opportunity, the private plot. Therefore, the private plot 
return increases by 3,646 F CFA ($US 8.06). The resulting effect in women’s welfare is 
an increase of their income by 43 percent (table 8.3).  
Notice that the change in the cotton pricing and fertilizer policies leads to the 
lowest household income effect on the household but provides the largest benefit for 
women because of the release of their labor and the consequent increase in the private 
plot returns. This highlights the existence of conflicting interest over resource allocation 
within the household and in response to the economic opportunities. The household head 
needs higher labor time from women to increase production on the communal plot and 
reaps higher profits. But women’s productive priority is on the private plot because more 
labor time spent on the private plot leads to higher returns and increases her private 
earnings.  
 
 
 
8.4. Summary 
In the household economy, household members are obligated to allocate 
significant labor input on the communal plot for the family subsistence needs. The work 
on the communal plot is the most time consuming women’s activities after the household 
chores but women earn little income relative to their other principal opportunity, i.e. the 
private plot. There was also potential from off-farm income for increasing women’s 
income but again there were time constraints. 
In terms of intra-household income distribution, women benefit relatively from 
the new economic opportunities introduced on the communal plot. The most profitable 
policy initiative for the household is the adoption of improved sorghum along with 
marketing strategies and the government interventions to raise the cotton price as well as 
to subsidize fertilizer. Nevertheless, these combined activities lead to lower welfare gains 
for women as compared to the elimination of the fertilizer subsidy and the lower cotton 
price.  
The reason is that these economic opportunities from the higher cotton price and 
lower fertilizer price increase significantly the demand for female labor on the communal 
plot. On the other hand, the elimination of fertilizer subsidy and the lower cotton price 
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release women’s time from the communal plot. Labor is reallocated on the private plot 
and results in an increase of the total return on labor. 
Thus, welfare enhancing policies for the household have a relatively low 
distributional impact on women. Women gain significantly from the increasing time 
allocated to the private plot. So, successful policies to increase women’s welfare might be 
more concerned with releasing women’s time constraints and increasing the returns on 
the private plot.  
In regard to the household decision making process, the increase in the share of 
household income received by women with the adoption of new sorghum technologies 
and policy changes indicates some extent of cooperation in the household but it is a weak 
evidence of bargaining. Probably over time with more agricultural innovations and the 
increase in women’s opportunity costs through off-farm work and gender work groups, 
women’s bargaining power will increase. 
 
 
 
8.5. Policy Suggestions 
This research has shown that the increase in women’s welfare will occur through 
the release of their time from their most demanding labor activities and the investment of 
their time in the opportunity that maximizes their private income. In this study, women’s 
private plot is found to be their most rewarding economic activity. Therefore, welfare 
enhancing policies for women could focus on releasing time from the less economic 
profitable activities and increasing returns on the private plot as also recommended by 
many gender related literatures.  
A rise in the private plot returns will follow an increase in the private plot 
productivity. This could be led by women’s access to good lands, adoption of yield 
increasing technologies such as chemical fertilizer and high yielding cultivars on 
women’s plots. But in the current socio-economic context, the productive resources are 
under male control and there is very limited opportunity to increase women’s access to 
those required agricultural inputs. Also, even if access to quality land and inputs become 
effective, another bottleneck resides in women’s control of the improved private plot 
outputs. Indeed, several projects have failed to achieve their expected results on women 
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because the women did not control the output resulting from the introduction of the 
agricultural technologies on the private plots (Dolan 2001).  
Greater control of women’s output can be achieved from strengthening their 
negotiation power, for example through the gender groups. In the Mopti region of Mali, 
the IER-INTSORMIL program has been successful at helping women to benefit from the 
new millet technologies by convincing their husbands to allow women to have access to a 
portion of the lands. Women work individually but create marketing groups to share the 
productivity gains.  
An alternative to the concentration on the private plot is to raise the 
compensations received from the family plot. The share of profit received from the 
communal plot under traditional technologies and new economic opportunities are very 
low relatively to the amount of time women spend for the communal work. The 
remaining income is concentrated with the household head who uses it for his individual 
preferences and family needs. Although women benefit from the household expenditures, 
higher cash payments will develop greater incentive to increase labor productivity on the 
communal plot and may result in larger profit for the household.  In other regions this 
concentration of income for the household head and poor compensation for other family 
members is one of the factors leading to the breakup of the large households into nuclear 
families (Lilja and Sanders 1998). 
A second alternative to increase women’s income is the release of women’s time 
from the labor intensive farm activities and unpaid household chores. The release of time 
from the labor intensive farm activities will be made possible with diffusion of 
agricultural technologies that require less investment in labor such as cereal technologies.  
Concerning the unpaid domestic activities, the inelastic sizable amount of time 
that women spend for the domestic work is a great obstacle to the development of 
economic employment opportunities for women. The duty of fetching water, firewood, 
and traditional processing of grains for meals all consume tremendous amount of time. 
So, household labor saving technologies including motorized water pumps, improved 
stoves and grain mills are expected to be effective in relieving women from the domestic 
work burden and create opportunities for productive activities. Lawrence et al. (2001) 
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have demonstrated that in Burkina Faso, the improved stoves were very efficient in 
releasing women’s time from the household chores and increasing their welfare. 
Additional free time will enable women to engage in non-farming activities where 
they can have extra source of cash. Petty commerce has been identified as a profitable 
earning activity for women although few opportunities exist currently to increase the 
market share for this activity given the limited market size in the study area and the 
distance from the paved highway. However, with further technology adoption and overall 
regional economic growth there will be potential to increase market size and increase 
demand for women’s retailing products. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
Mali has experienced significant increases in area and productivity of the main 
cereal crops over the past ten years. While the cereal sector has been gaining in yields, 
the cotton sector, which has been the backbone of the Malian agricultural economy and 
the main source of cash income for farmers has been through a period of drastic decline 
for the last decade excluding the temporary upswing in price in 2010. There is now 
evidence that an agricultural diversification strategy is needed to sustain farmers’ income 
and help them to cope with the declining prices in the world cotton market. 
Hence, questions are raised about the choice of investment strategies between 
restoring the cotton sector and/or diversifying into the cereals that can be most successful 
in enhancing farmers’ income. Though past policy initiatives have put a greater emphasis 
on improving maize productivity, sorghum offers a stronger comparative advantage to 
maize outside the high rainfall areas. Sorghum tolerates better flood, drought and soil 
nutrient deficiencies than maize. So, sorghum can help farm households secure enough 
food for consumption and can represent a source of cash income.  
Various policy instruments have been introduced at the farm level to support the 
development of the sorghum sector, promote food security and revamp the cotton 
economy. These policy instruments include sorghum agricultural technologies, sorghum 
marketing strategies, cotton pricing policy and a fertilizer subsidy extended to sorghum 
and millet in 2011. The evaluation of the farm level impact and the distributional effects 
within the household of those policy initiatives is essential to provide decision makers 
with specific information with the potential to promote agricultural growth and enhance 
farmers’ livelihoods. Hence, this research provides estimates of the income effects of 
improved sorghum technology with and without marketing change. It also focuses on one 
of the main innovations of the early 21
st
 century in many developing countries, the 
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fertilizer subsidies. This study also derives the welfare implications for women of the 
above policy initiatives. 
In Mali, recent agricultural policies to restore the cotton sector were based on a 
sizable increase in the farm gate cotton price and a fertilizer subsidy. The model 
estimation of the impact of the cotton pricing policy of a 31 percent increase in cotton 
price and 24 percent fertilizer subsidy indicates a substantial impact of those policies on 
the cotton sector as the cotton area and the farm household income increased 
considerably. These findings indicate that the cotton pricing policy and fertilizer subsidy 
program are important policies to be considered to increase farmers’ incomes and for a 
recovery of the cotton industry. The Malian government has been dependent upon the 
earnings of cotton and these have been decreased recently.
31
  
In the objective of providing alternative source of income for farmers and raising 
traditional sorghum productivity, we evaluated the effects of the introduction of sorghum 
agricultural technologies with the present access to the fertilizer subsidy and marketing 
strategies. The model results reveal that the improved sorghum technology is rapidly 
adopted. Farm household income increases by 20 percent. Most of this income effect is 
triggered by the yield effect led by the sorghum technology (improved cultivar, moderate 
inorganic fertilizer and improved agronomy). There is only a small additional effect from 
the improved marketing practices.  
These results indicate that the improved sorghum technology is a viable source of 
revenue diversification when farmers have access to improved cultivars, fertilizers, and 
input credit. The farmers’ associations facilitate all these things. Storage and late selling 
will ultimately lead to lower prices as more farmers embrace these strategies. Then other 
marketing activities will need to progress to include new markets such as the use of 
sorghum in poultry feed substituting for maize. Meanwhile, a focus on rapid technology 
expansion appears to have higher returns than the storage investments for the improved 
marketing. 
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 In recent years, gold has been replacing cotton as the principal source of foreign exchange and Mali has 
been promoting diversification in the cotton zone, especially increases in financing of inputs for maize. 
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The cotton prices of 2011 were very high and were largely affected by climatic 
events in China. With the continuing introduction of Bt cotton in the major cotton 
producers of the world reducing the cost of production and with normal climatic 
conditions in China we expect a cotton price decline to the level predominating in the 21
st
 
century. With this moderate farm level price decline of 8 percent farmers shift from 
cotton more into the cereals with new technology and are able to maintain their incomes 
in this way. 
The ultimate removal of the fertilizer subsidy pushed by the long term fiscal 
unsustainability is significantly detrimental to the household income. With the higher 
input costs, all the technology intensive activities decline including a 25 percent 
reduction of the new sorghum area. However, the declines are even greater for cotton and 
maize. Even with this fertilizer cost increase sorghum benefits from the improved 
marketing with sorghum being held for later sales while maize sales are increased at 
harvest for the harvest income requirement. The traditional sorghum activity expands 
substantially here; however, this expansion of traditional sorghum will not be sustainable 
without fertilization as it depletes the soil nutrients.  
The bottom line here is that new sorghum technologies and marketing is 
facilitating the diversification away from cotton and will be expected to continue but at a 
slower rate even as the fertilizer subsidies are eliminated. Sorghum plays a very 
important role in smoothing the household income over time when the cotton price is 
reduced and the fertilizer subsidy is eliminated. So, there is a danger of not recognizing 
the potential of sorghum by only providing the fertilizer subsidy to cotton and maize as 
was the case before 2011.  
Although we did not evaluate policies over an adjustment period, for food 
security reasons a short run (next 3 to 5 years) policy of keeping the fertilizer subsidies is 
recommended. There important learning by doing aspects of getting the moderate 
fertilizer employed and the rest of the agronomic practices right to accompany the 
improved cultivar. Moderate fertilizer needs to be side dressed not broadcast and a series 
of agronomic practices need to be adopted. So these changes need to be mastered by 
farmers to insure a high return to moderate fertilization (Coulibaly et al. 2011). 
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The welfare estimation of the various agricultural policies adopted at the 
household level shows that women are made better off from the increased household 
income. However, less labor intensive technologies such as the agricultural sorghum and 
marketing technologies provide a larger net income to women than policies to revamp the 
cotton sector. Policy initiatives that are less labor intensive allow for greater gains for 
women by enabling women to invest more labor time into the opportunity that maximizes 
their private income, i.e. their personal plot. 
Overall, the findings from this research have several policy implications.  
First, the improvement in the cotton industry caused by the substantial rise in 
cotton price and the allocation of fertilizer subsidy will be a short term effect given the 
predicted decline in the world cotton price and ultimately the reduction and elimination 
of the fertilizer subsidy. Cotton is expected to need more technological change to regain a 
leading position in this system. With 64 percent of world production in Bt cotton (James 
2010) it is difficult to see how Mali can compete with countries that are able to 
substantially reduce costs with this cheaper and safer control of insect pests. So Mali will 
need to follow Burkina Faso
32
 and rapidly incorporate this Bt gene into their improved 
cotton cultivars.  
Simultaneously, we have shown the potential for cereal diversification in the 
cotton economy. This cereal technology is currently represented by the high yielding 
sorghum technologies accompanied by marketing strategies. It has been demonstrated in 
this dissertation and in the field (Coulibaly 2010, Coulibaly et al. forthcoming) that the 
cereal technology-marketing package can transform sorghum from a subsistence to a 
commercial crop. Bank credit is necessary and is increasingly made available in Mali.  
Continued training of farmers’ associations in marketing strategy and business 
management should enable them to further improve output prices and to prepare for the 
real price declining effect expected from the widespread introduction of later selling of 
sorghum. Higher sorghum prices are presently obtained through storage and late sales. In 
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 INERA (Institute for the Agricultural and Environmental Research) officials in Burkina Faso reported 
that 85 percent of the total cotton area in the 2010 crop year was grown with Bt cotton in Burkina Faso 
(John Sanders, informal interview 2011). 
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the future a demand expansion for sorghum stimulated by the development of the 
emerging animal feed processing industry for poultry industry is expected to be effective 
in moderating a price decline from widespread technology introduction. Also, large 
product sales and volume input purchases by farmers’ associations will also benefit 
farmers. 
Further, fertilizer subsidies are deemed fundamental for Mali to increase crop 
productivity, meet the food security challenges and contribute to fulfill the goal of 
transforming Mali into the regional cereals granary for the sub-Saharan region of Africa 
consistently with the Malian Agricultural Plans. Nonetheless, the large fiscal 
expenditures implied by the subsidy program are likely to constrain the long-term 
sustainability of this program. Strengthening the farmers’ association ability to access and 
to modify fertilizer recommendations
33
 over time is one way of getting the costs of 
fertilizer down. The farmers’ associations can buy fertilizer in large quantities thereby 
reducing costs. Also as investments in infrastructure take place the cost of transport and 
other transaction costs related to long distance between the farm production entity and 
input and product markets will also be reduced. Continuing research and extension will 
also be useful to support the diversification activities and develop site specific fertilizer 
recommendations  
Welfare evidence on women suggests that the most profitable economic 
opportunity for the household is not the most beneficial for women. Women are better off 
with the adoption of less labor intensive technologies on the communal plot. Therefore, 
initiatives to improve women’s well-being must relax women’s time on the communal 
plot to enable women to spend a higher amount of time on the private plot.  
With the challenges facing women on access to land in terms of quantity and 
quality and also access to agricultural inputs, policy interventions for the private plot may 
need to target first access to better lands, compost and transportation to bring it to the 
                                                          
33
 The present moderate dose is one sack of DAP and one sack of Urea. Ultimately the lack of potassium 
will induce a deficiency in K and it will need to be applied. Sahelian soils tend to be deficient in P 
(phosphorous) and in organic matter. So N (nitrogen) and P were concentrated on in the initial fertilizer 
recommendations.  
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fields. Secondly, a continuing effort to increase access to agricultural inputs especially 
fertilizer and credit is necessary.  
To increase women’s income, other alternatives to the non-farm activities and to 
the private plot might be found in increasing the share of household income paid to 
women. Even though small, women receive a share of the household profit. With the new 
avenues for increasing household income and the bargaining type of decision making, 
there will be increasing pressure on the household head to raise the share of the income 
surplus from new technologies and marketing paid to women. Also, another strategy to 
increase women’s welfare that was beyond the scope of analysis in this research is to 
reduce women’s labor burden from the unpaid household chores. This could be made 
possible through access to household labor saving technologies in order to generate 
efficiency of women’s time and release time opportunities for self-employment or 
income generating activities (Lawrence et al. 1999). 
 
 
 
9.1 Directions for Future Research for the Farm Household 
The discrete stochastic model used an average representative household to assess 
the income effect of agricultural technologies, marketing strategy and public policies. 
Using a representative average household does not take into account the impact of 
differences in assets, resource endowments, farming systems, and cash flow across 
households. There is a wide range of farmers with different resource endowments and 
such factors are expected to influence the extent of technology adoption and marketing 
patterns. A step further in this analysis would be to model those parameters and analyze 
how sensitive farmers’ responses to some policy initiatives are to the household farming 
and economic conditions. This will help researchers, policy makers and development 
agencies to design technologies and policies that are best adapted to the household 
agronomic conditions and socio-economic characteristics and could be better focused on 
poverty alleviation.  
The model was calibrated and the analysis performed with retail level grain 
prices. Farmers also sell in local and regional markets and sorghum is produced all over 
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the country. Our retail price probably need to be slightly discounted for farm prices 
around harvest but the main difference then is transportation to specific agricultural areas 
with isolated or distant regions. The margins increase seasonally and we focused on this 
with the improved marketing option analyzed. 
More information is always better than less but gathering good farm level data on 
a crop sold all over the country in small quantities over time will not be easy. 
Nevertheless, there should be some benchmark farm prices collected carefully for time of 
sale and location relative to regional markets. Analyzing these margins will also be 
interesting as improved transportation and communication over time is expected to 
continue to reduce them. Our primary marketing focus in this research was on reducing 
the large seasonal price spread between harvest and post-harvest price.  
With increasing adoption of improved sorghum, there is potential for a structural 
market change in the long run. In the long run, with the increased production resulting 
from the adoption and the yield effect of the new sorghum will further reduce prices at 
harvest. The price difference after storage will then reflect storage cost and a return to 
entrepreneurs from taking the risk of holding the cereals. However, with the market 
expansion coming from the development of the poultry and the food processing 
industries, demand for sorghum will increase and moderate these real price declines. So, 
a step forward in the investigation after these future changes when the technology has 
been introduced on a widespread area will be to evaluate the price changes with the new 
market effects. 
 
 
 
9.2. Direction for Future Research on Women 
The welfare impact of technological change and agricultural policy on women 
was derived by using a partial budgeting approach with labor estimates from a farm 
household model. The share of income from the communal field was found by 
multiplying the household wealth derived from the model by a proportion of household 
income received by women based on household surveys. This proportion represented 
women’s bargaining power from historic technological change. This bargaining power 
has been held constant across technologies and economic opportunities. In reality, we 
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would expect women’s bargaining power to increase with higher income generating 
opportunities. So, a model that will allow adjustment of bargaining power consistently 
with the economic opportunities would provide more insights. An empirical application 
of a Stackelberg oligopoly model (Warner and Campbell 2000) or Nash-cooperative 
bargaining model with asymmetry power (Svejnar 1986) between spouses may be 
appropriate for this purpose. Those models have been theoretically developed but there 
are still large avenues for empirical research in development. 
Assessing the impact of agricultural technologies and government policy on 
women’s welfare is a multifaceted area of investigation with ample dimensions. We 
focus on this research on the tangible measurable aspects of women’s welfare. But there 
are untapped paths to evaluate welfare impact on women of policy initiatives and to 
design pragmatic policy actions to increase women’s well-being. So, additional research 
that will require innovative approaches might take into consideration more of the benefits 
created by the increased household incomes that contribute to improve women’s welfare. 
This could include improvements in housing, children education, household health, and 
improved diets resulting from new economic opportunity. This will require new intensive 
household surveys but would be a more complete response to the welfare impact on 
women from new technologies. 
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Appendix A: Yield Variability 
 
 
 
Real aggregate yield observations and monthly prices were only available for a 10 
years period going from 1998 to 2007. However, to be able to fit any appropriate 
distribution to the data, a larger number of observations are required. Given that 
traditional crop yields in the study area are mainly influenced by rainfall, observations on 
rainfall from 1980 to 2009 were used to simulate crop yields for the missing years of 
observations that means from 1980 to 1997 and from 2007 to 2009. In the study region, 
the likelihood of excess rainfall in the months of August and September makes flooding 
sometimes a constraint to adequate plant maturation and good crop yields.  Thus, a 
quadratic term in rainfall was added in the regressions to characterize the decreasing crop 
yield with excess of rainfall. So, the grain yield regression equations are described as 
follows: 
ittitiiit XXy  
2
210  
Where ity is the yield of the grain i (millet, sorghum and maize) in year t , tX and 
2
tX are 
respectively the rainfall observation and the quadratic term for rainfall in year t, it is the 
random term associated with the grain i in year t. i0 , i1 and i2  are the slope 
coefficients associated to the different variables. The results of the regressions are plotted 
in figures A.1 through A.3. 
For cotton, in addition to rainfall, exogenous cotton prices set by the parastatal 
company at the beginning of the agricultural season are expected to impact the allocation 
of land to cotton and influence significantly cotton yield. Therefore, cotton prices from 
1980 to 2009 were added in the cotton yield regression equation as shown below:  
ctctctctccct PXXy   3
2
210  
Where cty  is the cotton yield in year t, ctP is the cotton price in year t, ct is the random 
term for the cotton yield regression, c0 , c1 , c2  and c3  are the slope coefficients 
associated to the different variables. The result of the regression of cotton yield as a 
function of rainfall and price is reported in table A.1. 
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In total, instead of 10 years of observations, the expanded sample for crop yields contains 
29 observations including both real yield data and simulated yields. One year of 
observation (1984) was dropped because of inconsistency in the data. The first order 
moment and second order moments represented by the mean and the covariance matrix 
for the original sample (10 observations) and the expanded one (29 observations) were 
calculated. The results reported in tables A.2 through A.4 show a good match between 
these two samples which means that the expanded sample is a good representation of the 
sample of real yield observations and can thereby be used to construct a suitable yield 
distribution.   
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Figure A.1 Yield of Sorghum versus Mean Rainfall for the time series 1980 to 2009 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2 Yield of Millet versus Mean Rainfall for the time series 1980 to 2009 
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Figure A.3 Yield of Maize versus Mean Rainfall for the time series 1980 to 2009 
 
 
 
In the graphs, circles are the yields of observed data from 1998 to 2007. Dark lozenges 
are the yields of the predicted data in 1994 that have been replaced by the discounted 
observed data for this year. For cotton, we were able to have real yield data for that year 
1994. The squares are the predicted yields. Observations for the year 1984 have been 
dropped. Cotton yields are also function of cotton prices.  
 
 
 
Table A.1. Cotton Yields versus Rainfall and Cotton Prices  
Yield Intercept Price 
Coefficient 
Rainfall Rainfall^2 Adjusted 
R
2
 
F Standard 
deviation 
of the 
residuals 
Cotton  --3050.75** 3.15** 53.59** -0.21** 0.63 6.13** 68.91 
 (1166.40) (0.89) (18.47) (0.07)    
N=10 and standard error of the coefficients are reported in parentheses 
***= significance at 1 % level of confidence, **= significance at 5 % level of confidence and 
*=significance at 10% level of confidence 
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Statistics for the Real Data Set (1998 to 2007) 
 
 
 
Table A.2. Crop Average Yields for the Real data  Set (1998 to 2007) 
 
 Millet Yield  Sorghum Yield  Maize Yield  Cotton Yield  
Average Yield 
(kg/ha) 
961 1002 1765 966 
 
 
 
Table A.3. Variance/Covariance Matrix for the Real Data Set 
 
  Millet Sorghum Maize Cotton 
Millet 5,117.06 
   Sorghum 5,309.67 7,339.57 
  Maize 14,970.20 17,883.7 54,611.7 
 Cotton 3,357.93 6,615.84 11,774.7 19,309.4 
 
 
 
Statistics for the Expanded Data Set (1980 to 2009) * 
 
 
 
Table A.4 Crop Average Yields for the Expanded data Set (1980 to 2009) 
 
 Millet Yield  Sorghum Yield  Maize Yield  Cotton Yield  
Average Yield 
(kg/ha) 
953 996 1745 968 
*: Observation in 1984 has been dropped 
 
 
 
Table A.5 Variance/ Covariance matrix for the Expanded data Set 
  Millet Sorghum Maize Cotton 
Millet 5,453.92 
   Sorghum 6,271.76     7,934.58 
  Maize 13,210.3 15,649.9 37,934.6 
 Cotton 2,761.89 4,258.32 9,196.34 12,350.5 
*: Observation in 1984 has been dropped 
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Appendix B: Distribution of Yields and Prices 
 
 
 
Joint Multivariate Distribution of Yields using Gaussian Quadrature 
A multivariate joint distribution was used to derive yield states of nature because 
of the high correlation between crop yields. The multivariate normal distribution is the 
most commonly employed multivariate parametric distribution for empirical work. Direct 
representation of joint multivariate is computationally cumbersome and might lead to the 
issue of the “curse of dimensionality”. As the number of variables grows, the size of the 
matrix required to obtain good estimates of the joint probability distribution grows 
exponentially (Fass 2005).  Therefore, to avoid the difficulties inherent to direct 
estimation of joint multivariate distribution, a discrete approximation of the joint 
multivariate distribution is required. 
The Gaussian Quadrature is the approach selected to generate discrete 
approximations of the joint multivariate distribution. The Gaussian quadrature method 
has two main advantages over some alternative approximation methods. First, the 
Gaussian quadrature is simple to implement and avoids the complexity of evaluating 
numerically the integral function. Second, the number of points necessary to get a good 
approximation are lesser and more accurate than those obtained with some other 
approaches such as the Direct Expected Utility Maximizing Program using Quadrature. 
Therefore, it reduces the likelihood of occurrence of the curse of dimensionality limiting 
often the implementation of Discrete Stochastic Program and other dynamic models.  
The Gaussian Quadrature is a technique that uses moments to construct 
distributions. It is based on selecting points among random variables and their 
corresponding weights in such a way that the moments of the discrete approximation 
match the moments of the true distribution (De Vyust and Preckel 2007). The points can 
be interpreted as states of nature and the weights as the probabilities associated to the 
states of nature. 
The Gaussian Quadrature approach to numerical integration approximates the integral of 
the product of two functions g(x) and f(x).  
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Where ),( yxg is the level of profit realized when state of nature x is realized and the 
decision y is selected. y is a vector of decision variables. 
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 is a vector of m independent random variables. In the case of yield, we have 
four yields random variables for the traditional technologies and 5 yields random 
variables including the improved sorghum cultivar. )(xf is the joint probability density 
function for the random variables. jp is the weight or the probability associated with the 
vector of points jx . The sum of the probabilities must be equal to 1.  
With the Gaussian Quadrature, the probabilities of realization of a set of vectors 
of random variables are found by solving a programming problem. There is no objective 
in this programming problem but the constraints specify that the mean and the second 
order moment about zero must match the same moments of the original distribution. In 
addition, the sum of the probabilities of occurrence of the set of vectors must be equal to 
1. The application of the Gaussian Quadrature approach to approximate the original 
distribution of yield random variables leads to 17 points or set of random variables 
vectors with positive probability (see table B.1). 
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Table B.1 States of nature of Yields (kg/ha) and their Corresponding Probabilities 
Points Cotton Maize Sorghum Millet 
New 
Sorghum Probability 
1 939 1715 1005 951 1642 0.171 
2 781 1383 846 830 1483 0.069 
3 909 1841 976 968 1613 0.128 
4 962 1621 962 918 1599 0.025 
5 1028 1364 713 716 1350 0.026 
6 1143 1727 1005 954 1642 0.089 
7 1031 1823 971 1007 1608 0.023 
8 953 1903 1090 1039 1727 0.14 
9 1009 1538 978 931 1615 0.015 
10 1111 1868 1056 1006 1693 0.072 
11 777 1207 798 785 1435 0.034 
12 1145 1800 1059 958 1696 0.047 
13 1063 1804 994 921 1631 0.037 
14 767 1896 991 979 1628 0.007 
15 1005 2040 1095 1000 1732 0.049 
16 824 1578 939 901 1500 0.034 
17 875 1941 1088 1026 1800 0.034 
 
 
 
Distribution of Prices 
In regards to the distribution of prices at the different decision periods, the 
residuals of the prices regression equations were used to construct distributions and to 
derive the probabilities associated to the states of nature. A Gaussian Quadrature 
approximation can be used also in this case to identify the probabilities of the price states 
of nature but given the 10 price observations an empirical distribution will produce 
exactly the same results as the Gaussian Quadrature approximation. Thus, the empirical 
distribution identifies each year of the 10 years period as a single state of nature, with the 
probability 1/10 attached to each outcome. Thus, 10 states of nature with a probability of 
1/10 for each event have been identified for prices at harvest, in the recovery and the lean 
seasons (see tables B.2, B.3 and B.4).  
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Table B.2 Probability Distribution of the Residuals for the Grain Harvest Prices regressed 
on Yields 
States Maize Millet Sorghum Probability 
1 17.15 52.062 18.629 0.1 
2 -10.49 -0.439 8.598 0.1 
3 -27.381 -34.372 -33.667 0.1 
4 21.602 26.859 34.321 0.1 
5 17.58 23.978 14.514 0.1 
6 -31.104 -27.889 -22.948 0.1 
7 4.114 -9.403 -4.772 0.1 
8 5.425 9.188 0.011 0.1 
9 -12.872 -24.624 -26.502 0.1 
10 15.975 -15.359 11.816 0.1 
 
 
 
Table B.3 Probability Distribution of the Residuals of Grain Recovery Prices regressed 
on Harvest Prices 
States Maize Millet Sorghum Probability 
1 -6.869 -31.622 -6.994 0.1 
2 -23.026 -41.915 -30.45 0.1 
3 23.895 39.602 28.375 0.1 
4 35.079 44.288 47.948 0.1 
5 -24.764 -2.52 -22.55 0.1 
6 -11.631 -27.275 -14.73 0.1 
7 41.447 39.939 44.667 0.1 
8 -14.632 -3.319 -11.263 0.1 
9 -13.973 -15.398 -19.578 0.1 
10 -5.526 -1.78 -15.426 0.1 
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Table B.4 Probability Distribution of the Residuals of prices in the Hungry Season 
regressed on prices in the Harvest and Price Recovery Periods 
States Maize Millet Sorghum Probability 
1 -0.831 7.423 -0.651 0.1 
2 -6.547 1.539 -7.764 0.1 
3 -10.977 -11.945 -2.708 0.1 
4 11.474 -3.798 -3.889 0.1 
5 -9.898 -8.277 -1.952 0.1 
6 -6.321 -4.041 -14.567 0.1 
7 -11.152 17.561 5.125 0.1 
8 -10.885 -5.631 -5.557 0.1 
9 7.445 -7.498 8.349 0.1 
10 37.693 14.668 23.614 0.1 
 
137 
Appendix C: Yield, Rainfall and Price Data 
 
 
 
Table C.1: Yield, Rainfall and Cotton Price Data from 1980 to 2009 
 
Years Millet 
Traditional 
Sorghum 
Improved 
Sorghum 
Maize Cotton Rainfall 
Nominal 
Cotton 
Price 
Real  
Cotton 
Price 
1980 951 1005 1642 1715 939 108 55.00 212 
1981 994 1051 1688 1846 1043 121 65.00 230 
1982 1005 1070 1707 1870 1058 119 65.00 227 
1983 951 1005 1642 1715 958 108 75.00 218 
1985 988 1048 1685 1824 970 117 85.00 207 
1986 1001 1056 1693 1871 987 125 85.00 211 
1987 913 958 1595 1606 893 101 85.00 214 
1988 1022 1082 1719 1931 1028 129 85.00 215 
1989 830 846 1483 1383 778 93 85.00 219 
1990 968 976 1613 1841 906 151 93.00 221 
1991 1001 1061 1698 1866 1070 122 95.00 235 
1992 882 914 1551 1523 826 99 85.00 209 
1993 918 962 1599 1621 957 103 97.50 233 
1994 716 713 1350 1364 1028 190 130.00 219 
1995 996 1059 1696 1843 1046 117 155.00 227 
1996 954 1005 1642 1727 1145 111 185.00 278 
1997 995 1026 1663 1893 1053 143 170.00 247 
1998 1007 971 1608 1823 1031 148 185.00 262 
1999 1039 1090 1727 1903 953 123 150.00 214 
2000 931 978 1615 1538 1009 105 170.00 224 
2001 1006 1056 1693 1868 1111 112 200.00 252 
2002 785 798 1435 1207 777 91 180.00 235 
2003 958 1059 1696 1800 1145 136 200.00 255 
2004 921 994 1631 1804 1063 98 210.00 255 
2005 983 989 1626 1773 798 113 160.00 188 
2006 979.4 991 1628 1896 767 152 165.00 184 
2007 1000 1095 1732 2040 1005 138 160.00 174 
2008 901 939 1500 1578 825 102 200 200 
2009 1026 1088 1800 1941 875 129 170.00 164 
Mean 953 996 1633 1745 967 121 133 222 
 
Note: data in bold are real data from the region of Sikasso in 1994 discounted by a percentage to 
reflect the yields in Koutiala. The discount rates are bias observed between yields of Koutiala and 
Sikasso from 1998 to 2007. Over this time period, yields of millet in Sikasso are on average 7 
percent higher than millet yields in Koutiala. Sorghum and maize yields are respectively 5 
percent and 1 percent lower in Sikasso than yields in Koutiala. Those discount rates were applied 
to find the estimated yields in 1994 in Koutiala for millet, sorghum and maize.   
Data in italic are the observed yields in Koutiala from 1998 to 2007 
Data in regular font are the predicted yields obtained with the regression equations 
For the improved sorghum, we had only three years of field observations (2007 to 2009), so we 
computed first the difference in the average yield between the traditional cultivar and the 
improved one during those years. Then we found the yields of the improved sorghum for the 26 
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years with missing observations by adding this average value to the yields of the traditional 
sorghum variety. 
Rainfall data are average monthly observations in mm. 
Cotton real prices have been obtained by deflating the nominal prices using the GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) deflator index in Mali with 2008 as the base year. The resulting predicted 
cotton yields appear to be more consistent with the observed trend in yields when the GDP 
deflator is used to correct for inflation than the CPI (Consumer Price Index). 
 
 
 
Table C.2: Sorghum Real Prices from 1998 to 2008 
 
Years Harvest Season Recovery Season Hungry Season 
  Prices Prices Prices 
1998 119 135 124 
1999 80 73 65 
2000 65 117 153 
2001 114 185 202 
2002 157 157 115 
2003 56 65 72 
2004 90 158 196 
2005 96 108 103 
2006 69 73 93 
2007 82 90 120 
2008 80 109 138 
Mean 92 115 126 
Note: Prices have been deflated with GDP deflator by using 2008 as the base year. 
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Appendix D: GAMS Model 
 
 
 
*%%%%% Jeanne DSP model%%%%%%% 
*1. Finding the probabilities of the different states of nature 
 
Option 
limrow=0 
limcol=0 ; 
 
Sets 
 
inp input for crops /npkc, ureac, herb, insect,seedc,npkm,uream, seedma, seedmi,seedsor, urea2, 
dap,seedntso/ 
 
lper labor period /L1*L10 / 
 
crop all crops in the model /cot,maiz,mil,sorg/ 
 
grain(crop) grain consumed in the household hold / mil, sorg, maiz/ 
 
cropact all crop activities used in the model / trdct, trdma, trds, trdmi,ntso/ 
*trdct=traditonal cotton, trdma=traditonal maize, trds=traditional sorghum, trdmi= traditional 
millet, Ntso=new technology for sorghum 
trad(cropact) traditional activities /trdct, trdma, trds, trdmi/ 
gtrad(trad) traditional activities except cotton / trdma, trds, trdmi/ 
 
t time period /t1*t29/ 
*time from 1980  to 2009 with 1984 dropped 
ty(t) subset time period when we have real yield data /t18*t27/ 
*time from 1998 to 2007 
sy(t) subset time period when yield probabilities is not equal to 
zero/t1,t9,t10,t13,t14,t16,t18,t19,t20,t21,t22,t23,t24,t26,t27,t28,t29/ 
labor family labor /male, female, child/ 
alias (cropact,j),(trad,trd),(grain,gr) ; 
alias (ty,ty1,ty2,ty3); 
 
 
 
 
 
Table outmap(cropact,crop) Which crop activities produce which crops 
         cot  maiz  mil   sorg 
trdct     1 
trdma           1 
trds                              1 
trdmi                 1 
ntso                                1 ; 
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Parameter 
 
table yield(t,*) predicted and real yield data in kg per ha 
            trdmi        trds         trdma         trdct        ntso 
t1          951        1005        1715          939         1642 
t2          994        1051        1846        1042         1688 
t3        1005       1070         1870        1058         1707 
t4          951        1005        1715          963         1642 
t5          988        1048        1824          969         1685 
t6        1001        1056        1871          990         1693 
t7          913          958        1606          895         1595 
t8        1022        1082        1931        1026         1719 
t9          830          846        1383          781         1483 
t10        968          976        1841          909         1613 
t11       1001       1061        1866        1068         1698 
t12         882         914        1523          828        1551 
t13         918         962        1621          962        1599 
t14         716         713        1364        1028        1350 
t15         996        1059       1843        1046        1696 
t16         954        1005       1727        1143        1642 
t17         995        1026       1893        1053        1663 
t18        1007         971       1823        1031        1608 
t19        1039       1090       1903          953        1727 
t20          931         978       1538        1009        1615 
t21        1006       1056       1868        1111        1693 
t22          785         798       1207          777        1435 
t23          958        1059      1800        1145        1696 
t24          921          994       1804        1063       1631 
t25          983          989       1773         798        1626 
t26          979          991       1896         767        1628 
t27        1000       1095        2040        1005        1732 
t28          901         939        1578          824        1500 
t29        1026       1088        1941          875        1800 ; 
 
Positive Variables 
pry(t)         Probability on the t-th yield ; 
Variables 
z              Dummy objective ; 
Equation 
obj            Dummy objective definition 
prysum         Probabilities add to 1 
mu(cropact)       Means of crop yields 
sig(cropact,cropact) Covariances of crop yields ; 
obj .. z =e= 0 ; 
prysum .. sum(t,pry(t)) =e= 1 ; 
mu(cropact) .. sum(t,pry(t)*yield(t,cropact)) =e= sum(t,yield(t,cropact))/card(t) ; 
sig(cropact,j) .. sum(t,pry(t)*yield(t,cropact)*yield(t,j)) 
 =e= sum(t,yield(t,cropact)*yield(t,j))/card(t) ; 
Model GQYields / obj,prysum,mu,sig / ; 
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Option limrow=1,limcol=1 ; 
Solve GQYields using lp minimizing z ; 
scalar nstate Number of states ; 
nstate = sum(t$pry.l(t),1) ; 
display nstate ; 
yield(t,'prob') = pry.l(t) ; 
display yield ; 
 
 
Table map(cropact,crop)  Mapping from crops to grains 
          mil   sorg  maiz cot 
trdmi    1 
trds              1 
trdma               1 
trdct                               1 
*ntso            1             ; 
 
Parameter 
rainfall(t) average monthly rainfall across time periods 
/t1 108, t2 121, t3 119, t4 108, t5 117, t6 125, t7 101, t8 129, t9 93, t10 151, 
 
t11 122, t12 99, t13 103, t14 190, t15 117, t16 111, t17 143, t18 148, t19 123, 
 
t20 105, t21 112, t22 91, t23 136, t24 98, t25 113, t26 152, t27 138, t28 102, t29 129/ 
 
pcot(t) real cotton prices across time periods in F CFA per kg 
/t1 212, t2 230, t3 227, t4 218, t5 207, t6 211, t7 214, t8 215, t9 219, t10 221, 
 
t11 235, t12 209, t13 233, t14 219, t15 227 , t16 278, t17 247, t18 262, t19 214, 
 
t20 224, t21 252, t22 235, t23 255, t24 255, t25 188, t26 184, t27 174, t28 200, t29 164/; 
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Table hvprice(t,grain)  Harvest time price for grain 
            mil    sorg       maiz 
t18     153     119        96 
t19       94       80        64 
t20       82       65        67 
t21     128     114        98 
t22     170     157      130 
t23       83       56        49 
t24     109       90        84 
t25     115       96        87 
t26       82       69        62 
t27       87       82        83 
t28     104       80        86 
; 
Table rcprice(t,grain)  Recovery time price for grain 
           mil     sorg      maiz 
t18     131      135      113 
t19       69        73        64 
t20     140      117      114 
t21     185      185      157 
t22     175      157      130 
t23       74        65        60 
t24     164      158      149 
t25     126      108        96 
t26       85        73        71 
t27     103        90      101 
t28     123      109      113 
; 
Table hnprice(t,grain)  Hungry time price for grain 
          mil     sorg     maiz 
t18     119      124      100 
t19      70          65        63 
t20     167      153      120 
t21     204      202      167 
t22     153      115        79 
t23       80        72        73 
t24     210      196      148 
t25     128      103        77 
t26       93         93       88 
t27     137      120      136 
t28     156      138      120 
; 
 
Variables 
 calpha         Intercept for cotton yield 
 cbetar         Rainfall slope for cotton yield 
 cbetarr        Rainfall^2 slope for cotton yield 
 cbetap         Price slope for cotton yield 
 alpha(grain)   Intercept for harvest price of grain 
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 beta(grain)     Yield slope for price of grain 
 rpalpha(grain) Intercept for regression of recovery price 
 rpbeta(grain)  Slope for regression of recovery price 
 hpalpha(grain) Intercept for regression of hungry price 
 hphbeta(grain)  Slope for regression of hungry price for harvest price 
 hprbeta(grain)  Slope for regression of hungry price for recovery price 
 ssq            Regression sum of squares ; 
 
Equation 
lsqobj         Least squares objective ; 
lsqobj .. sum(grain,sum(ty,sqr(hvprice(ty,grain) 
  -alpha(grain)-beta(grain)*sum(cropact,map(cropact,grain)*yield(ty,cropact))))) 
  + sum(ty,sqr(yield(ty,'trdct')-calpha-cbetar*rainfall(ty) 
  -cbetarr*sqr(rainfall(ty))-cbetap*pcot(ty))) 
  + sum(grain,sum(ty,sqr(rcprice(ty,grain)-rpalpha(grain) 
  -rpbeta(grain)*hvprice(ty,grain)))) 
  + sum(grain,sum(ty,sqr(hnprice(ty,grain)-hpalpha(grain) 
  -hphbeta(grain)*hvprice(ty,grain) 
  -hprbeta(grain)*rcprice(ty,grain)))) 
=e= ssq ; 
Model HPReg / lsqobj / ; 
Solve HPReg using nlp minimizing ssq ; 
Parameters 
 rhvp(ty,*)  Residuals for grain harvest prices regressed on yield 
 rrcp(ty,*)  Residuals for grain recovery prices regressed on harvest price 
 rhnp(ty,*)  Residuals for grain hungry prices regressed on harvest and recovery prices ; 
rhvp(ty,grain) = hvprice(ty,grain) 
  -alpha.l(grain)-beta.l(grain)*sum(cropact,map(cropact,grain)*yield(ty,cropact)) ; 
rrcp(ty,grain) =  rcprice(ty,grain)-rpalpha.l(grain) 
  -rpbeta.l(grain)*hvprice(ty,grain) ; 
rhnp(ty,grain) = hnprice(ty,grain)-hpalpha.l(grain) 
  -hphbeta.l(grain)*hvprice(ty,grain) 
  -hprbeta.l(grain)*rcprice(ty,grain) ; 
rhvp(ty,'prb') = 1/card(ty) ; 
rrcp(ty,'prb') = 1/card(ty) ; 
rhnp(ty,'prb') = 1/card(ty) ; 
yield(t,cropact)$(not yield(t,'prob')) = 0 ; 
 
display yield,rhvp,rrcp,rhnp ; 
 
**Deterministic prices and residuals 
Parameter 
hprice(t,ty,*); 
hprice(t,ty,grain)= 
alpha.l(grain)+beta.l(grain)*sum(cropact,map(cropact,grain)*yield(ty,cropact))+ rhvp(ty,grain); 
hprice(t,ty,'prob')= pry.l(t)*1/card(ty); 
hprice(t,ty,grain)$(not hprice(t,ty,'prob'))=0; 
Parameter 
rprice(t,ty1,ty2,*); 
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rprice(t,ty1,ty2,grain)= rpalpha.l(grain)+rpbeta.l(grain)*hprice(t,ty1,grain)+ rrcp(ty2,grain); 
rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'prob')= pry.l(t)*1/card(ty)**2 ; 
rprice(t,ty1,ty2,grain)$(not rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'prob'))=0; 
Parameter 
huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,*); 
huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,grain)= 
hpalpha.l(grain)+hphbeta.l(grain)*hprice(t,ty1,grain)+hprbeta.l(grain)*rprice(t,ty1,ty2,grain)+rhn
p(ty1,grain); 
huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,'prob')= pry.l(t)*1/card(ty)**3  ; 
huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,grain)$(not huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,'prob'))=0; 
display hprice,rprice,huprice; 
 
Parameters 
 
Table inpuse (cropact,inp) quantity of inputs used per activity 
*seed= kg/ha; npk=kg/ha;  urea=kg/ha; herb=lt/ha;  insect=lt/ha  manure=kg/ha 
 
             seedc    seedma  seedsor  seedntso seedmi   npkc   ureac   urea2   herb  insect dap  npkm   
uream 
trdct        30       0     0          0      0       150     50      0      3      5     0      0      0 
trdma         0      20     0          0      0        0       0      0      2      0     0     100     100 
trds          0       0     9          0      0        0       0      0      0      0     0      0      0 
trdmi         0       0     0          0      5        0       0      0      0      0     0      0      0 
ntso          0       0     0          10     0        0       0      50     0      0     50     0      0  ; 
 
 
 
Table labusec (cropact,lper) qty of labor used on crop activity 
 
*unit of labuse: pde=person day equivalent, 1pde=8 hours of work by an adult 
* Human labor period definition see Coulibaly (1995) 
*for the definition of the labor period, see Appendix IV in Coulibaly (1995) 
*the definition of the labor periods vary per crop 
*cot: L1=manure spray, L2= ridging, L3= seeding1 , L4=insecticide spray, L5= weeding and 
fertil appl, 
*L6= herbicide spray,  L7= weed2 (is zero because no 2nd manual weeding but with animal 
traction), L7= mounting, L8= harvest L9= harvest 
*maize: L1=manure spray, L2=ridging and seeding1, L4=fert&weeding1, L5=weeding2, 
L6=mounting, L7=harvest, L8=harvest 
*sorg and mil : L1=manure spray, L2=ridging, L3=seeding1, L4=seeding2&thining, 
L5=weeding, L6=weeding, L7=weeding, L8=mounting, L9=harvest, L10=harvest 
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               L1     L2    L3    L4     L5    L6    L7    L8    L9      L10 
trdct       24      51     6       8      72     5      0       26    280    149 
trdma     30      51     0      58     50    51    20   210      0         0 
trds         0       36     10    14     17     4      10    58      20      105 
trdmi      0       36     10    14      17    4      10    58      20      105 
ntso       24      36     10    14      17    4      10    58      20      105; 
 
 
Table labavail (labor,lper) family labor availability 
*Adult members are composed of adult males, females and child labor 
*labor are expressed in person day equivalent, 1 pde=8 hours 
*Male adult works an average of 8 hours per day 
*Female adult works an average of 6 hours a day, women are only available for planting, thinning 
and harvesting 
*Child works an average of 4 hours per day 
 
 
                 L1     L2    L3      L4     L5    L6    L7    L8     L9      L10 
Male      208    104   104     96     96     72    120   208    208     208 
Female    156    78    78      72     72    54     90    156    156     156 
Child      104    52     54      48     48    32     60    104    104     104  ; 
 
 
Parameter 
 
hirew(lper)  wage (F CFA per day)  hired labor 
/L1 500,  L2 500,  L3 500,  L4 500,  L5 500,  L6 500,  L7 500,  L8 500, L9 500,  L10 500/ 
 
*incost(inp) /npk 268, urea1 268, herb 2888, insect 4510, seedc 34.5, seedma 400, seedmi 400, 
seedsor 400,urea2 300, dap 340,seedntso 120/ 
*Inputs Prices 2008 
*incost(inp) /npkc 369, ureac 380, npkm 351,uream 380, herb 4500, insect 4510, seedc 34.5, 
seedma 400, seedmi 400, seedsor 400,urea2 350, dap 720,seedntso 120/ 
*Subsidized fert for sorgh=518, noS=615 
*scenario  P=231, all else constant 
*incost(inp) /npkc 334, ureac 344, npkm  318,uream 344, herb 4078, insect 4088, seedc 31, 
seedma 363, seedmi 363, seedsor 363, urea2 317, dap 653,seedntso 109/ 
*scenario  P=231,and fertilizer cost changed 
incost(inp) /npkc 243, ureac 243, npkm  243,uream 243, herb 4078, insect 4088, seedc 31, 
seedma 363, seedmi 363, seedsor 363, urea2 243, dap 486,seedntso 109/ 
 
*scenario removal of fertilizer subsidy fertilizer cost at the 2011 market prices 
*incost(inp) /npkc 342, ureac 303, npkm 335, uream 303, herb 4078, insect 4088, seedc 31, 
seedma 363, seedmi 363, seedsor 363, urea2 303, dap 671,seedntso 109/ 
 
*Inputs Prices 2008 and subsidized fertilizer price for all crops 
*incost(inp) /npkc 243, ureac 243, npkm 243,uream 243, herb 4500, insect 4510, seedc 34.5, 
seedma 400, seedmi 400, seedsor 400,urea2 243, dap 486,seedntso 120/ 
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Qstock1(crop) initial stock of grain at the begining of the planting season 
/ cot 0, mil 1200, sorg 1500, maiz 1000/ 
farmlab(labor) number of active family member /male 4, female 3, child 3/ 
exrcprice(crop)/ cot 222, mil 125, sorg 115, maiz 106/ 
 
mincons1 minimum household requirement in stage 1 /5103/ 
mincons2 minimum household requirement in stage 2 /3645/ 
mincons3 minimum household requirement in stage 3 /2916/ ; 
 
Parameter  Joint(t,ty,ty,ty) ; 
Joint(t,ty1,ty2,ty3)=pry.l(t)* 1/card(ty1)*1/card(ty2)*1/card(ty3); 
 
Scalar 
*Scalar for the first stage 
Icap1  initial capital /365000/ 
hhexp1 Household expenditures in the first stage /136240/ 
hhexp2 Household expenditures in the second stage /110000/ 
hhexp3 Household expenditures in the third stage /136240/ 
Harvreq harvest income requirement /163000/ 
pricecot announced cotton price /231/ 
 
Land1 constraint /12/ 
*Land constraint for millet 
Land2 constraint /3/ 
socred /150000/ 
intrest/0.30/ 
land /15/ 
 
taum/0.20/ 
taus/0.32/ 
taumi/0.23/; 
 
Positive Variables 
cons1(crop)           Quantity of grain consumed during the agricultural season (kg) 
Qsale1(crop)          Quantity of grain sold at the beginning of the planting season (kg) 
Qpurch1(crop)         Quantity of grain purchased at the beginning of the planting season (kg) 
Qtrans1(crop)         Quantity of grain transferred from planting to the end of harvest (kg) 
Cashtrans1             Amount of cash transferred from the first period to the second one (F CFA) 
Xha(cropact)           Area of land allocated to the different crops (ha) 
totinp(inp)          Total quantity of purchased inputs used for the traditional technologies (kg) 
Hlab(lper)             Agricultural labor hired on farm (man hours) 
agprod(t,crop)        Harvest crop production (kg) 
cons2 (crop,t,ty)     Quantity of grain consumed during the second period by yield and harvest 
price state of nature (kg) 
Qsale2(crop,t,ty)     Quantity of crop sold at harvest by yield and harvest price state of nature (kg) 
Qpurch2 (crop,t,ty)    Quantity of grain purchased at harvest by yield and price state of nature 
(kg) 
Qtrans2(crop,t,ty)    Quantity of grain transferred from harvest to the recovering period by yield 
and harvest price state of nature 
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Cashtrans2(t,ty)        Amount of cash transferred from harvest to the recovering period by yield 
and harvest price state of nature 
Cons3(grain,t,ty,ty)  Quantity of grain consumed during the third  period (kg) 
Qsale3 (grain,t,ty,ty) Quantity of grain sold at the end of the recovering period by yield harvest 
price and recovering price state of nature (kg) 
Qtrans3(grain,t,ty,ty) Quantity of grain transferred from the recovering period to the hungry 
season by yield harvest price and recovering price state of nature (kg) 
Cashtrans3(t,ty,ty)     Amount of cash transferred from the recovering period to the hungry season 
by yield harvest price and recovering price state of nature (kg) 
 
Variable 
Eprofit               Expected profit 
 
; 
Equations 
 
GRAINBAL1                          Grain balance for the first period 
GRAINCONS1                       Grain consumption first period 
CASHBAL1                            Cash balance for the first period 
LANDCROP1                          Land constraint for cotton, sorghum and maize 
LANDCROP2                          Land constraint for millet 
INUSE(inp)                              Input used constraint 
FARMLABAV(lper)                Farm labor availability 
GRAINBAL2                            Grain balance for the second period 
APROD(crop,t)                          Agricultural production 
GRAINCONS2(t,ty)                  Grain consumption second period 
CASHBAL2(t,ty)                       Cash balance second period 
GRAINBAL3(grain,t,ty,ty)       Grain balance third period 
GRAINCONS3(t,ty,ty)              Grain consumption third period 
CASHBAL3(t,ty,ty)                   Cash balance third period 
OBJECTIVE                               Linear objective 
HARVINC(t,ty)                          Harvest income constraint 
GRAINCONSS(crop,t,ty)          Grain consumption constraint related to agricultural production 
COTONCRED(t)                       Cotton credit 
NTSOCRED(t,ty,ty)                   Improved sorghum credit 
GRINK                                       Improved sorghum credit constraint 
LIMPURCH2(crop,t,ty)              Limit on grain purchase second period 
 
; 
GRAINBAL1 (crop)$(ord(crop) gt 1).. cons1(crop)+ Qsale1(crop)+ Qtrans1(crop)=l= 
Qstock1(crop)+ Qpurch1(crop); 
GRAINCONS1..sum((crop)$(ord(crop)gt 1), cons1(crop))=G= mincons1 ; 
 
variable icap ; 
positive variable borrow(t,ty); 
CASHBAL1.. hhexp1 + sum((cropact)$((ord(cropact)gt 2)and(ord(cropact)lt 
5)),sum((inp)$((ord(inp)gt 7)and (ord(inp)lt 11)), Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp))) 
 + exrcprice('sorg')*1.24*Qpurch1('sorg') + 
exrcprice('mil')*1.23*Qpurch1('mil')+exrcprice('maiz')*1.37*Qpurch1('maiz')+Cashtrans1 =l= 
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*Icap+ sum(crop $(ord(crop)gt 1),exrcprice(crop)*Qsale1(crop)) ; 
Icap1+ sum(crop $(ord(crop)gt 1),exrcprice(crop)*Qsale1(crop)) ; 
 
LANDCROP1.. sum(cropact$(not(ord(cropact)eq 4)),Xha(cropact))=L= Land1; 
*Land constraint for millet 
LANDCROP2..Xha('trdmi')=L= Land2; 
INUSE(inp)..sum(cropact, inpuse(cropact,inp)*Xha(cropact))=E= totinp(inp); 
 
FARMLABAV(lper)..sum(cropact,labusec(cropact,lper)*Xha(cropact)) =l= 
sum(labor,labavail(labor,lper)*farmlab(labor))+ Hlab(lper); 
 
positive variable borrow(t,ty); 
*Constraints for the second period (End of December-May) 
 
GRAINBAL2(crop,t,ty)$((ord(crop)gt 1)and(sy(t)))..cons2(crop,t,ty)+ Qsale2(crop,t,ty)+ 
Qtrans2(crop,t,ty) =l= 
 Qtrans1(crop)+agprod(t,crop)+ Qpurch2(crop,t,ty); 
 
APROD(crop,t)$sy(t).. agprod(t,crop)=E= 
sum(cropact,outmap(cropact,crop)*yield(t,cropact)*Xha(cropact)); 
 
 
GRAINCONS2(t,ty)$sy(t)..sum((crop)$(ord(crop)gt 1),cons2(crop,t,ty))=G=mincons2; 
 
CASHBAL2(t,ty)$sy(t).. hhexp2 + hprice(t,ty,'mil')*1.38*Qpurch2('mil',t,ty)+ hprice(t,ty,'sorg') 
 *1.39*Qpurch2('sorg',t,ty)+ hprice(t,ty,'maiz')*1.40*Qpurch2('maiz',t,ty)+Cashtrans2(t,ty) 
+ sum(lper,Hlab(lper)*hirew(lper))+sum((cropact)$(ord(cropact)lt 3),sum((inp)$(ord(inp)lt 8), 
Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp)))=l= 
 hprice(t,ty,'mil')*Qsale2('mil',t,ty)+ hprice(t,ty,'sorg')*Qsale2('sorg',t,ty)+ 
hprice(t,ty,'maiz')*Qsale2('maiz',t,ty)+ Cashtrans1+pricecot*agprod(t,'cot')  ; 
 
*Harvest income requirement 
HARVINC(t,ty)$sy(t)..hprice(t,ty,'mil')*Qsale2('mil',t,ty)+ hprice(t,ty,'sorg')*Qsale2('sorg',t,ty)+ 
hprice(t,ty,'maiz')*Qsale2('maiz',t,ty)+ pricecot*agprod(t,'cot') =G= harvreq; 
 
COTONCRED(t)$sy(t)..pricecot*agprod(t,'cot') =G= sum((cropact)$(ord(cropact)lt 
3),sum((inp)$(ord(inp)lt 8), Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp))); 
 
LIMPURCH2(crop,t,ty)$((ord(crop)gt 1)and(sy(t)))..Qpurch2(crop,t,ty) =L= cons2(crop,t,ty)-
Qtrans1(crop); 
*Constraints of the third period (End of May-September) 
 
GRAINBAL3(grain,t,ty1,ty2)$sy(t).. cons3(grain,t,ty1,ty2)+ Qsale3(grain,t,ty1,ty2) 
 + Qtrans3(grain,t,ty1,ty2) =l= Qtrans2(grain,t,ty1)+ Qpurch3(grain,t,ty1,ty2); 
 
GRAINCONS3(t,ty1,ty2)$sy(t)..sum(grain,cons3(grain,t,ty1,ty2)) =G= mincons3; 
 
CASHBAL3(t,ty1,ty2)$sy(t).. hhexp3 + Cashtrans3(t,ty1,ty2)+ rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'mil') 
149 
 *1.22*Qpurch3('mil',t,ty1,ty2)+ rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'sorg')*1.23*Qpurch3('sorg',t,ty1,ty2)+ 
rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'maiz') 
 *1.27*Qpurch3('maiz',t,ty1,ty2)+ 1.12*(sum((cropact)$(ord(cropact)eq 5),sum((inp)$(ord(inp)gt 
10), Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp)))) 
   =l= sum(grain,rprice(t,ty1,ty2,grain)*Qsale3(grain,t,ty1,ty2))+ Cashtrans2(t,ty1) ; 
 
 
NTSOCRED(t,ty1,ty2)$sy(t)..rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'sorg')*agprod(t,'sorg') =G= 
sum((cropact)$(ord(cropact)eq 5),sum((inp)$(ord(inp)gt 10), 
Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp))); 
 
 
GRINK.. sum((cropact)$(ord(cropact)eq 5),sum((inp)$(ord(inp)gt 
10),Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp)))=L=socred; 
 
*Expected profit 
 
 
OBJECTIVE.. Eprofit =E= sum(t$sy(t),sum(ty1,sum(ty2,sum(ty3, huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,'prob') 
 *(sum(grain,huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,grain)*Qtrans3(grain,t,ty1,ty2))+Cashtrans3(t,ty1,ty2)))))); 
 
Model Expprofit 
/GRAINBAL1,  CASHBAL1, LANDCROP1, LANDCROP2,INUSE, FARMLABAV, 
GRAINBAL2, APROD, CASHBAL2, GRAINBAL3, 
HARVINC, 
COTONCRED, 
GRINK , 
LIMPURCH2, 
NTSOCRED, 
CASHBAL3, OBJECTIVE, 
GRAINCONS1, GRAINCONS2, GRAINCONS3/ ; 
cashtrans3.up(sy,ty1,ty2) = 10000000 ; 
qtrans3.up(grain,sy,ty1,ty2) = 1000000 ; 
 
*Qsale3.fx(grain,sy,ty1,ty2)=0; 
Qsale3.fx('maiz',sy,ty1,ty2)=0; 
Qsale3.fx('mil',sy,ty1,ty2)=0; 
xha.fx('ntso') = 0 ; 
*Solve Expprofit using lp minimizing icap ; 
*Qsale3.fx('sorg',t,ty1,ty2)=0; 
 
Solve Expprofit using lp maximizing Eprofit ;
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